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TRANSCRIPT
IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER

By: Dan Kahan
I. Introduction...................................................................7
II. Keynote Address........................................................10
I. Introduction

PROFESSOR PENNY WHITE: Good morning.
Thank you so much for coming to the annual symposium of
the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy. My name is Penny
White, and I have the distinguished opportunity to faculty
advise this law [journal], the Tennessee Journal of Law and
Policy. And that's why I am here today. I get the experience
of working with incredible students at the College of Law.
And one of those is Sean Francis, who is this year's
Symposium Editor. I'm going to turn it over to Sean who will
introduce our keynote address speaker. However, as you all
know Micki, I have reminders for you from Micki before we
get started.
Reminder number one, because of the crowd some of
you will be sending in your big $25 check for CLE fees later.
That's fine. But if you don't turn in your attendance report
before you leave today, she will not give you credit. So you
have that separate attendance report. Be sure and make sure


Dan Kahan is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law and Professor
of Psychology at Yale Law School. In addition to risk perception, his
areas of research include criminal law and evidence. Prior to coming to
Yale in 1999, Professor Kahan was on the faculty of the University of
Chicago Law School. He also served as a law clerk to Justice Thurgood
Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court (1990–91) and to Judge Harry
Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
(1989–90). He received his B.A. from Middlebury College and his J.D.
from Harvard University.
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Micki gets that before you leave.
Secondly, we don't apologize for the crowd, we're
delighted by the crowd. But the reason that we do not have
an overflow room with this on a television for you and others
to watch is that we simply don't have enough space at the
College of Law today with all the classes going on to have
an overflow room. So I hope you won't be too
uncomfortable, and I hope you'll just still be glad that you
came even after a crowded day.
So with no more ado, Sean Francis, who has put this
thing together.
MR. SEAN FRANCIS: I would like to echo
Professor White. The turnout is great. We're very happy to
have all of you here. As she said, my name is Sean Francis.
I'm the Symposium Editor for the Tennessee Journal of Law
and Policy.
If I may, I would like to get just a few thank-yous
out of the way. Of course, I would like to thank the
University of Tennessee College of Law. They provided
these facilities here for us to have the symposium. Without
them, we would be meeting at a Waffle House somewhere
and it would not be nearly as nice, so we appreciate that.
Along that same vein, I would like to thank Micki
Fox, the CLE director. You guys know how much work she
puts into these things; the registrations, the fees, putting
together the credits for you guys, getting the verification for
CLE for the credits. All of that is Micki, and more. So we
definitely thank her for her help. I would also like to thank
Jeff Groah, our audio/visual guy. He's back there in the back
making sure everything is working well. If anything goes
wrong, you can blame him, so get a good look at his face.
It's not my fault.
And then I would also like to thank the Advocacy
and Dispute Resolution Center. They're the ones who
provided the financial backing for all of this. They funded
[8]
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the little snacks that we have for you guys. All of the fees
and registration that we had for this, all of that was them. So
we would like to thank them.
And, finally, we would like to thank the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy. They provided the manpower
behind all of this. They organized all of this. And without
them, none of this would have been possible. So if I can have
just a short plug for the Journal, it was established in 2004.
It produces twice yearly publications on the subject of law
as it intersects with decision-making or policy-making. So
any of you who work with lawmakers or who are lawmakers,
or who work in the policy-making arena, it's a really great
resource for all of you. And even if you don't, you're just
interested in those topics, I would encourage you to check
out the editions that we have out and the future editions that
we will publish.
One more short housekeeping note about the
schedule today. So the morning session—I'll just go over
that now. We'll begin with Professor Kahan's address here in
a few minutes after I introduce him. After which, we'll have
a short fifteen minute break. And then we'll have a panel of
experts and practitioners in the field of law who will come
up and react to his speech and answer questions from the
audience. So, please, think of your questions as they speak
and as Professor Kahan speaks, and feel free to ask as many
questions as you might have.
So without any further ado, I would like to introduce
Dr. Dan Kahan. He is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of
Law and Psychology at the University—at Yale University
College of Law. He is also a member of the Cultural
Cognition Project, which is a group of scholars who seek to
analyze the impact of group values on perceptions and
related facts.
And that's what he has generally come here to speak
to us about today. So I would like to ask you to join me in
welcoming Dr. Dan Kahan.
[9]
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II. Keynote Address

PROFESSOR DAN KAHAN: It was really just an
honor to receive the invitation. And I want to thank the
Journal and also Penny for giving me this opportunity. And
actually, everybody has been really nice to me since I got
here. And I'm sure that that reflects a sort of friendship
[indiscernible]. [Laughter.] It's really great to have that kind
of relationship with you.
Now, I saw what's been going on here just a little bit
in today's politics, and it made me realize that really, if you
want to get people to listen to you, you have to make a really
bold claim. Right. So I'm going to make three really bold
claims. Kind of give me a chance here and don't all rush me
[indiscernible] that way. But one of them that's especially
bold is that judges and lawyers, they don't see things the way
that ordinary people do. Now, you're already kind of saying,
come on. And so I'll just add a little proviso. They don't see
things the way that the public does, well, except when they
do.
Now, the second claim, bold claim, this is generally
a good thing, that judges and lawyers think differently from
ordinary people. You know, just give me a chance here and
I'll qualify it a little. It's generally good, but sometimes it can
also be bad. So those are my three very bold claims. And I'm
going to make out these claims by going through a series of
studies with you. And the first one actually has to
acknowledge that it has roots in Tennessee. It's a study that
initially we pretested within Justice Koch's fellow members
of the Inns of Court in Nashville. So I don't know if that
disqualifies him from being on the jury, actually the judge,
the work.
Now, the paper that reports the results of this study
has a title based off protests, which is an allusion to a famous
study conducted in the 1950s where the researchers asked
students from two rival colleges to watch the tape of the
[10]
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football game between their two schools and decide whether
the referee had made the right call or the wrong call on
certain disputed calls during the game. And what they found
is that the students from Dartmouth, they were all convinced
that the official must be a referee of Princeton or something,
he was so biased. And whereas the students from Princeton,
they said, you know, what's going on? Did they bribe the
referee? We can't believe he's this unfair. Right. So the
students were conforming what they saw on the tape
essentially to their institutional affiliation. And this is what's
referred to in psychology as identity protective cognition.
People are going to selectively credit the information with
the arguments of the judgments about the credibility of the
speaker, it could be the quality of scientific data, to the
interest of some kind of special group. They're going to do
that because they want to maintain their standing and status
in the group. And if you take positions that are contrary to
the other group members, well, then sometimes they might
look down on you. Right. So this is identity protective
cognition. And what we wanted to do was see whether this
might actually apply in law.
But by the way, don't you see the one from
Tennessee, he's clearly out of bounds. Right. I mean, I see it,
so. But we thought, well, does this identity protective
cognition actually influence how fact finders in law are
performing their duties? So we took a sample, not of judges
and lawyers as we did that day at the Inns of Court with Dean
Koch, but just ordinary individuals. Two hundred people
who were drawn from a Nashville panel, the kind of people
who might be on a jury. And we told them, imagine you are
on a jury and it's a suit by political protestors against the
police, that a political protestor said that the police violated
their First Amendment rights when they ordered them to end
their demonstration. And the police on the other hand said
that they weren't violating the First Amendment rights of the
protestors. The protestors had crossed the line from speech
[11]
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to intimidation, that they were waving their signs in a
menacing fashion at passersby, screaming in their face.
That's not protected by the First Amendment. And blocking
access to the building that you see in the background.
Now, we have an experimental component in this
study. We told half the people that the protest was happening
at an abortion clinic and that the protestors were against the
right to an abortion. And we told the other half of the sample
that this demonstration was at a college recruitment center,
and that the demonstrators were expressing their opposition
to excluding gay and lesbian individuals from the military. I
see we have some younger people, that's well before your
time. Actually, that used to be the policy of the United States.
It got changed. But we did our—we collected our data before
President—then President Obama had changed that.
There were also laws that were specific to each one
of the two conditions, right, so that the subject—study
subjects for the abortion clinic condition, they were to apply
a statute that says it's illegal to interfere with, to obstruct or
intimidate or threaten people who are trying to access a
facility where abortions are being given. And the police have
the power if people—they see people doing that, to disperse
them or else arrest them. And then similarly in the
recruitment center condition, anybody who was interfering,
intimidating, blocking or what have you, the access to a
facility where military recruitment is going on, they're
breaking the law and the police can stop that too.
Now, there was one other thing that we measured
here; the cultural worldviews and problems of our subjects
and just preferences about how society should be organized
along
two
different
dimensions,
individualism,
communitarianism, hierarchy, and egalitarianism. And we
measure that by having the subjects respond with a graded
scale to statements, do they agree with them or disagree with
them and how strongly. Things like, it's not the government's
business to try to protect people from themselves. It's kind
[12]
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of an individualistic sensibility, or the government should
put limits on the choices the individuals can make so that
they don't get in the way of what's good for society. You're
more collectivist if you agree with that, that our society
would be better off if the distribution of wealth is more equal
than to egalitarian. And then something like this, society as
a whole has become too soft and feminine. Now, that's kind
of a traditionalist view.
So that's how we measured the cultural outlooks.
And for our purposes, the communities who have these
combinations of values that are reflected in the twodimensional representation of the cultural worldviews,
they're performing the same functions in our experiment as
the students' college affiliations did, and they saw a gain,
right. These are the groups who share these values with
respect to which people are going to be judging by disputed
evidence, in order to find that the status of their group in
competition with other groups is actually predominant.
You have here the lawsuit by people who have
distinctive, very strongly held and contested political
positions, and that's going to put pressure on the study
subjects to conform what they're seeing when they watch the
tape to the outcome that's consistent with what their own
group's values are.
And so here's what we saw. In the abortion clinic
condition, the egalitarian individualists, they formed
rather—well, they formed attitudes that were anti-protestor,
like—either like egalitarian—kind of like libertarians. In
their view, the police didn't go too far and shouldn't be
enjoined from stopping this kind of demonstration in the
future because of that, like the abortion protestors, that's
what they thought they were, had crossed the line from
speech to intimidation.
The higher up communitarians, in contrast, they
thought that the police had clearly gone too far. And these
are people who have more traditional values. They tend to
[13]
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subscribe to the pro-life position, and for sure, the officers
should be enjoined from doing this thing again in the future.
Now, that was the response if they had been assigned to the
abortion clinic conditions.
If they were assigned to the recruitment center
condition, then they flipped around completely. All right.
And we also, of course, have the egalitarian,
communitarians, and the higher up individualists, they don't
care that much about abortion, but they were clearly very
polarized in the military recruitment condition. All right.
And the reason that they came to these conclusions
is that they actually thought they were seeing different kinds
of things. Right. People who have the—well, in any
condition, people with one set of values would disagree with
people who had other sets of values of whether, in fact, the
protestors were blocking entry to the building and whether
they were screaming in the face of onlookers. But across the
conditions, right, people with the same values were
disagreeing with each other. They are disagreeing with their
counterparts in the other condition. If you thought you were
watching the abortion condition, then you had very different
reactions from somebody who had values like you in the
military recruitment center condition.
All right. So people are conforming their
impressions to the outcome that is most in line with their
group's values. And you can see why this is going to be a
problem for the First Amendment. I don't know if you
recognize that the—does anybody get those Supreme Court
advocate trading cards? Because here's—this is a woman
who actually argued a case to the Supreme Court and won,
and her name is Shirley.1 She's from the Westboro Church,
which is a hate group, and they're very emphatic, that's
exactly what they are, who hate gays, for example. And you
see they used to go around to the funerals of soldiers who
died fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan and they would say,
1

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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well, this is vengeance by God for the United States being
too tolerant of homosexual rights. And as you can imagine,
that didn't make the parents of the soldiers feel very good.
So one of them sued the Westboro Church, right, for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and they got
some big judgment. It was reduced on appeal, but not by
much, like five million dollars. And so they're appealing to
the Supreme Court, saying this is contrary to the First
Amendment to punish us on these grounds. And, in fact, they
won. I don't think that that's really a surprise because the
theory of the case that they were—that was presented against
them, it kind of runs headlong into one of the essential pillars
of First Amendment law, the non-communicative harm
principle.
See, the Court said: “The record confirms that any
distress occasioned by the Westboro's picketing”2 —I mean,
there's clearly distress, right, people are being severely
traumatized by what they're doing. It “turned on the content
in viewpoint of the message conveyed rather than any
interference with the funeral itself.”3 And you recognize this
because you can generalize it. If you regulate people
engaged in speech activity, you have to have some goal or
interest that can be defined independently of people just not
liking the speech. It's not a cognizable harm that they were
upset by the content of the speech—I mean, clearly, here the
content of the speech is what upset the parents.
If the protestors had been saying, you know,
welcome home, thank you, we appreciate your sacrifice, this
wouldn't have happened. But if the harm is one that can be
defined independently of First Amendment, then there's
room for regulation. Interference with the funeral itself,
right, they're blocking the procession and may be hitting
people over the head with the sign, you can define the harm
that's being inflicted there independently of whatever point
2
3

Snyder, 562 U.S. at 457.
Id.
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they were trying to make by speaking, or even whether they
were speaking at all. All right.
So we have—have this important First Amendment
principle. It's reflected in the two laws that I showed you.
They're trying to identify the kinds of non-communicative
harm that people can suffer when they're subject to
intimidation and threatening and so forth.
But here's the problem, right, if when fact finders
are trying to determine whether the conditions of those laws
are consistent with the First Amendment have been satisfied,
their perceptions are going to be sensitive to the values of the
protestors. They're more readily going to find the noncommunicative harm principle to be satisfied when they
don't like the message of the protestors than when they do.
So in making these kinds of factual determinations under the
influence or pressure of identity protective cognition, they're
actually recreating a legal regime that determines whether
people can engage in protests based on the values that they
have. And that's really going to be a—prove to be a problem
for the First Amendment. And some people think that's what
the Supreme Court or even state courts are doing, they're
being too political, maybe because they're reasoning in this
way. And, I guess, you know, the question—
Did you say I could ask questions and quiz people
or—
PROFESSOR PENNY WHITE: Sure.
PROFESSOR DAN KAHAN: Do you think our
study actually supports this anxiety on the part of the public
that judges are, in fact, political in their ruling? Do you think
it does? I mean, there's one—do you think so?
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: I don't know.

[16]
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PROFESSOR DAN KAHAN: Well, I thought you
were raising your hand. You need to get into the action here.
But you see, you know, the study, I told you, we did
it on lay people. I mean, not people with any legal training,
much less judges, right. And it's not new to the law that
sometimes people are going to be biased politically and that
it might even unconsciously affect their judgments. That's
why you have strict scrutiny of laws that abridge the First
Amendment, whether it's incidentally or not to see, well,
were people really motivated by something else that they're
not expressing here? We train the prospective lawyers to be
able to apply these rules.
Now maybe—maybe the judges are going to be
affected in the same way, but it's a question begging given
that the judges that have been trained and allowed to
experience the kinds of reasoning that lawyers do. They say,
well, you must be like the public. And that's exactly what
they're going to do, they're kind of checking influences in the
public.
The only way we can figure out whether judges are
going to react similarly is to do a study with judges in it. All
right. So here's the second study. They saw a statutory
ambiguity. And in this one, we had members of the public,
students, lawyers and judges. Right. It was a fifteen hundred
member sample, and we had all of these groups so we could
kind of make some comparative judgments. And it's about
ambiguous statutes. There are two statutes. One said that you
can't deposit junk or debris in a national park. And so here
we have a national park. I guess it's running along the TexasMexico border and we have people who left water—plastic
water containers in this wildlife preserve or this national
park with the expectation that they might come back and
refill them and drink it. Well, is that depositing debris in the
protected area? All right. That's a statutory ambiguity to have
to try to figure out whether that's debris. Maybe it's not
debris, they're going to drink out of it. But maybe it is
[17]
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because, I don't know, a coyote might try to eat it and choke
or something like this. All right.
In the other—the other ambiguous statute, you have
a police officer who admittedly, knowingly distributed
confidential law enforcement material to a nongovernmental actor—that would never happen now, but it
was a hypothetical. And the question is, when the statute
says if you knowingly violate the standards and you're
guilty, do you have to prove not only that he knew that he
was distributing the confidential information to somebody
who wasn't a law enforcement official, but knew that a
violation would be something for which he could be
punished. It's a classic mistake of law problem. Right. We
see these kinds of things all the time. And sometimes it
comes out one way and it knowingly applies not to the law,
but only to the facts. And sometimes the other way, you have
to know about the law. So we had that ambiguity too.
Now, again, we had experimental manipulation
[indiscernible]. Right. These have to do with the identity of
the parties. Right. So in the first case, where the issue is
whether leaving the water—refillable water containers in the
park is to be depositing debris. In one condition, the study
was told that these were construction workers and maybe the
people who are going to build President Trump's wall. Right.
In the other condition, they were told that these were
immigrants' rights activists who were worried that when
people were trying to cross the border illegally, they might
get thirsty and want to drink from these containers.
And no matter how you feel about the motivations
of the actors, whether they're construction workers or
immigrant aide workers, it doesn't make any difference to
what the outcome is. The question is just whether when you
leave the plastic bottle, refillable bottles in the desert, you're
depositing debris.
In the second case with the disclosure, we vary the
identity of the party to whom the disclosure was being made.
[18]
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Right. So in one case, we had the officer who knew he was
distributing the confidential information, giving it to a prolife counseling center and saying, watch out, right, there's an
abortion rights advocate who is trying to apply under false
pretenses to work with you, so you better be careful. And in
the pro-choice condition, the same thing, the officer
saying—that they're telling the pro-choice facility, watch
out, there's an abortion rights advocate who is trying to apply
to sabotage your efforts. And, again, that doesn't really have
any bearing whatsoever on the legal standard. All right. You
have to determine whether his knowing violation is required
or not.
But we did expect that that manipulation, as well as
the one in the first case, could give a lot of motivation,
unconscious most likely, to construe the reading of the
statute to the position that was consistent with the identity of
the study subjects. And so we're going to see that the relative
impact of the manipulation on members of the public,
students, lawyers, and judges. And so to start with the public
and the judges, here's what we found. That in the layperson's
standpoint, you saw again that people were polarizing
depending on what condition they were in, and in ways that
were congenial—held congenial to their own cultural values.
They did that in both of these cases.
Judges, however, they weren't very different from
each other. Right. They're converging on a particular
outcome, no violation in the littering case regardless of who
it is. And the same with the disclosure case. Right. It's a
violation of the law regardless of the condition, regardless of
their values.
Now, I can have a fancy statistical model, like this,
where they put little asterisks down here that say, see, now
you know, you better believe me, or something like this. If
somebody does that, if they give you a chart like this and tell
you that their conclusions have been satisfied, demand your
money back. Right. That's what I'm going to do, have you to
[19]
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demand your money back. So what you have to do is that
this kind of information, it's not even by—it is by itself
intelligible or easy to understand for somebody who is
actually familiar with how these statistical models work. It's
come up with some way that represent what the elements of
the model mean in practical terms. All right.
So here's what I do. I use a simulation. This is kind
of how Nate Silver determines who's going to win the
election. I wouldn't say that given that he [indiscernible] job
for the last time. Right. But you plug the values into the
model that reflects whatever set of conditions you want it to
test for. Right. And maybe you say, well, I want a
hierarchical individualist that's a judge in the immigrant
rights component, the control group would end the littering
problem, and the formula—the model will spit out the
answer. Right. But it does it with a kind of spitting. It doesn't
do it with its hand. It hands out an answer with kind of a
shaky hand. Right. So it imposes a little bit of random noise
into the estimate reflecting the overall error in the model's
various components. And it does that once. And then it does
it again and again and again, about a thousand times. And
then you can represent what the entire probability
distribution is for somebody like that coming up with a
conclusion to find a violation. So the hierarchical—if they're
a hierarchical individualist in the construction group, you're
not very—well, forty percent likely to find that there was a
violation, well, plus or minus seven percent.
If you're a hierarchical individualist in the
immigrant rights condition, well, then you're much more
likely to find a violation. It's seventy-five percent. So that's
a difference in thirty-four percentage points. If you're an
egalitarian communitarian and you're in the immigrant rights
condition, it looks like you're around fifty percent. But you're
twenty-seven percentage points behind the hierarchical
individualist for whom the conviction outcome was much
more culturally congenial than it was to the egalitarian
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communitarian.
And the egalitarian communitarian in the
construction scenario, twenty-three percentage points
difference between what the egalitarian communitarian
would have found in the immigrant rights conditions. So
they're polarizing. Right. It looks a lot like the last study.
And you get similar kinds of results, polarization in the
disclosure case. Right.
Now, let's look at the judges. You see, they're all
smooshed [sic] up against each other. There's very little
difference in what's going on in the littering version of the
problem. It doesn't matter to whom—who the parties were
to the judges. Right. No significant differences. But they're
all basically of a piece—one piece of mind on what the
outcome should be in the disclosure case. So those are pretty
strong results showing that the public is subject to the
identity protective cognition kinds of influences, but the
judges aren't. And you can kind of generalize this, call this
the identity protective cognition impact.
I mean, how many percentage points more likely is
someone to find a violation if the person was assigned to the
condition in which a violation would be congenial to that
person's cultural outlooks, as opposed to the condition in
which the finding of the violation wouldn't be congenial to
that person. And it's about twenty-two percentage points for
a member of the public—twenty-two percentage points more
likely to find it's a violation if it's congenial culturally than
non-congenial. And for the judges, that's minus five percent,
plus or minus twelve percent. It's not meaningfully different
from zero. And you've got a pretty big spread between the
members of the public, twenty-seven percentage points more
likely to be influenced by the congeniality of the conditions
than are the judges.
We could look at the students and lawyers briefly.
The lawyers, they look a lot like the judges. Right. They're
basically agreeing on what the outcome should be regardless
[21]
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of their values and regardless of what condition they're
assigned to. The students, they're looking a little bit more
like members of the public. The effect isn't as big. But, you
know, that's why if there are any students here, we charge
you this much for your tuition so that you can get to be like
the lawyers and the judges and be perfectly neutral. It takes
a lot of work, at least three years of law school. So this is
the—you can do it too with simulations if you like. So judges
and lawyers don't see things the way that ordinary members
of the public do.
And I'm going to try a little experiment here because
this is relevant. What's the mechanism and what's going on?
Why should we understand judges and lawyers to be
resisting these kinds of influences? And I guess the question
in the first study, can you tell—this is a baby chick. Do you
think it's male or female? Can you tell just by looking? Do
we have any chick sexers in the audience? Well, you're
laughing, but you wouldn't be if the chick sexers all went on
strike because that would be really devastating to the poultry
industry.
You see, chick sexers, they perform this extremely
important function when the baby chick is just a few hours
old. They're segregating the male from the female ones. And
see, the female ones, well, they're going to have juicier meat.
They're going to lay eggs. The male ones, they're going to
peck at the female ones and they're not very good for eating
and they don't produce the eggs. Well, you keep a few who
lead a kind of privileged existence. The others, you're just
tossing them away. And they're coming down a conveyor
belt, okay. And if it's male, you throw it in that—and these
guys are ninety-nine percent accurate.
And what makes this kind of astonishing is there's
no visually ascertainable difference between the anatomical
parts in question for male and female chicks at this stage of
life. And you ask a chick sexer, how do you do this. And if
he's honest, he goes, I don't know, you know. Somebody else
[22]
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might say, well, I do it this way, you know, the male chick,
he always tries to distract you. And he says something like
how many games out of first place are the Red Sox, or
something like that. That's confabulation. That's not what
you're doing. And we know how somebody became an
expert chick sexer from the tutelage of a chick sexer grand
master, right. They went off and the grand master showed
them slides, male, female, female, male, male. And so finally
they developed this kind of intuitive sense of who is the male
and who is the female.
Now, this sounds kind of exotic and weird, but it's
not. In fact, it's completely mundane and ubiquitous. This is
a psychological mechanism known as pattern recognition
where you try to classify a potential instance of some thing,
like a baby chick's gender based on a mental inventory that's
richly stocked with examples because you've been doing this
for a long time, and it's all over the place. That's how we read
each other's emotions. It's how people in aerial surveillance
when they look at the photos can tell Cuba is putting
missiles—Russians are putting missiles in Cuba and maybe
it will happen again soon. Right?
But here's—what—this is what happens, you see,
when you go to the law school. Well, Karl Llewellyn had a
theory very much like this, and this is one of Dean Koch's
favorite writers. Karl Llewellyn called it situation sense,
right, that you're immersed in the—with the culture of the
law. And you start to develop these sensibilities to classify
situations and then determine what the right result is. And
that's why you get the tremendous convergence among
lawyers and judges on admittedly vague kinds of statutes.
Right? So that's what law school is. Right. It's the proximate
causation, unreasonable restraint of trade, material
misrepresentation. You keep showing the slides. You keep
showing the examples and eventually students are going to
get this kind of thing.
And that's what's going on, at least that's what I—
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the theory we had when we did this study, that there's this
kind of ingrained professional judgment that judges are
going to have because they're immersed in a certain kind of
culture that started with going to law school, but continued
after that. And, you know, that's judges seeing things
different from how ordinary members of the public do. But
we still have this little proviso, except when they don't see
things differently. And, you know, we also measure the
cultural outlooks, as I've said, of the subjects in this study.
Usually we use this measure to try to understand why people
are fighting about different kinds of risks. And so it turns out
that members of these groups, they form kind of clusters of
perceptions about risk; environmental risk, guns and gun
control, gays in the military, gay parenting, marijuana
legalization, HPV vaccination. All the kinds of hot-button
issues that you're careful when you first meet somebody and
you don't get into that until you know them a little better.
And we did that for the judges in this case. And the
public and the students, they both showed the characteristic
polarizations on the issue of whether global warming was
happening, right, but so did the lawyers and so did the
judges. And the public was divided on legalization of
marijuana. There's really not that much difference in how
students, lawyers, and judges saw things. And so you get a
sense, if the reason that judges are able to be neutral is that
they have this situation sense that is a consequence of being
immersed in the culture of the law. But when you're outside
of that domain, there's no reason to expect them to be any
different from anybody else. And that was true of our judges.
So it's a kind of domain specific immunity. It's not the—it's
not that the judges became superheroes because they're
always kind of pumping justice in the weight room or
something and they're never going to be experiencing any
bias. But when they do their job, then they apply the habits
of mind that are instinctive to what they're doing. So
sometimes they actually do see things the way the public
[24]
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does.
Now, you can see why this is generally good,
because it means that if a judge is assessing the kinds of
issues that might arise on remand in Shirley's case, whether
the protestors crossed the line on the non-communicative
harm principle, they should be able to do that pretty well.
And, in fact, that case came out eight to one in the Supreme
Court.4 And just a couple terms later, there was a Supreme
Court case in Massachusetts that had a very protective or
restrictive, depending on how you look at it, provision on
how close people can come to people at the abortion clinic
to try to influence them.5 And they said, no, you can't do that.
It was a nine to zero opinion.6 And they said you've got to
follow the kind of standards that are in the Freedom of
Access to Clinic[] [Entrances] Act, which is what's on the
right. 7 And so that's pretty good. Judges are being pretty
neutral. But here it can also be kind of bad sometimes.
And I'll give you an example, from trial
administration—and it's another study actually that we did
in Scott v. Harris8. The issue was whether when the police
use deadly force against a fleeing motorist, meaning
ramming their car into his and causing it to spin out, it's
clearly deadly force. Are they justified in using deadly force
under the Fourth Amendment under those circumstances?
And there was a video, right, of the chase. And the late
Justice Scalia said that's the scariest thing I've seen since The
French Connection,9 right, and he probably hasn't even seen
a movie since The French Connection.
And then you had Justice Stevens—you know,
4

Snyder, 562 U.S. 443.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120E (2012), invalidated by McCullen v.
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
6
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 2518.
7
Id. at 2357.
8
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
9
Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
(No. 05-1631).
5

[25]
25

Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
Justice Breyer, the same thing, said he almost wet his pants
when he saw it.10 It was terrifying. And we had one justice,
right, Justice Stevens who said, well, that didn't scare me.
That's the way it looks when I'm really in a hurry to make it
to court when you have to pass somebody on a two-lane
road.11 You know, some kind of Mr. Magoo or something
like that. I knew you guys would get that. And so, you know,
all he could do was say thank you to Justice Scalia and to
Justice Stevens because they decided that people should just
decide for themselves. And this is the first Supreme Court
decision with a hyperlink in it.12 Watch the video and decide
for yourself. They both are convinced it's going to come out
this way.
And, again, we have a model. We gave this to fifteen
hundred people. And we can simulate how different kinds of
jurors would react. Right. So you've got Ron who lives in
Arizona, and he doesn't like the government touching his
junk, right. But he's still relatively hierarchical and has
strong opinions about who should do what in the household
and so forth. And then we've got Bernie, who is a—he was
even for several years before Bernie ran for president, a
professor in Vermont who has very kind of hands-off views
about regulations. People should be allowed to use
marijuana and so forth. But if people are having trouble, the
government should help them—he's got a kind of socialist
orientation. Then there's Linda, who's a social worker in
Philadelphia and she goes along with Bernie on a lot of
issues except drugs. She thinks kids have to have more
discipline. And, finally, there's Pat; and Pat, well, is sort of
average in social outlook, average in income and average in
gender. Pat is the survey mean, right, just an average
American who doesn't exist. You see, people have opinions
that reflect who they are. And there's nobody who is just a
10

See Scott, 550 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 390 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12
Id. at 378 n.5 (majority opinion).
11
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little bit of everything. Right. Ron, very likely to agree with
the Supreme Court's outcome on the issue—the factual issue
that the driver in Scott v. Harris was posing a deadly risk to
others. Right. Then you've got Linda and Bernie who have a
little bit more noise in their simulated values. But they think
that's—no, and that's not—they're not very likely to find that
outcome. And then there's, of course, Pat. And Pat's closer
to Ron.
But here's the issue, right, whether when you have
people disagreeing like this, is the disagreement sufficiently
strong and you're just going to basically have summary
judgment, which is what the Supreme Court ruled in that
case, eight to one. Right. That it would be summary
judgment because no reasonable juror could watch the tape
and come to any other conclusion, but that this guy was a
death machine on wheels. Right. No, it's not true. People
who have different experiences, different identities, they
might come to a different outcome. Maybe they're going to
lose, you know, but the question is whether they should have
a—at least have a chance to be heard by people in the
community who don't agree with them and at least get a
chance to maybe tell them why they feel differently. It can't
be the case that summary judgment is warranted because the
views of people like Bernie and Linda are just not
reasonable. These are reasonable people.
And I think this is a consequence of—really of
situation sense. The judges don't see things the way members
of the public do. And when they have to predict what
members of the public might think, they're at a risk of error
that they're going to be imposing their own outlooks on that
prediction. They need to do a better job on that.
The second problem is I think even more
significant. I call it the neutrality communication problem.
And, again, I want to go on a little detour here and get into
science communication because my lab also studied both
kinds of issues. And we wanted to know, well, how do
[27]
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people form their understandings of scientific incentives on
these kinds of issues. So what we did was we showed them,
right, three people who look like they're pretty much experts
on their subject matters. But they're—well, they all went to
good schools. One went to a really great school. It's in my
contract. I have to say stupid things like that whenever Yale
and Harvard are on the same slide. Right. But they all went
to elite schools. They're on the faculty at these prestigious
universities. All members of the National Academy of
Sciences. And we say, well, do you think that this is a
genuine expert on the issue of climate change or, you know,
gun control or nuclear waste. Right.
And we picked those issues because we know that
people are very divided in these two cultural groups. But we
also, again, have an experimental component. We tell half
the people that the featured scientist is taking the high-risk
position, that climate change is happening and there's
consensus on it and we're going to die if we don't do
something versus the low risk. Right. The computer models,
they're subject to error. It's too early to say. We shouldn't do
anything precipitous. Right. The kinds of arguments that
they recognize.
The same thing with nuclear waste, high risk to put
the waste in deep geologic isolation. No, low risk, that's been
determined to be perfectly safe. And the same thing under
the concealed—carry concealed guns. They make crime
rates go up because more people are armed and there's going
to be accidents and there could be deadly confrontations. No,
it's going to make the crime rate go down because if you
don't know, right, whether anybody you're dealing with is
packing heat, you're kind of on your best behavior. You don't
want to piss them off or anything. You're laughing so I know
they're cultural orientation on that one. Right. Because what
happened is that people when they're making these
judgments about, is this really an expert on this issue, they're
much more likely to form the judgment that the person was
[28]
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a genuine expert when we depicted the expert as taking the
position that was dominant in their cultural group.
All right. These are [indiscernible] seventy-two
percentage points more likely to find that this is an expert
when you're an egalitarian communitarian if it's in the global
warming condition and the person says it's dangerous. Right.
Similarly [indiscernible] effects for all of these issues. Now,
this is just like, or very similar to, they saw a game. Right.
People who have these different kinds of group
commitments, they're looking at evidence that they're
drawing some issue that divided their group from another.
And they're selectively crediting it or not crediting it,
depending on whether it's consistent with their group's view.
Right.
That's why we have what I call the [indiscernible]
communication problem, the persistence of strong partisan
disagreement over issues of simple fact, right, that can be
determined by empirical methods. And in some cases, have
already been extensively studied. Right. Because you're
filtering the information in a way that will make what you
believe, what you think the facts are support your group's
position on these kinds of issues.
Now, you have that because, you see, members of
the public don't have the same kind of professional
judgment. They don't have the inventory of prototypes that
the scientists do. Right. If the scientists are perfectly neutral,
then they're not going to be seen that way by members of the
public who have these different kinds of outlooks. People
aren't going to converge on what the best evidence is.
The same thing is happening, you see, in the law.
Right. People see one of these charged issues like involving
protests, for example. And for them, their own eyes are
telling them, this is what happened. Right. And, you know,
it doesn't matter it was eight to one in Shirley's case, nine to
zero in McCullen v. Coakley.13 Okay. People are going to
13

McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
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say, how could the justices do this? How could the State
Supreme Court justices do this? How could a trial court—I
can see it with my own eyes, they must be biased. And as
these things accumulate, everybody becomes convinced that
the courts are political, even if they're not. Right. And not
surprisingly, right, whether you think that they're being
political on the liberal side, well, yes, if you're a
conservative. Or they're being political on the conservative
side, yes, if you're a liberal, but not if you're a conservative.
So you get the same kind of disagreement about whether the
court itself is being political and why.
And this can very positively account for the
declining public confidence in courts. The courts are being
political. Even if they're not, right. Well, the judges—new
proposition here, judges and lawyers need to learn to see
what ordinary members of the public see as part of their
professional craft, right. The same way—doing good
science, is that the same thing as communicating what it
means? Because doing good science depends on the kinds of
habits that modern scientists have that most of the public
don't. So you use the kinds of techniques that I have been
showing you to try to figure out how to communicate science
so that the validity of it is recognized by people who don't
have the kinds of insights that the scientists do.
Well, there's a neutrality communication problem.
No matter how impartial courts are being on these kinds of
hot-button issues, it is the case that members of the public
who don't like the results are going to see it as politically
biased. Well, we need a new science of traditional neutrality
communication. Just doing good judging doesn't by itself
certify to members of the public that it's good judging or that
it's neutral. But that's something that we ought to address
within our profession, and starting with the education of law
students.
So what should we do in that regard? Well, you tell
me. You have more understanding of this as judges, as
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practicing lawyers—you know what they say about those
who can do and those who would rather not because it's so
easy and fun to teach law, or something like that. But your
intuitions are better than mine. You know, is there something
with opinion writing? Is it the kind of common exaggeration
that we know that eight—judges in the majority says,
eighteen arguments, they all come out this way. A judge
says, eighteen arguments, they all come out that way. Right.
And maybe in a Supreme Court, which is already selecting
the cases based on whether there's disagreement about it in
the lower courts. It can't be the case, it's that simple. But they
always—the judge is always right that it is that way. Maybe
that has an impact on people who will believe that the
decision is wrong, that there's no convincing of any kind of
uncertainty. I don't know. This is what judges have told me
you might want to consider. Or maybe that you would have
some kind of additional public outreach so that people could
learn more about the decisions in terms that they could
understand and evaluate them as to whether they're neutral
or not. Maybe a judicial selection criteria should reflect
something like this. I don't know.
We should do things in legal education. Well, what?
Right. What we really need is the creation of evidence-based
capacity and practice in the judiciary. We look—where the
judges and lawyers traffic in facts, the system that we
attribute to is supposed to ascertain the truth. Well, we
should use the kinds of empirical methods that are
appropriate for assessing the performance of ourselves to see
whether we, in fact, are projecting—teaching people about
facts, ensuring that facts govern in the cases that we decide.
All right.
So you tell me what would be a good way to help
address this question, and then I'll help you by measuring
and using the same kinds of methods that I've been talking
to you about today. And that brings us to the close with the
highlight on Pat, a very important member of our project.
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I. Introduction

On July 1, 2013, Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 36.1 went into effect. 1 The stated purpose for
Rule 36.1 was straightforward: “to provide a mechanism for
the defendant or the State to seek to correct an illegal
sentence.” 2 To further effectuate that purpose, Tennessee
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 was also amended to reflect
the right of a defendant or the State to appeal an adverse Rule
36.1 ruling.3 Both purposes were designed to correct flaws
in the prior methods used to correct illegal sentences.4 But
then something strange happened. By late August of 2015,
there had been over seventy-five opinions filed by the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals dealing with Rule 36.1
motions.5 Most of these Rule 36.1 motions were “filed by
inmates in state or federal custody” long after the challenged
sentences “should have been fully served.”6 Most of these
cases involved claims “of an illegal concurrent sentence.”7
Why were large numbers of prisoners filing to correct illegal
1

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1 (2013) (amended 2016).
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1 (2013), Advisory Comm’n Cmt. (amended
2016).
3
Id.
4
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2015) (noting
that prior to the enactment of Rule 36.1 the State “had no mechanism for
seeking to correct illegal sentences”); State v. Moody, 160 S.W.3d 512,
516 (Tenn. 2005) (noting that direct appeal was not authorized for the
dismissal of a common law motion to correct an illegal sentence).
5
State v. Taylor, NO. W2014-02446-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 Tenn. Crim.
App. LEXIS 849, at *29–30 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2015)
(Holloway, J., concurring).
6
Id. at *30.
7
Id.
2
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sentences that were shorter than what had been statutorily
mandated?
The answer to that question laid in subsection (c)(3)
of the original text of Rule 36.1, which provided that if “the
illegal sentence was entered pursuant to a plea agreement”
and “the illegal provision was a material component of the
plea agreement,” the trial court was required to give the
defendant “an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea” and
to reinstate the original charge against the defendant if the
defendant chose to withdraw the plea. 8 Additionally, the
original text of Rule 36.1 simply stated that an illegal
sentence could be corrected “at any time.”9 Prisoners began
challenging sentences that had long ago expired in hopes that
they would be allowed to withdraw their pleas and,
ultimately, nullify their convictions, which had been used to
enhance other sentences. The floodgates had been opened.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals quickly
fractured over how to interpret Rule 36.1. Some members of
that court interpreted Rule 36.1 as allowing for the correction
of an illegal sentence even after it had expired. 10 Other
members of the court concluded that the doctrine of
mootness prevented Rule 36.1 from being used to challenge
8

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2013) (amended 2016). This portion of
Rule 36.1 reflects the long-standing case law in Tennessee that a
defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea when an illegal sentence
is “a material element” of the plea agreement. See, e.g., Summers v.
State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d
871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). However, the inclusion of the ability to attack the
underlying conviction in Rule 36.1 appears to be unique to Tennessee
law. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 834 (2016) (noting that,
generally, a motion to correct an illegal sentence “is not a vehicle for a
collateral attack on a conviction” and that “the relief available . . . is
correction of a sentence rather than reversal of a conviction”).
9
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) (2013) (amended 2016).
10
State v. Talley, NO. E2014-01313-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7366257,
at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2014) (Woodall, P.J., concurring in the
judgment) (stating that, to him, “‘at any time’ means what it says,
whether before or after sentences have been fully served”).
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an expired sentence. 11 In State v. Brown, the Tennessee
Supreme Court rejected both of these interpretations and
held that Rule 36.1 did not “expand the scope of relief
available for illegal sentence claims” from what would have
been available if such claims were brought in a petition for
writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, did not “authorize the
correction of expired illegal sentences.” 12 In essence, the
Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that Rule 36.1
implicitly incorporated certain procedural requirements
from the state’s habeas corpus law. With that, the floodgates
were effectively closed.
This article will examine how the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s opinions in Brown and its companion case,
State v. Wooden,13 interpreted Rule 36.1 inconsistently with
the principles of statutory construction and overlooked
significant aspects of “the jurisprudential context from
which Rule 36.1 developed.”14 Part II of this article will take
a close look at Rule 36.1 and the reasoning of the Brown and
Wooden opinions. Part III will examine the “jurisprudential
context from which Rule 36.1 developed”15 and will discuss
how it was actually much broader than described in Brown.
Part IV will look at the plain language of Rule 36.1 and how
it was inconsistent with the Court’s interpretation of the Rule
in Brown. Part V will discuss how the definition of “illegal
sentence” found in Rule 36.1 was not a definition exclusive
to “the habeas corpus context”16 as was asserted in Brown
and Wooden. Part VI will examine the potential
“unconstitutional applications of Rule 36.1”17 described in
Brown and how that concern did not apply to the facts at
issue in Brown. Part VII will address the doctrine of
11

Id. at *3.
479 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tenn. 2015).
13
478 S.W.3d 585 (Tenn. 2015).
14
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 209.
17
Id. at 211.
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mootness and how it, likewise, did not apply to the facts at
issue in Brown. Part VIII will conclude the article by looking
at the recent amendment of Rule 36.1 and how it will, for
better or worse, bring the text of Rule 36.1 into agreement
with the Brown and Wooden opinions.
II. Rule 36.1, Brown, and Wooden
A. Rule 36.1

The original text of Rule 36.1 provided that either the
defendant or the State could, “at any time, seek the
correction of an illegal sentence by filing a motion to correct
an illegal sentence in the trial court in which the judgment of
conviction was entered.” 18 An “illegal sentence” was
defined for purposes of Rule 36.1 as a sentence “that is not
authorized by the applicable statutes or that directly
contravenes an applicable statute.”19 If the motion stated a
“colorable claim” alleging an illegal sentence and the
defendant was indigent, the original text of Rule 36.1
required the trial court to appoint an attorney to represent the
defendant. 20 The movant was required to “promptly
provide[]” notice of the motion to the adverse party. 21 The
adverse party was given thirty days to file a written response
to the motion, after which the trial court was required to
“hold a hearing on the motion, unless all parties waive[d] the
hearing.”22
Subsection (c) of the original text of Rule 36.1
outlined the possible outcomes of a Rule 36.1 motion. If the
trial court ultimately determined that the sentence was not

18

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) (2013) (amended 2016).
Id.
20
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(b) (2013) (amended 2016).
21
Id.
22
Id.
19

[37]
37

Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
illegal, it was required to file an order denying the motion.23
Should the trial court determine that the sentence was illegal
but that it was not entered pursuant to a guilty plea, it was
required to enter “an amended uniform judgment document”
reflecting “the correct sentence.” 24 If the illegal sentence
was entered pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court was
then required to determine whether the illegal sentence “was
a material component of the plea agreement.”25 If the illegal
sentence was not a material component of the plea
agreement, the trial court was required to enter an amended
judgment document reflecting the correct sentence. 26
Conversely, if the illegal sentence was a material component
of the plea agreement, the trial court was required to “give
the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea,”
and if the defendant so chose, to enter an order “reinstating
the original charge against the defendant.” 27 Rule 36.1
provided both the State and the defendant with the right to
appeal from the trial court’s disposition of a Rule 36.1
motion.28
B. State v. Wooden

The Tennessee Supreme Court examined Rule 36.1
for the first time in the companion cases of State v. Wooden29
and State v. Brown.30 In Wooden, the defendant filed a Rule
36.1 motion alleging that “the trial court increased his
sentence above the statutory presumptive minimum sentence
but failed to find enhancement factors justifying the

23

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(1) (2013) (amended 2016).
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(2) (2013) (amended 2016).
25
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2013) (amended 2016).
26
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(4) (2013) (amended 2016).
27
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2013) (amended 2016).
28
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(d) (2013) (amended 2016).
29
478 S.W.3d 585, 586 (Tenn. 2015).
30
479 S.W.3d 200, 202 (Tenn. 2015).
24
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increase.” 31 The State responded by arguing that the
defendant’s “allegations were not sufficient to state a
colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1.”32 In addressing
Mr. Wooden’s argument on appeal, the court “determine[d]
the meaning of two terms used in Rule 36.1—‘colorable
claim’ and ‘illegal sentence.’”33
After noting that “Rule 36.1 does not define
‘colorable claim,’”34 the court referred to the definition of
the term used “for purposes of post-conviction relief . . . .”35
Specifically, the court noted that “colorable claim" was
defined in the post-conviction context as “a claim, in a
petition for post-conviction relief, that, if taken as true, in the
light most favorable to petitioner, would entitle petitioner to
relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.”36 The court
concluded that “the term has the same general meaning in
both [post-conviction and Rule 36.1] contexts,” and held that
“for purposes of Rule 36.1, . . . ‘colorable claim’ means a
claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most
favorable to the moving party, would entitle the moving
party to relief under Rule 36.1.”37
With respect to the term “illegal sentence,” the court
stated that the Rule 36.1 definition “mirror[ed] that
[definition] adopted” in Cantrell v. Easterling, which
“defin[ed] the term for purposes of habeas corpus petitions
seeking correction of illegal sentences.” 38 The court held
that “the definition of ‘illegal sentence’ in Rule 36.1 . . .
[was] coextensive with, and not broader than, the definition
of the term in the habeas corpus context,” and that holding
31

Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 587.
Id. at 589.
33
Id. at 587.
34
Id. at 592.
35
Id.
36
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TENN. SUP. CT. R. 28,
§ 2(H)).
37
Id. at 593.
38
Id. at 594.
32
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otherwise would require it “to ignore the plain language of
Rule 36.1 and of Cantrell.”39 The court ultimately concluded
that Mr. Wooden’s allegations were “insufficient to state a
colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1”40 because even if
the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence, it was still
“statutorily available for the offense of which he was
convicted” and, therefore, not illegal.41
C. State v. Brown

In Brown, the defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion alleging:
[T]hat his sentences [were] illegal because . .
. the trial court failed to award him pretrial
jail credit[,] . . . the trial court imposed sixyear sentences . . . when his plea agreement
called for three-year sentences[,] . . . and[,]
[like the defendant in Wooden,] the trial court
imposed sentences above the presumptive
statutory minimum . . . without finding
enhancement factors.42
In the Brown opinion, the court framed the issues as
“whether Rule 36.1 expand[ed] the scope of relief available
for illegal sentence claims . . . [to allow for] correction of
expired illegal sentences,” and whether the failure to award
pretrial jail credit was “a colorable claim for relief . . . under
Rule 36.1.”43
Regarding the first issue, the State conceded that
“Rule 36.1 [allowed for] the correction of expired illegal
39

Id. at 594–95.
Id. at 596 (internal footnote omitted).
41
Id.
42
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 202–03 (Tenn. 2015) (internal
footnotes omitted).
43
Id. at 205.
40
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sentences” and agreed with Mr. Brown’s interpretation of
Rule 36.1. 44 The court began its analysis of the issue by
noting that the same rules used to construe statutes are used
in construing rules of procedure like Rule 36.1.45 In regard
to interpreting procedural rules, the court stated that courts
“need not look beyond the plain language [of the rule] to
ascertain [its] meaning” if “the text is clear and unambiguous
. . . .” 46 Put another way, courts “are constrained . . . to
construe the language [of a rule] in a way that is natural,
ordinary, and unforced.”47 Additionally, courts “interpret a
procedural rule in light of the law existing at the time the
procedural rule was adopted.” 48 In doing so, “courts may
presume that the [drafter] knows the ‘state of the law.’”49
After stating these rules, the court then reviewed “the
development of Tennessee law regarding the correction of
illegal sentences . . . .”50
The court noted that, generally, “a trial court’s
judgment becomes final thirty days after entry . . . [or] upon
[the] ‘entry of the order denying a new trial’” or another
specified post-trial motion,51 and that “a trial court has no
power to alter a final judgment.”52 The court also noted the
exception to this rule recognized in the 1978 case State v.
Burkhart, where the Tennessee Supreme Court “held that ‘a
44

Id. at 210.
Id. at 205 (citing State v. Johnson, 342 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Tenn. 2011)).
46
Id. at 205 (citing Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527
(Tenn. 2010)).
47
Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 808 (Tenn. 2015).
48
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 205 (citing Beecher, 312 S.W.3d at 527).
49
Beecher, 312 S.W.3d at 527 (quoting Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A.
v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2005)).
50
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 205.
51
Id. at 205–06 (quoting TENN. R. APP. P. 4(c)) (citing State v. Green,
106 S.W.3d 646, 648–49 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Peele, 58 S.W.3d 701,
704 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn.
1996)).
52
Id. at 206 (citing Green, 106 S.W.3d at 648–49; Peele, 58 S.W.3d at
704; Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837).
45
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trial judge may correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely
erroneous, sentence at any time, even if it has become
final.’”53 However, when the Tennessee Rules of Criminal
Procedure became effective in 1979, they did not “specify
any procedure for making such requests,” 54 and “the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which also became
effective in 1979, did not authorize an appeal as of right from
a trial court’s decision on a motion to correct an illegal
sentence.” 55 Instead, defendants seeking to challenge an
illegal sentence followed the procedure that was used in
Burkhart, which was to file a motion to correct the illegal
sentence in the trial court and then rely “upon the
discretionary common law writ of certiorari to seek appellate
review of trial court orders . . . .”56
After reviewing the rule and procedure found in
Burkhart, the court examined its 2005 opinion in Moody v.
State and concluded that Moody reaffirmed “the rule
announced in Burkhart—that an allegedly illegal sentence
may be challenged at any time, even after it is final,” but that
Moody rejected “the Burkhart procedure.” 57 The court
quoted the holding in Moody, stating that “the proper
procedure for challenging an illegal sentence at the trial level
[was] through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the grant
or denial of which [could] then be appealed under the Rules
of Appellate Procedure.”58 In Brown, the court reasoned that
53

Id. (quoting State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978)).
Id. (citing Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Tenn. 2011)).
55
Id. at 206 (internal footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Moody, 160
S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tenn. 2005)).
56
Id. at 206 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 515). In fact, “[t]he common
law writ of certiorari [is] codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section
27-8-101,” and is available when the trial court has acted “without legal
authority and where no other ‘plain, speedy or adequate remedy’ is
available.” Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 278-101 (2000)) (citing State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tenn. 2002)).
57
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 206 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516).
58
Id.
54
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“[b]y adopting habeas corpus as the mechanism for
challenging illegal sentences, the Moody Court implicitly
limited the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims to
unexpired illegal sentences.”59 The court reasoned this was
because habeas corpus relief is statutorily limited to persons
“imprisoned or restrained of liberty” 60 and that it had
previously held, in the habeas corpus context, that “[u]se of
the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on
a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to
permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction
long after the sentence on the original conviction has
expired.”61
The Brown opinion asserted that it was “[a]gainst this
jurisprudential backdrop” that Rule 36.1 was adopted.62 The
court then turned to the text of Rule 36.1, noting that Rule
36.1 differed “from the procedure applicable to habeas
corpus petitions challenging illegal sentences” in that it
allowed the State to seek correction of an illegal sentence
and that the motion was to be filed in the trial court where
the judgment of conviction was entered rather than the
county where the defendant was incarcerated. 63 The court
asserted that Rule 36.1 was “identical to habeas corpus in
other respects” but cited only its conclusion in Wooden to
support the proposition that definition of “illegal sentence”
in Rule 36.1 was “coextensive with, and actually mirror[ed],
the definition [the] Court [had] applied to that term in the
habeas corpus context.”64
The court also reasoned that the phrase “at any time”
had “no bearing on whether Rule 36.1 authorizes relief from
59

Id.
Id. at 206–07 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-21-101(a) (2012)).
61
Id. at 207 (quoting Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tenn.
2004)).
62
Id. at 208.
63
Id. at 209 (quoting TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)).
64
Id. at 209 (citing State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585 (Tenn. 2015)).
60
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expired illegal sentences.”65 Instead, the court asserted that
the phrase was designed to convey that illegal sentences
could be challenged even after the judgment became final
and that, like habeas corpus petitions, Rule 36.1 motions
were “not subject to any statute of limitations.”66 The court
further asserted that the phrase “at any time” “simply [did]
not answer the question of whether Rule 36.1 permit[ed] the
correction of expired illegal sentences” because “the text of
Rule 36.1 [was] silent” on this point.67 The court admitted
that “one possible interpretation of this silence [was] that
Rule 36.1 authorize[d] the correction of expired illegal
sentences . . . .” 68 However, the court rejected this
interpretation, finding that it was “not reasonable in light of
the expressed purpose of Rule 36.1, its language, and the
jurisprudential background from which it developed.”69
The court then reasoned that
Rule 36.1 was adopted “to provide a
mechanism for the defendant or the State to
seek to correct an illegal sentence.” Neither
the comments to Rule 36.1 nor its text
suggest that it was intended to expand the
scope of relief available on such claims by
permitting the correction of expired illegal
sentences. Had such an expansion been
intended, Rule 36.1 would have almost
certainly
included
language
clearly
expressing that intent, given its inconsistency
with this Court’s prior decisions refusing to
grant habeas corpus relief for expired illegal
sentences. That Rule 36.1 was not, in fact,
65

Id. at 210.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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intended to expand the scope of relief for
illegal sentence claims is evidenced by the
portion of Rule 36.1 defining “illegal
sentence” exactly as this Court had already
defined that term in the habeas corpus
context.70
The court also asserted that interpreting Rule 36.1 to
allow for the correction of expired sentences could
“potentially produce absurd, and even arguably
unconstitutional, results.” 71 The court argued that if Rule
36.1 allowed the State to correct an illegally lenient sentence
after it had been served, defendants would likely argue that
such an action would violate constitutional protections
against double jeopardy. 72 The court concluded that the
“outcry would be unimaginable” if the State were to “start
using Rule 36.1 to jail untold numbers of citizens that by all
indications [had] completely served their sentences. . . .”73
As such, the court held “that Rule 36.1 [did] not expand the
scope of relief [from what was available in a habeas corpus
proceeding] and [did] not authorize the correction of expired
illegal sentences.”74
In so holding, the court rejected the argument
propounded by some members of the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals that claims regarding expired sentences
were moot. The Court noted that in the habeas corpus
context, a challenged conviction’s “collateral consequences
may prevent a habeas corpus petition from becoming moot,”
but the fact that the claim is not moot does not mean that it
70

Id. at 210–11 (internal citation omitted) (quoting TENN. R. CRIM. P.
36.1, Advisory Comm’n Cmt.).
71
Id. at 211.
72
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Selavka, 14 N.E.3d 933, 941 (2014)).
73
Id. at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lee v. State, NO.
W2014-00994-CCA-R3-CO, 2015 WL 2330063, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.
App. May 13, 2015) (Williams, J., dissenting)).
74
Id. at 211.
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will fall “within the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction.”75
Because the court had interpreted Rule 36.1 as implicitly
limiting the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims to
unexpired illegal sentences, the court concluded that
“[c]ollateral consequences may prevent a case from
becoming moot in the traditional sense of the mootness
doctrine, but Rule 36.1 [was] not an appropriate avenue for
seeking relief from collateral consequences.”76
The court then examined the issue of whether failure
to award pretrial jail credit was a colorable claim for Rule
36.1 relief and held it was not. 77 The court concluded its
opinion by addressing Mr. Brown’s claim that the trial court
erroneously imposed six-year sentences rather than threeyear sentences as provided by the plea agreement. 78 The
court concluded that the mistake was a mere clerical error
that could be corrected pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.79 Rule 36 also contained the phrase
“at any time.” The court reasoned that “[p]ermitting
correction of the clerical error pursuant to Rule 36 despite
the expiration of [the] sentence [did] not contravene [its]
75

Id. at 211–12 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting May v.
Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 356 (Tenn. 2008) (Koch, J., dissenting)).
76
Id. at 212 n.12.
77
Id. at 212–13. The court did so despite the fact that the awarding of
pretrial jail credits is statutorily mandated. T ENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23101(c) (2012). The court reasoned that pretrial jail credits did not alter
the sentence itself; rather, they merely affected “the length of time a
defendant is incarcerated.” Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 212. The court
concluded, therefore, that the denial of pretrial jail credits could never
render a sentence illegal. Id. at 213. Instead, a trial court’s failure to
award pretrial jail credits could be challenged on direct appeal. Id. at
212–13. It remains to be seen whether this holding forecloses postconviction or habeas corpus relief for defendants erroneously deprived
of pretrial jail credits or is merely limited to Rule 36.1 relief.
78
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 213.
79
Id.; see also TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36 (stating that a trial court “may at
any time correct clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of
the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission”).
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principal holding that Rule 36.1 [did] not authorize courts to
grant relief from expired illegal sentences.” 80 The court
further reasoned that “[c]orrecting clerical errors so that the
record accurately reflects the sentence imposed [did] not
amount to granting relief from expired illegal sentences.”81
As such, the court remanded the case to the trial court for
correction of the clerical error pursuant to Rule 36.82
III. “Jurisprudential Context” of Rule 36.1
A. Common Law Motions to Correct Illegal Sentences

As noted in Part II, the Tennessee Supreme Court
first dealt with the issue of a trial court’s inherent power to
correct illegal sentences in the 1978 case of State v.
Burkhart.83 At issue in Burkhart was the trial court’s failure
to order, as mandated by statute, two sentences to be served
consecutively.84 Mr. Burkhart was convicted of “burglary in
the first degree,” escaped from prison, was subsequently
convicted for the escape, and sentenced to one year in prison
running from the day of his conviction. 85 When the State
Department of Correction realized that this, in effect, would
allow the prisoner to serve his two sentences concurrently
(contrary to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-3802), it
notified the prisoner that he would have to serve his sentence
for the escape after his sentence for burglary concluded.86
Mr. Burkart petitioned the trial court to prevent the State
Department of Corrections from altering the terms of his
sentence; however, the trial court, realizing its mistake,

80

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 213.
Id.
82
Id.
83
State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1978).
84
Id. at 872.
85
Id.
86
Id.
81
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denied the petition. 87 On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme
Court held that the trial court had the inherent power to
correct the defendant’s illegal sentence, stating that “the
judgment entered in the trial court . . . was in direct
contravention of the express provisions of [a statute], and
consequently was a nullity.”88 The court further stated that
“the trial judge . . . had both the power, and the duty, to
correct the judgment . . . as soon as its illegality was brought
to his attention.”89 The court held that “[a]s a general rule, a
trial judge may correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely
erroneous, sentence at any time, even if it has become
final.”90
In Burkhart, the court did not state its rationale for
holding that a trial court could correct an illegal sentence.
However, the court did cite to several cases from other
jurisdictions that establish the source of a trial court’s power
to correct illegal sentences. 91 In State v. Culver, the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated that a trial court’s “power to
punish criminal offenders . . . would seem naturally to
include the power to correct the sentences imposed by it.”92
The New Jersey Supreme Court then held that when a trial
court has imposed an illegal sentence “the court’s
jurisdiction to impose a correct sentence [would not expire]
until a valid sentence was imposed.”93 Likewise, the Iowa
Supreme Court held in State v. Shilinsky that “[u]ntil a valid
judgment [is] entered, the [trial] court [does] not exhaust its
jurisdiction, and might be required to correct any
87

Id.
Id. at 873.
89
Id.
90
Id. (citing State v. Leathers, 531 P.2d 901 (Or. 1975); Frazier v.
Langlois, 240 A.2d 152 (R.I. 1968); State v. Fountaine, 430 P.2d 235
(Kan. 1967); In re Sandel, 412 P.2d 806 (Cal. 1966); State v. Shilisnky,
81 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1957); State v. Culver, 129 A.2d 715 (N.J. 1957)).
91
Id.
92
Culver, 129 A.2d at 720.
93
Id. at 724.
88
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irregularities by pronouncing a valid sentence and entering a
valid judgment.”94 This is so because, as noted by the Kansas
Supreme Court in State v. Fountaine, “a void sentence in
contemplation of law is non-existent.”95 Therefore, as held
by the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Leathers, a trial
court that has imposed an illegal sentence “has not exhausted
its jurisdiction [because] it has in fact failed to pronounce
any sentence.”96 This reasoning regarding illegal sentences
was in line with Tennessee case law of the time, which
maintained that “where a judgment is void then there is no
judgment and consequently the [trial] court does not lose
jurisdiction over the matter.” 97 Yet, the court’s opinion in
Brown made no mention of these cases in its discussion of
the jurisprudential context of Rule 36.1.
B. Illegal Sentence Claims in the Years Between
Burkhart and Moody

In the years following Burkhart, the Tennessee
Supreme Court, on at least two occasions in State v. Mahler98

94

Shilinsky, 81 N.W.2d at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Nelson v. Foley, 223 N.W. 323, 324 (S.D. 1929)).
95
Fountaine, 430 P.2d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Howell, 103 F. Supp. 714, 718 (S.D.W. Va.
1952)).
96
State v. Leathers, 531 P.2d 901, 303 (Or. 1975) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Nelson, 424 P.2d 223, 225 (Or. 1967)).
97
Tennessee ex rel. Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tenn.
1951). This reasoning was also in line with the purpose of the original
text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which provided that a
federal district court could “correct an illegal sentence at any time.” See
United States v. James, 709 F.2d 298, 307–08 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting
that Rule 35 was designed to continue the existing decisional law which
recognized that a district court’s power to correct an illegal sentence
“sprang from the court’s want of jurisdiction to impose [an] illegal
sentence in the first place”).
98
State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987).
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and McConnell v. State,99 addressed illegal sentence claims
that had been raised as part of a petition for post-conviction
relief. Again, the Brown opinion made no reference to these
cases in its discussion of the jurisprudential context of Rule
36.1. Meanwhile, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
was more vexed by the question of how to procedurally treat
a motion to correct an illegal sentence. For example, in State
v. Reliford, 100 a panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals
addressed a defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s
dismissal of his motion to correct his sentences. 101 The
Reliford opinion noted that there was no direct appeal as of
right from the trial court’s dismissal.102 However, citing the
holding of Burkhart, the panel reasoned that “[l]ogic
dictate[d] that some avenue of appeal [lay] from an adverse
ruling of the trial court” and elected to treat the defendant’s
appeal as a common law petition for writ of certiorari. 103
Citing to Mahler and McConnell, the panel concluded that
the defendant’s sentence was illegal. 104 Specifically, the
panel noted that “[s]entencing is jurisdictional and must be
executed in compliance with the applicable legislative
mandates” and that trial courts lack “the statutory authority
to impose a sentence . . . that deviate[s] from the penalties
proscribed by law.”105
In an opinion filed eleven days after Reliford, a
separate panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that
“the appropriate procedure for challenging a void sentence

99

McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 796 (Tenn. 2000).
State v. Reliford, NO. W1999-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL
1473846 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2000).
101
Id. at *1.
102
Id. at *2.
103
Id.
104
Id. (quoting State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987)).
105
Id. at *2 (citing McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 798–800 (Tenn.
2000)).
100
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is a petition for habeas corpus relief.”106 The panel reasoned
that a petition for habeas corpus relief is “the appropriate
procedure” because “[i]n cases arising from criminal
convictions, the remedy of habeas corpus relief applies when
the judgment is void.”107 However, the panel then stated that
“because an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time,
[it did] not believe that the defendant’s failure to seek habeas
corpus relief necessarily deprive[d] him of appellate
review.” 108 Citing to Reliford, the panel concluded that a
defendant could “pursue appellate review from the denial of
a motion to correct an illegal sentence through the common
law writ of certiorari.”109 The panel ultimately declined to
grant the defendant an appeal after concluding, on the merits,
that his sentence was not illegal.110
Less than a year later, in April 2001, a third panel of
the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the procedural
nature of illegal sentence claims in a published opinion,111
Cox v. State.112 In outlining its analysis of the issue, the Cox
opinion stated that

106

State v. Jones, NO. M2000-00381-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1520012,
at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 2000) (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28
S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2000)). The long-standing rule in
Tennessee is that “the writ of habeas corpus will issue only in the case
of a void judgment or to free a prisoner after his term of imprisonment
or other restraint has expired.” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255
(Tenn. 2007) (citing Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992)).
107
Jones, 2000 WL 1520012, at *2 (citing Passarella v. State, 891
S.W.2d 619, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d
157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)).
108
Id. at *2.
109
Id. (citing State v. Reliford, NO. W1999-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2000
WL 1473846, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2000)).
110
Id. at *3–4.
111
Published opinions are controlling authority in Tennessee state courts
until they are reversed or modified by a court of competent jurisdiction.
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 4(G)(2).
112
53 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
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[t]he key to analyzing these collateral attacks
on sentences is to appreciate that the phrase
“illegal sentence” as used in our caselaw [sic]
is a term of art that refers to sentences
imposed by a court that is acting beyond its
jurisdiction—that is to say, sentences that
result from void judgments. The upshot of
our analysis [would] be that habeas corpus is
the preferred, if not the only, method of
collaterally attacking void sentences and that
collateral attacks that assert lesser claims of
merely erroneous or voidable sentences are
generally doomed, unless by nature they fit
within some other recognized form of
action.113
This panel reasoned that “[t]he distinction made in Mahler
and Burkhart between erroneous, voidable sentences . . . and
illegal or void sentences . . . call[ed] to mind the scope of the
writ of habeas corpus” and that “the phrase ‘illegal sentence’
[was] synonymous with the habeas corpus concept of a
‘void’ sentence.” 114 Noting that “a claim that merely
assert[ed] a void sentence, even though it may not assert a
void conviction, [was] cognizable as a habeas corpus
proceeding,” the panel concluded that “the better method of
challenging illegal or void sentences [was] via an application
for a writ of habeas corpus.”115 The panel further noted that
“illegal or void sentence claims” sounding in a habeas
corpus proceeding would “be subject to dismissal [for]
fail[ing] to meet the procedural requirements” of such a

113

Id. at 291.
Id. at 291–92 (citing Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn.
1993)).
115
Cox, 53 S.W.3d at 292 (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910,
911 (Tenn. 2000)).
114
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proceeding.116 However, the panel recognized that an illegal
sentence claim could be brought in a petition for postconviction relief. 117 Likewise, the panel recognized that,
while they should “rarely be granted,” appeals via the
common law writ of certiorari were available for claims that
rose “to the level of illegality or voidness.”118
C. Habeas Corpus Cases

It was against this backdrop that the Tennessee
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Moody v. State. In
Brown, it is asserted that Moody stands as a rejection of “the
Burkhart procedure” because “[b]y adopting habeas corpus
as the mechanism for challenging illegal sentences, the
Moody court implicitly limited the scope of relief for illegal
sentence claims to unexpired illegal sentences.” 119
Underpinning the Brown court’s reasoning is the assumption
that Moody adopted habeas corpus as the exclusive
procedural vehicle for challenging illegal sentences.
However, a close reading of Moody indicates that may not
be true.
The court in Moody took the “opportunity to clarify
the proper procedure for seeking review of illegal sentence
claims at both the trial level and on appeal.” 120 The court
held that the Cox opinion’s “reliance on Burkhart as
supporting certiorari review of the denial of a motion to
correct an illegal sentence [was] misplaced” because
Burkhart was decided prior to the adoption of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, which were “intended to replace the
appellate court procedure that was governed by scattered
provisions of the Tennessee Code and the rules and decisions
116

Id. at 293.
Id.
118
Id. at 294.
119
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 206 (Tenn. 2015).
120
State v. Moody, 160 S.W.3d 512, 515 (Tenn. 2005).
117
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of the appellate courts.” 121 Noting that the Rules of
Appellate Procedure did not “authorize a direct appeal of a
dismissal of a motion to correct an illegal sentence[,]”
Moody clarified “that the proper procedure for challenging
an illegal sentence at the trial level [was] through a petition
for writ of habeas corpus, the grant or denial of which
[could] then be appealed under the Rules of Appellate
Procedure.” 122 The fact that the summary dismissal of a
habeas corpus petition could be challenged on appeal was
one of the key factors in the court’s holding. The court
further clarified that because a defendant could use a habeas
corpus proceeding to challenge an illegal sentence, “the writ
of certiorari [was] not available to review an illegal sentence
claim that [had] been presented through a motion.”123
However, in so holding, the court noted that “[a] void
or illegal sentence also [could] be challenged collaterally in
a post-conviction proceeding when the statutory
requirements are met.”124 Concluding the opinion, the court
restated its holding that “[a] habeas corpus action [was] the
proper procedure for collaterally challenging an illegal
sentence,” but then stated that “[a]lthough a trial court may
correct an illegal sentence at any time, appellate courts may
not review the denial of a motion to correct an illegal
sentence through the common law writ of certiorari.” 125
These two aspects of the Moody opinion were not mentioned

121

Id. at 516 (citing State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.
1978)).
122
Id. at 516 (emphasis added) (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d
910, 912 (Tenn. 2000)).
123
Id. at 516 (citing State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tenn. 2002)).
124
Id. at 516 n.2 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d
226, 228 (Tenn. 1987)). Post-conviction relief is available “when the
conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of
any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution
of the United States.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-103 (2012).
125
Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516 (emphasis added).
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by the court in Brown.126 Contrary to the assertion in Brown
that Moody established habeas corpus as the sole procedural
vehicle for challenging an illegal sentence, Moody directly
stated that illegal sentences could be challenged in a postconviction proceeding as well as a habeas corpus
proceeding.127 Furthermore, Moody also directly stated that,
while there was no method for direct appeal from a motion
to correct an illegal sentence, trial courts continued to retain
their inherent power to correct an illegal sentence at any
time.128
Two years after Moody, the Tennessee Supreme
Court addressed whether an expired illegal sentence could
be challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding in Summers v.
State.129 The court began its analysis by restating the rule
that “[a] sentence imposed in direct contravention of a
statute is void and illegal.”130 The court then declared that
“[a] trial court may correct an illegal or void sentence at any
time” before reaffirming the holding of Moody that “[a]
habeas corpus petition, rather than a motion to correct an
illegal sentence, is the proper procedure for challenging an
illegal sentence.”131 However, in restating these principles,
the court again noted that an illegal sentence could also be
challenged in a post-conviction proceeding “when the
statutory requirements are met, including the one-year
limitations period.”132
The Summers court then addressed the question of
whether an expired illegal sentence could be challenged in a
habeas corpus proceeding. 133 The court noted that a
126

See State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 206 (Tenn. 2015).
Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516.
128
Id.
129
Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007).
130
Id. (citing Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000)).
131
Id. at 256 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516).
132
Id. at 256 n.3 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a) (2006); State
v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987)).
133
Id. at 257.
127
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petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief must be “imprisoned
or restrained of liberty.”134 Such status has been deemed “[a]
statutory prerequisite for eligibility to seek habeas corpus
relief . . . .” 135 The court explained that the term
“imprisoned” in the habeas corpus statutes referred “to
actual physical confinement or detention.” 136 The court
further explained that “restrained of liberty” was “a broader
term and encompass[ed] situations beyond actual physical
custody[,]” but only if “the challenged judgment itself
impose[d] a restraint on the petitioner’s freedom of action or
movement.” 137 As such, the court concluded that habeas
corpus relief would not lie “to address a conviction after the
sentence on the conviction [had] been fully served.” 138
However, the court ultimately determined this rule did not
bar Mr. Summers’s petition because his total effective
sentence had not been served and had not expired.139
In the years following Summers, the court in Cantrell
v. Easterling140 “returned to the topic of illegal sentences [to]
provide a more comprehensive analysis of sentencing errors
and a more general definition of illegal sentences.” 141
Cantrell will be discussed in more detail later in this article,
but for purposes of this section it is important to note that in
Cantrell the court again stated that a defendant could
challenge an illegal sentence in a post-conviction proceeding
“when the statutory requirements are met.” 142 The
134

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-21-101 (2000)).
135
Benson v. State, 153 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Tenn. 2004).
136
Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 257 (citing Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d
16, 22 (Tenn. 2004)).
137
Id. (citing Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 22).
138
Id. (citing Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23–24).
139
Id. at 258.
140
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 445 (Tenn. 2011).
141
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Cantrell,
346 S.W.3d at 448–55).
142
Id. at 453 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Moody, 160 S.W.3d 512, 516 n.2 (Tenn. 2005)).
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statements in Summers and Cantrell demonstrate that, even
after the court in Moody found that habeas corpus was the
“proper procedure” for challenging an illegal sentence, the
court continued to recognize the availability of postconviction proceedings to challenge an illegal sentence.143
More recently, the court in State v. Brown discussed the
details of Moody, 144 Summers,145 and Cantrell146 at length,
but it made no mention of the fact that all three opinions
contained similar statements to that effect.
The court’s reasoning in Brown, maintaining that
“the Moody Court implicitly limited the scope of relief for
illegal sentence claims to unexpired illegal sentences[,]”147
is highly questionable in light of the fact that the Moody,
Summer, and Cantrell decisions never adopted habeas
corpus proceedings as the exclusive mechanism for
challenging an illegal sentence. Habeas corpus and postconviction have long been recognized as the “two primary
procedural avenues available in Tennessee to collaterally
attack a conviction and sentence which have become
final.”148 The Tennessee Supreme Court “[has] rejected and
will continue to reject efforts to intertwine the two
procedures.”149 For example, the court held in Taylor v. State
that “the statute of limitations for filing post-conviction
petitions in no way precludes the filing of petitions for
habeas corpus which contest void judgments.”150 Similarly,
in Summers, the court “declin[ed] to incorporate the liberal
procedural safeguards of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act
143

Id. at 206 (citing Moody, 160 S.W.3d at 516).
Id.
145
Id. at 207.
146
Id. at 208.
147
Id. at 206.
148
Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Potts v. State,
833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that “[t]hese procedural
vehicles are theoretically and statutorily distinct.”).
149
Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007).
150
Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 84.
144

[57]
57

Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
into the provisions governing habeas corpus.”151 Rather than
habeas corpus being the only method to challenge an illegal
sentence, as implied in the Brown opinion, there were at least
two separate and distinct procedural vehicles to challenge an
illegal sentence during the time between the Moody decision
and the enactment of Rule 36.1.
D. Post-Conviction Proceedings and Expired Sentences

In addition to the fact that habeas corpus was not the
sole mechanism for challenging an illegal sentence, a
separate factor, related to the ability to challenge an illegal
sentence via a post-conviction proceeding as stated in
Moody, Summers, and Cantrell, undermines the court’s
reasoning in Brown that “the Moody Court implicitly limited
the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims to unexpired
illegal sentences.”152 In 1977, the Tennessee Supreme Court
held in State v. McCraw that the term “in custody” found in
the Post-Conviction Relief Act meant “any possibility of
restraint on liberty.” 153 The court then reiterated several
factors concerning the mootness of a habeas petition postconviction, including the possibility that a conviction could
be used in the future to prevent a defendant from engaging
“in certain businesses,” losing the right to vote, losing the
ability to serve as a juror, and the possibility that the
conviction “could impeach the petitioner’s character at any
future criminal trial or be used as a basis for infliction of
greater punishment on [the] petitioner.”154
151

Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261.
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 206 (emphasis in original).
153
State v. McCraw, 551 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1977).
154
Id. (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968); Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55–56 (1965)); see also Hickman v. State, 153
S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tenn. 2004) (narrowing the definition of “restrained of
liberty” to situations where “the challenged judgment itself imposes a
restraint upon the petitioner’s freedom of action or movement.”); Joshua
Kaiser, Revealing the Hidden Sentence: How to Add Transparency,
152
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In 1991, the court declined the State’s “invitation to
reverse McCraw.”155 Shortly after that, a panel of Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals stated that McCraw stood for the
proposition “that one may file a post-conviction petition,
even after fully serving a sentence, as long as the petitioner
remain[ed] subject to collateral legal consequences due to
the challenged conviction.”156 In fact, the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals has reviewed the denial of postconviction relief because the petitioner’s prior sentences had
been used to enhance his current sentence for a federal
conviction even though the challenged sentences expired
over ten years prior to its review.157 The Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals has recognized as recently as 2015 that “a
petition for post-conviction relief [was] permitted to attack
collaterally an expired sentence when ‘the challenged
conviction [was] used to enhance punishment.’”158
More importantly, the Tennessee Supreme Court in
State v. Hickman recognized that “the language ‘imprisoned
or restrained of liberty’ used in . . . the habeas corpus
statue[s] was not co-extensive with the ‘person in custody’

Legitimacy, and Purpose to “Collateral” Punishment Policy, 10 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 163 (2016) (analyzing the NICCC data and finding
that Tennessee has 888 “post-release hidden” sentencing laws, fifty-eight
percent of which have mandatory or automatic execution and eightythree percent of which remain in effect for the remainder of the
defendant’s life). Based on these findings, perhaps it is time to reexamine
the issue of whether collateral consequences of a conviction can justify
a habeas corpus challenge even after the conviction has “expired” given
the life-long effects and voluminous number of collateral consequences
in this state. Such a question, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
155
Albert v. State, 813 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tenn. 1991).
156
State v. Clemons, 873 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
157
Tyrice L. Sawyers, NO. M2007-02867-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL
5424031, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 31, 2008).
158
Massengill v. State, NO. E2015-00501-CCA-R3-PC, 2015 WL
7259279, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 2015) (quoting State v.
McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tenn. 1987)).
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language of the [post-conviction statutes].” 159 The court
reaffirmed that the term “in custody” “has long been broadly
construed to permit persons to collaterally challenge, by
means of a post-conviction petition, a judgment of
conviction that later may be used to enhance a sentence on
another conviction,” and that “[s]uch challenges have been
allowed even if the sentence on the challenged conviction
has been served or has expired at the time of the postconviction petition is filed.” 160 The Brown court cited
Hickman for the proposition that “habeas corpus relief may
not be granted after [the] expiration of a sentence,”161 but the
court’s discussion did not refer to Hickman’s statement that
a petitioner “may be ‘in custody’ for purposes of the PostConviction Procedure Act, but he is neither ‘imprisoned’ nor
‘restrained of liberty’ for purposes of seeking habeas corpus
relief.”162 Similarly, the Brown court did not discuss the fact
that an expired sentence could be collaterally challenged in
a post-conviction proceeding.
Until Brown, the court had never held that habeas
corpus was the exclusive procedural vehicle to challenge an
illegal sentence; instead, the court had consistently
recognized two separate and distinct procedural mechanisms
for challenging illegal sentences. In habeas corpus
proceedings, the statutory pleading requirements “are
mandatory and must be followed scrupulously.” 163 Postconviction proceedings, on the other hand, have much more
“liberal procedural safeguards” 164 and defendants can use
them to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence even
after the sentence has expired—the exact type of claims
159

Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23 n.4.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. McCraw, 551 S.W.2d 692, 694
(Tenn. 1977)).
161
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tenn. 2015).
162
Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23 n.4.
163
Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 165 (Tenn. 1993).
164
Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007).
160
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brought in the flood of Rule 36.1 litigation.165 This weakens
the court’s reasoning in Brown that Rule 36.1 did “not
expand the scope of relief [beyond that which is available in
a habeas corpus proceeding] and [did] not authorize the
correction of expired illegal sentences.” 166 The drafters of
Rule 36.1 were presumed to know this “‘state of the law’”
when drafting Rule 36.1,167 but the Brown court overlooked
a significant portion “of the law existing at the time” Rule
36.1 was adopted. 168 With this jurisprudential context in
mind, this article now turns to the text of Rule 36.1.
IV. Plain Language of Rule 36.1

While admitting that the view that Rule 36.1
authorized “the correction of expired illegal sentences” was
165

Admittedly, it would be difficult to challenge an expired illegal
sentence in a post-conviction setting due to the one-year statute of
limitations. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a) (2012). The challenge
would have to involve a misdemeanor sentence or the petition would
have to show a statutory or due process reason for tolling the statute of
limitations. Id. § 40-30-102(b) (listing the statutory bases for tolling the
statute of limitations); Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 23 (Tenn. 2014)
(listing instances where the Tennessee Supreme Court has tolled the
post-conviction statute of limitations on due process grounds).
Additionally, the case law is unclear as to exactly what constitutional
right is at issue when an illegal sentence is challenged in a postconviction proceeding. Mahler and McConnell address alleged illegal
sentences in the post-conviction context without addressing this issue. In
at least one opinion, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that,
in the context of a guilty plea, failure to inform the petitioner he was
agreeing to an illegal sentence constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel which caused the defendant to unknowingly and involuntarily
enter into a guilty plea. See, e.g., Meriweather v. State, NO. M200802329-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 27947, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7,
2010).
166
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.
167
Lee Med., Inc., v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010) (citing
Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn.
2005)).
168
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 205.
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“one possible interpretation,” the court in Brown rejected
that interpretation as unreasonable “in light of the expressed
purpose of Rule 36.1, its language, and the jurisprudential
background from which it developed.”169 In looking at the
text of Rule 36.1, the court stated that the phrase “at any
time,” as used in Rule 36.1, had “no bearing” on the issue of
whether Rule 36.1 authorized the correction of expired
illegal sentences.170 Instead, the court argued that the phrase
“at any time” simply meant (1) that an illegal sentence could
be corrected after it became final and (2) that there was no
statute of limitations on Rule 36.1 motions. 171 Also, in
looking at the text of Rule 36.1, the court stated that the rule
differed “from the procedure applicable to habeas corpus
petitions challenging illegal sentences” in “at least two
ways.” First, the rule allowed the State to challenge an illegal
sentence. Second, it required the motion to be filed in the
trial court where the judgment of conviction was entered
rather than the county where the petitioner was
incarcerated. 172 Finally, the court reasoned that, had the
drafters of Rule 36.1 intended for it to differ from the court’s
“prior decisions refusing to grant habeas corpus relief for
expired illegal sentences,” they “almost certainly” would
have “included language clearly expressing that intent . . .
.”173
The court’s reasoning in Brown regarding the phrase
“at any time” has led one Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals judge to question how that term could “mean one
thing in the text of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36
and yet mean an entirely different thing in the text of Rule
36.1?” 174 The court concluded at the end of the Brown
169

Id. at 210.
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 209.
173
Id. at 211.
174
State v. Bennett, NO. E2015-00510-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL
8773599, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2015) (Witt, J., concurring).
170
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opinion that Rule 36, addressing clerical errors, did apply to
expired sentences because Rule 36 did not “authorize courts
to grant relief from expired illegal sentences.”175 However,
nowhere in Rule 36 or Rule 36.1 is there any language to
suggest the two rules are different because one could be used
to grant relief “from expired illegal sentences.” Similar to
the language found in the original text of Rule 36.1, Rule 36
stated that trial courts “may at any time correct clerical
mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record,
and errors in the record arising from oversight or
omission.” 176 This has been a long-standing rule in
Tennessee 177 and is similar to prior Tennessee case law
holding that “where a judgment is void then there is no
judgment and consequently the [trial] court does not lose
jurisdiction over the matter.”178 In light of this, there appears
to be no textual reason to interpret the phrase “at any time”
differently in Rule 36.1 from how the court treated the
phrase in Rule 36.
In addition to its unique interpretation of the phrase
“at any time,” the court in Brown also downplayed the
differences between habeas corpus procedure and Rule 36.1.
As previously stated, the pleading requirements in habeas
corpus proceedings “are mandatory and must be followed
scrupulously.” 179 To that end, petitioners seeking habeas
corpus relief are required to state in their petitions that they
175

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 213 (emphasis in original).
Compare TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36 (2013) (amended 2016), with TENN.
R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) (2013) (amended 2016) (stating that either “the
defendant or the state may seek to correct an illegal sentence . . . .”).
177
See Bailey v. State, 280 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tenn. 1955) (noting that
trial courts have the power “to correct every mistake apparent on the face
of the record”); State v. Disney, 37 Tenn. 598, 601 (1858) (“[A]fter the
record is made up, and the term [of court] closed, [the record] admits of
no alteration, by the same court, unless for some mistake patent upon the
face of the record, or proceedings in the case.”).
178
State ex rel Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tenn. 1951).
179
Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 165 (Tenn. 1993).
176
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are “illegally restrained of liberty” and to attach a copy of
the alleged void judgment “or a satisfactory reason given for
its absence.” 180 Furthermore, the habeas corpus statutes
provide a method of summary dismissal “[i]f, from the
showing of the petitioner, the plaintiff would not be entitled
to any relief, the writ may be refused . . . .”181 Put another
way, “when a habeas corpus petition fails to establish that a
judgment is void [upon the face of the judgment or record],
a trial court may dismiss the petition without a hearing[]” or
the appointment of counsel.182
The original text of Rule 36.1, on the other hand, had
no mechanism for summarily dismissing claims and allowed
for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing if
the motion merely stated “a colorable claim” and was not
limited to proof on the face of the record. 183 These
differences were in addition to the ones outlined by the court
in Brown.184 To that end, the original text of Rule 36.1 was
much more in line with the “liberal procedural
safeguards” 185 of post-conviction proceedings, which,
likewise, required the trial court to appoint counsel and hold
an evidentiary hearing when a petition states a colorable
claim.186 In fact, the court in Wooden actually adopted the
definition of “colorable claim” used in the post-conviction
context for use in Rule 36.1 proceedings.187 In light of this,
the court’s interpretation of the plain language of Rule 36.1
failed to construe the rule “in a way that is natural, ordinary,

180

TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-21-107(b) (2012).
Id. § 29-21-109.
182
Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 260.
183
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(b) (2013) (amended 2016); see also State v.
Talley, No. E2014–01313–CCA–R3–CD 2014 WL 7366257, at *2
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2014).
184
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 209 (Tenn. 2015).
185
Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tenn. 2007).
186
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 28, §6(B).
187
State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 592–93 (Tenn. 2015).
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and unforced.” 188 In fact, court could only point to one
similarity between a Rule 36.1 motion and a habeas corpus
proceeding—the definition of “illegal sentence.”189
V. Definition of Illegal Sentence

A key factor the court cited in Brown to support its
conclusion that Rule 36.1 “was not . . . intended to expand
the scope of relief for illegal sentence claims” was that Rule
36.1 defined “‘illegal sentence’ exactly as [this] Court had
already defined that term in the habeas corpus context.”190
But, the court’s reasoning in this regard suffered from the
same flaw as its reasoning regarding the jurisprudential
context of Rule 36.1: it assumed that the definition of “illegal
sentence” found in Rule 36.1 had exclusively been applied
in “the habeas corpus context.” 191 However, a closer
examination of that definition and its development in
Tennessee case law proves that is not the case.
The original text of Rule 36.1 defined an “illegal
sentence” as “one that [was] not authorized by the applicable
statutes or that directly contravene[d] an applicable
statute.”192 The Brown opinion refers to its companion case,
Wooden, for the proposition that Rule 36.1’s definition of
“illegal sentence” was “coextensive with, and actually
mirror[s], the definition this Court has applied to that term in

188

Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 808 (Tenn. 2015).
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 209. While not cited to in Brown, the language
in subsection (c)(3) of Rule 36.1 dealing with illegal sentences when
used as material components of a plea agreement is similar to language
used in the court’s habeas corpus cases. See Summers, 212 S.W.3d at
258–59. However, for a demonstration of the principle that a defendant
can withdraw his guilty plea in such a situation pre-dating Moody and its
progeny, see State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978).
190
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.
191
Id.
192
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)(2) (2013) (amended 2016).
189
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the habeas corpus context.”193 In Wooden, the court held that
the definition of “illegal sentence” found in Rule 36.1
“mirror[ed] [the one] adopted by this Court in [Cantrell v.
Easterling] . . . .”194 In Cantrell, the court held that an illegal
sentence was “one which [was] ‘in direct contravention of
the express provisions of [an applicable statute], and
consequently [is] a nullity.’” 195 The Cantrell court also
added that it would “include within the rubric [of] ‘illegal
sentences’ those sentences which [were] not authorized
under the applicable statutory scheme.” 196 In essence, the
definition of “illegal sentence” found in Rule 36.1 and
Cantrell concerns two types of sentences: (1) sentences in
direct contravention of an applicable statute and (2)
sentences “not authorized by the applicable statutes.”197
In State v. Burkhart, the court defined an illegal
sentence as one “in direct contravention of the express
provisions of [an applicable statute] . . . .” and made no
mention of sentences not authorized by the applicable
statutes.198 However, in State v. Leathers, one of the cases
cited by the court in Burkhart, the Oregon Supreme Court
defined an “illegal sentence” as a sentence “beyond the
bounds of [the trial court’s] sentencing authority . . . .” that
would subsequently be “void for lack of authority and thus
totally without legal effect.”199 Likewise, the court in State
v. Mahler, a post-conviction case pre-dating Cantrell by over
two decades, recognized the Burkhart definition of an illegal
193

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 209 (citing State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585
(Tenn. 2015)).
194
Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 594.
195
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2011) (alteration
in original) (quoting State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.
1978)).
196
Id. (citing Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2010)).
197
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)(2) (2013) (amended 2016); Cantrell, 346
S.W.3d at 452 (citing Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 759).
198
Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978).
199
State v. Leathers, 531 P.2d 901, 903 (Or. 1975) (citations omitted).
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sentence and that there had also been cases “where sentences
were imposed which were higher or lower than that
authorized by the statute designating the punishment for the
crime.”200 The Mahler court determined that such sentences
were “held subject to being later vacated or corrected.”201
The court reaffirmed this principle in McConnell v. State,
another post-conviction case.202
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in State v.
Reliford cited McConnell for the proposition that a sentence,
which “the trial court lacked the statutory authority to
impose,” was an illegal sentence. 203 Reliford, which
predated Cantrell by over a decade, involved a challenge to
an illegal sentence brought in the trial court via a common
law motion to correct an illegal sentence and subsequently
brought to the intermediate appellate court via the common
law writ of certiorari. 204 McConnell was also cited by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Stephenson v. Carlton for the
proposition that a sentence with “no statutory basis” was
“illegal” and that a guilty plea agreement could not “salvage
an illegal sentence or otherwise create authority for the
imposition of a sentence that [had] not been authorized by
statute.”205 Stephenson was cited by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in Davis v. State for the proposition that trial courts
lack jurisdiction to impose a sentence not authorized by the

200

State v. Mahler, 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987).
Id. (citing State v. Hamlin, 655 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1983)).
202
McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 799–800 (Tenn. 2000).
203
State v. Reliford, NO. W1999-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL
1473846, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 2, 2000) (citing McConnell, 12
S.W.3d at 795, 799–800).
204
Id.
205
Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tenn. 2000) (citing
McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 799).
201
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applicable statutes. 206 The Cantrell court then cited Davis
when it articulated the two-part definition.207
The definition of “illegal sentence” in Cantrell and
Rule 36.1 was not unique to the habeas corpus context, as
the court suggested in Wooden and Brown. 208 Rather, that
definition had been used by Tennessee courts in examining
illegal sentence claims in post-conviction proceedings, in
proceedings utilizing the common law motion to correct an
illegal sentence, and in habeas corpus proceedings. In fact,
the only aspect of the Cantrell definition that differed from
the original definition of an illegal sentence found in
Burkhart was the inclusion of sentences not authorized by
the applicable statute. However, the Tennessee Supreme
Court first recognized those types of sentences as illegal in
the post-conviction context (several years before Cantrell),
not the habeas corpus context as asserted in Wooden and
Brown.209 As such, the definition of “illegal sentence” found
in Rule 36.1 was not a definition adopted solely from the
“habeas corpus context” but, instead, was simply the
definition of “illegal sentence” found generally in Tennessee
law and applied across all the procedural vehicles used to
challenge illegal sentences prior to Moody and Cantrell.210
VI. Double Jeopardy and Rule 36.1

In addition to the text and jurisprudential context of
Rule 36.1, the Brown court also said that interpreting Rule
36.1 to allow for the correction of expired illegal sentences
“could potentially produce absurd, and even arguably
206

Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2010).
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2010).
208
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015).
209
See generally Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200; Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585.
210
See generally Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200; Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585;
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2010); Moody v. State,
160 S.W. 3d 512 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn.
1978).
207
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unconstitutional results.” 211 Chiefly, the court stated that
under such an interpretation of Rule 36.1 “the State would
be entitled to correct an illegally lenient sentence, even after
the sentence had been fully served.” 212 The Brown court
imagined that “[a] defendant faced with the prospect of
returning to prison after already serving his sentence would
undoubtedly raise many objections . . . including
constitutional objections[,]”213 and that “the ‘outcry’ would
be unimaginable were ‘the State [to] start using Rule 36.1 to
jail untold numbers of citizens that by all indications have
completely served their sentences . . . .’”214 The court stated
that it would not interpret Rule 36.1 to allow for the
correction of expired illegal sentences because such an
interpretation had “the potential to result in unconstitutional
applications” of the rule.215
There are several problems with the Brown court’s
analysis with respect to the danger of Rule 36.1 being
applied unconstitutionally. First, to the extent that the court
differentiated between illegally lenient sentences and other
illegal sentences in Brown, its reasoning was in direct
contravention of the court’s prior holding that a trial court
“lacks jurisdiction to impose an agreed sentence that is
illegal, even an illegally lenient one.”216 Put another way, an
illegally lenient sentence is just as void as any other type of
illegal sentence. Additionally, the question of whether a
government’s attempt to correct an expired illegally lenient
sentence would violate constitutional protections against
double jeopardy is not as straightforward as the court
211

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.
Id. (emphasis in original).
213
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Selavka, 14 N.E.3d 933, 941 (Mass.
2014)).
214
Id. (quoting Lee v. State, 2015 WL 2330063, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App.
May 13, 2015) (Williams, J., dissenting)) (alterations in original).
215
Id.
216
Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tenn. 2007) (citing
McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tenn. 2000)).
212
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presented it in Brown. 217 Admittedly, at least one
jurisdiction has issued a blanket pronouncement that such an
action would violate double jeopardy protections. 218
However, other jurisdictions have taken a more nuanced
view of the issue, noting that the issue requires the weighing
of a defendant’s interest in finality of the sentence against a
state’s interest in the correction of the illegality 219 and,
moreover, that the passage of time is a key factor in
determining whether a defendant has a legitimate
expectation of finality in an illegal sentence.220 Further still,
at least one jurisdiction has concluded that despite a sentence
being already served by a defendant, a “[d]efendant [cannot]
have a legitimate expectation of finality in the severity of the
original sentence because it was illegally lenient . . . .”221
217

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.
See State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(quoting Sneed v. State, 749 So. 2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000))
(stating that “where a sentence has already been served, even if it is an
illegal sentence, the court lacks jurisdiction and would violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause by resentencing the defendant to an increased
sentence”).
219
See State v. Trieb, 533 N.W.2d 678, 681 (N.D. 1995) (citing United
States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1992); DeWitt v.
Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1993)) (noting that a defendant
“cannot acquire a legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence which
is illegal, because such a sentence remains subject to modification” but
recognizing that in some cases correction could be “so unfair that it must
be deemed inconsistent with fundamental notions of fairness” and
providing a balancing test).
220
Commonwealth v. Selavka, 14 N.E.3d 933, 941, 944 (Mass. 2014)
(emphasis added) (recognizing that “a defendant’s legitimate
expectation of finality may well be diminished when his sentence is
illegal” but concluding that “even an illegal sentence, with the passage
of time, acquire[s] a finality that bars further punitive changes
detrimental to the defendant”).
221
People v. Thompson, NO. 4609/99, 2009 WL 348370, at *3, *5 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 2009) (also noting that the defendant’s “expectation of
finality” was further “undermined by the additional legal circumstance
that New York courts have the inherent power to correct an illegal
sentence”).
218
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The question of whether the State could seek to
correct an expired, illegally lenient sentence, however, was
not dispositive to the claim at issue in Brown. The motion to
correct an illegal sentence at issue in Brown had been
brought by Mr. Brown, not the State.222 It is well established
that “[w]hen the accused himself procures a judgment to be
set aside upon his own initiative and he voluntarily accepts
the result, then he cannot by his own act avoid the jeopardy
in which he stands and then assert it as a bar to a subsequent
jeopardy.”223 As such, the question of whether use of Rule
36.1 by the State to correct an expired, illegally lenient
sentence was not before the court and, therefore, not
necessary for the determination of Mr. Brown’s case.
Accordingly, the court should not have considered in its
analysis the possible “constitutional objections” of a
theoretical defendant in that situation. 224 Ultimately, there
was no constitutional impediment to Mr. Brown’s argument
that he could use Rule 36.1 to correct his expired illegally
lenient sentences.
VII. Mootness

Prior to the court’s decision in Brown, a panel of the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the
expiration of Mr. Brown’s sentences rendered his motion to
correct them moot. 225 Citing the mootness doctrine, the
222

State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 202 (Tenn. 2015).
State v. Clemons, 873 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting
State v. Collins, 698 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985)).
224
Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (observing that
“under Tennessee law, courts do not decide constitutional questions
unless resolution is absolutely necessary for determination of the case
and the rights of the parties” and that “courts should avoid deciding
constitutional issues” if “a case can be resolved on non-constitutional
grounds”).
225
State v. Brown, NO. E2014-00673-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 5483011,
at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2014).
223
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panel concluded that Mr. Brown’s motion to correct his
expired illegal sentences failed to present a “live
controversy” and that the case could “no longer provide
relief” to Mr. Brown.226 To support this reasoning, the panel
cited to cases from other jurisdictions that had “concluded
that a challenge to the legality of a sentence [became] moot
once the sentence [had] been served.”227 However, the cases
to which the panel’s decision referred cited little to no
authority to support this reasoning. 228 One of the cases
contained a vigorous dissent, which noted that even after a
sentence is served the sentence “still exists” unless it has
been expunged and that there are “[a] countless number of
situations [that] occur where a prison sentence has collateral
consequences[]” that can plague a defendant in the future.229
Despite the fact that the Tennessee Supreme Court
had previously referred to an expired illegal sentence claim
brought in a habeas corpus proceeding as moot,230 the court
in Brown 231 rejected the mootness argument of the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The court noted that
the question of whether a defendant was imprisoned or
restrained of liberty was a “separate and distinct” question
from the issue of whether a “challenged conviction’s
226

Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6 (citing State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2012); Barnes v. State, 31 A.3d 203, 207 (Md. 2011); Sanchez v. State,
982 P.2d 149, 150–51 (Wyo. 1999)).
228
See Barnes, 31 A.3d at 210 (citing only Sanchez to support its
reasoning); Sanchez, 982 P.2d at 150–51 (citing no authority to support
its conclusion). Additionally, the rules in all of these other jurisdictions,
unlike Rule 36.1, did not provide a method to attack a defendant’s
underlying conviction. See MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 4-345(a)
(West 1984); WYO. R. CRIM. PROC. 35; FLA. R. CRIM. P. RULE 3.800.
229
Barnes, 31 A.3d at 212 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
230
See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 257–58 (Tenn. 2007) (stating
that the court would have accepted the State’s argument that the
defendant’s illegal sentence claim was moot if the defendant had fully
served his total effective sentence).
231
Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211 n.12.
227
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collateral consequences [could] prevent . . . [it] from
becoming moot.” 232 The court concluded that “[c]ollateral
consequences [could] prevent a case from becoming moot in
the traditional sense of the mootness doctrine” but that Rule
36.1, in light of the opinion’s interpretation of the rule, was
“not an appropriate avenue for seeking relief from collateral
consequences.” 233 While this article has laid out a strong
case against the court’s view that Rule 36.1 was not an
appropriate vehicle for challenging the collateral
consequences of an expired illegal sentence, I agree with the
court’s reasoning regarding the inapplicability of the
mootness doctrine to expired illegal sentence claims.
The court has stated in the past that showing a
defendant is imprisoned or restrained of liberty is “[a]
statutory prerequisite for eligibility to seek habeas corpus
relief . . . .” 234 Further, the court has declined to include
restraints on a defendant’s liberty that it deemed “merely a
collateral consequence of the challenged judgment” as
cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding.235 As previously
discussed, the court has also held that an expired sentence
may be challenged in a post-conviction proceeding.236 In so
holding, the court stated that “a criminal case is moot only if
it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal
consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged
conviction.”237 As noted by the dissenting opinion in Barnes
and the Tennessee Supreme Court in McCraw, there are
numerous possible collateral consequences that flow from an
expired illegal sentence. As such, the mootness doctrine
would not apply to bar expired illegal sentence claims under
Rule 36.1.
232

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting May v. Carlton, 245
S.W.3d 340, 356 n.22 (Koch, J., dissenting)).
233
Id.
234
Benson v. State, 153 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Tenn. 2004).
235
Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tenn. 2004).
236
See, e.g., State v. McCraw, 551 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1977).
237
Id. (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1965)).
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VIII. Conclusion

In Brown, the Tennessee Supreme Court overlooked
a significant portion of the “jurisprudential context” from
which Rule 36.1 originated, interpreted the plain language of
Rule 36.1 in a way that was not “natural, ordinary, and
unforced,”238 and unnecessarily raised a constitutional issue
that had not been presented for the court’s review. The court
based its reasoning upon the assumption that because of its
opinion in Moody, habeas corpus was the sole procedural
vehicle for challenging an illegal sentence and Rule 36.1
thereby implicitly incorporated the habeas corpus statutes’
procedural ban on challenging expired illegal sentences.
This reasoning overlooked the fact that the court had
repeatedly stated that some illegal sentences could be
challenged in a post-conviction proceeding, a proceeding
that has long been held to allow for challenges to expired
sentences. Furthermore, the court’s interpretation of the
plain language of Rule 36.1 discounted the fact that the rule
more closely resembled a post-conviction proceeding, rather
than a habeas corpus proceeding. Likewise, the one portion
of Rule 36.1 the court cited as being identical to habeas
corpus case law, the definition of the term “illegal sentence,”
actually predated Moody and has been used by courts outside
the habeas corpus context. Additionally, the court’s
constitutional concerns and the doctrine of mootness both
proved to be irrelevant to the issues presented in Brown. All
of this leads to the conclusion that the court erred in
interpreting Rule 36.1 to not allow for the correction of
expired illegal sentences.
Nevertheless, Brown and its companion case
Wooden will likely be mere footnotes in Tennessee’s
jurisprudential history. On December 29, 2015, roughly four
weeks after Brown and Wooden were filed, the Tennessee
Supreme Court entered an order that replaced the original
238

Moreno v. City of Clarksville, 479 S.W.3d 795, 808 (Tenn. 2015).
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text of Rule 36.1 in its entirety, effective July 1, 2016.239 The
order removed the phrase “at any time” from Rule 36.1 and
replaced it with a requirement that, except for one narrow
exception, the motion “must be filed before the sentence set
forth in the judgment order expires.” 240 Rule 36.1 now
requires the moving party to include “a copy of the relevant
judgment order(s)” with the motion, allows the movant to
include “other supporting documents,” and requires the
movant “to state whether the motion is the first motion to
correct the illegal sentence.” 241 The new Advisory
Commission Comment to Rule 36.1 states that the rule’s
definition of “illegal sentence” “incorporates the definition .
. . set forth in Cantrell.”242 The new version of Rule 36.1 also
permits summary denial of motions that do not set forth a
colorable claim.243
The new Rule 36.1 also “limit[s] the circumstances
under which relief may be granted where the defendant has
entered into a plea bargain which contains an illegal
sentence.”244 Trial courts are now required to deny motions
when the defendant has “benefitted from the bargained-for
illegal sentence.” 245 As an example, the new Advisory
Commission Comment states that when a defendant has
received illegal concurrent sentences, that defendant cannot
bring a motion to correct the illegal sentences.246 Rule 36.1
additionally provides, in new subsection (d), a narrow
exception to the rule’s prohibition on challenging expired
illegal sentences.247 Subsection (d) allows the State “to seek
239

Order Amending the Rules of Criminal Procedure, No. ADM201501631 (filed Dec. 29, 2015).
240
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a)(1) (2016).
241
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(a) cmt. (ADVISORY COMM’N 2016).
242
Id.
243
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(b)(2) (2016).
244
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(c)(3) (2016) (ADVISORY COMM’N 2016).
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(d) (2016).
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to correct a judgment order that failed to impose a statutorily
required sentence of lifetime community supervision” if the
motion is “filed no later than ninety days after the sentence
imposed in the judgment order expires.”248
In essence, the amendment to Rule 36.1 wiped out
the original version and replaced it with a new version
explicitly in line with the court’s interpretation of the
original Rule 36.1 in Brown and Wooden.249 The amendment
to Rule 36.1 replaced the liberal procedural safeguards,
similar to those of post-conviction proceedings found in the
original text of the rule, with more stringent procedural
requirements reminiscent of those found in habeas corpus
proceedings. Also, the addition of subsection (d) is
interesting, given the court’s statements in Brown allowing
for the correction of expired illegal sentences that “could
potentially produce absurd” results. These additions are
especially interesting in light of the court’s concern that
allowing the State to correct expired sentences had “the
potential to result in unconstitutional applications” of the
rule.250 Based on the court’s reasoning in Brown, any use by
the State of subsection (d) would be open to an obvious
constitutional challenge on double jeopardy grounds.
Also troubling is the new Rule 36.1’s language
regarding defendants’ having “benefitted from the
bargained-for illegal sentence.” This portion of the new rule
seemingly ignores the precedent that a trial court “lacks
jurisdiction to impose an agreed sentence that is illegal, even

248

TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(d) (2016); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 36.1(d) cmt.
(ADVISORY COMM’N 2016) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-524
(2014)).
249
“The [Tennessee] [S]upreme [C]ourt has the power to prescribe by
general rules the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the
practice and procedure in all of the courts of [Tennessee] in all civil and
criminal suits, actions and proceedings.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-402
(2009).
250
State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2015).
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an illegally lenient one.”251 Additionally, while it is true that
these defendants may have served shorter sentences on the
front end, most of the defendants challenging illegal
sentences under Rule 36.1 were incarcerated in state or
federal prison, and their new sentences were enhanced by
prior convictions infected with the challenged illegal
sentence. It is hard to imagine that a defendant “benefits”
from continuing to be exposed to such a collateral
consequence. Moreover, the Tennessee Supreme Court
adopted the amendments to Rule 36.1 without much thought
to these issues or the shortcomings of the Brown and Wooden
decisions. Perhaps, after the issuance of the Brown and
Wooden opinions, the court was reminded of the ancient
maxim, “[b]lessed be the amending hand.”252

251

Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tenn. 2007).
EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW
OF ENGLAND 366 (4th ed., London, A. Crooke et al. 1669) (1644).
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Introduction

Family violence1 is a continuing social problem that
breeds new complexity at every turn. Just as we seem to get
a modicum of control over the sheltering of at-risk mothers
and children (among other human victims), we find that
family pets2—dependent creatures endangered by the same
This article uses the terms “family violence” and “domestic violence”
interchangeably to denote repeated conduct involving abuse, including
physical and verbal aggression, in a marital, familial, or other or setting
characterized by cohabitation.
2
This article addresses protection for a specific subset of nonhuman
animal dependents—those commonly treated as family members in U.S.
households. The word “pet” is used in this article instead of the term
“companion animal” unless the context requires the use of the latter.
“Companion animal” may be interpreted more narrowly, even if more
favorably. See, e.g., Kathy Matheson, Pet? Companion animal? Ethicists
1
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violent behavior that threatens their human caretakers—
often are left unprotected or under-protected by both law and
society. In most cases, pets are unable to be sheltered with
human victims of domestic violence due to shelter
restrictions.3 Although the heroic efforts of Allie Phillips—
through her Sheltering Animals & Families Together (SAFT)™ initiative—and others aim to change the bias against
the communal sheltering of abuse victims and their pets (and
are enjoying success), 4 many targets of family violence
cannot find shelter with their pets. Restrictions on the
sheltering of abuse victims with their pets result in difficult
choices for human victims who cohabit with pets. Those
choices potentially affect the well-being of both the humans
and their pets in leaving (and, in some cases, returning to)

say
term
matters,
ASSOC.
PRESS
(May
4,
2011),
https://phys.org/news/2011-05-pet-companion-animal-ethicists-term.html;
see also infra note 149 and accompanying text (relating to relevant
statutory definitions).
3
See, e.g., Nathaniel Fields, The Pet and Women Safety (PAWS) Act will
save lives, THE HILL (Aug. 11, 2016, 5:11 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/291166-the-pet-andwomen-safety-paws-act-will-save-lives (noting that “[t]he Urban
Resource Institute’s URIPALS (People and Animals Living Safely)
program is the only program in New York City and one of the few
nationally that allows domestic violence survivors to co-shelter (live in
a domestic violence shelter apartment with their pets).”); Annamarya
Scaccia, New Bill Would Help Domestic Violence Survivors Find Shelter
for Their Pets Too, REWIRE (Apr. 14, 2015, 5:31 PM),
https://rewire.news/article/2015/04/14/new-bill-help-domesticviolence-survivors-find-shelter-pets/ (“Less than five percent of
domestic violence shelters nationwide house pets”).
4
See Sheltering Animals & Families Together™, You Can Do More!,
http://alliephillips.com/saf-tprogram/ (last visited July 30, 2017). The
number of SAF-T shelters (“shelters . . . equipped to accept families of
domestic violence along with their pets”) is updated regularly and
continues to grow; over 100 shelters now are listed on the SAF-T
Shelters website. See SAF-T Shelters, You Can Do More!,
http://alliephillips.com/saf-tprogram/saf-t-shelters/ (last visited July 30,
2017).
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their violent households. 5 Federal lawmakers have twice
introduced legislation to help address this issue, but neither
attempt progressed beyond the committee phase.6
Animal safe haven programs have stepped up to
serve some of this unmet need. 7 These programs agree to
take in the cats, dogs, and (in some cases) other pets of
domestic violence victims who decide to seek refuge in a
shelter. This solution is not without problems, however. Pets
are separated from their owners at the very time they may
need each other most. Moreover, safe havens typically only
offer temporary care to pets, and the time limits on these
arrangements may not mesh well with the transitioning of
victims to new, independent housing situations after their
shelter stays are over. Finally, a victim may decide to return
to the abusive household and take the animal with her,
subjecting the animal, as well as herself, to renewed abuse.
This article ultimately addresses the last of these
three identified weaknesses of safe haven programs—which
we refer to as the safe haven conundrum—and suggests a
solution rooted in traditional notions of property and contract
law and consistent with related public policy. In the process
of doing so, the article panoramically describes the overall
societal and legal context in which the issue arises. This
background is important to many social and legal issues
5

See Fields, supra note 3; Scaccia, supra note 3.
See Pet and Women Safety Act of 2015, H.R. 1258, 114th Cong. § 3(a)
(2015); Pet and Women Safety Act of 2014, H.R. 5267, 113th Cong. §
3(a) (2014). See generally Pet and Women Safety (PAWS) Act,
https://awionline.org/content/pet-and-women-safety-paws-act.
7
See Tara J. Gilbreath, Where's Fido: Pets Are Missing in Domestic
Violence Shelters and Stalking Laws, 4 J. ANIMAL L. 1, 9–12 (2008). See
generally Safe Havens Mapping Project for Pets of Domestic Violence
Victims, https://awionline.org/content/safe-havens-mapping-project-petsdomestic-violence-victims; The Human Society of the United States,
Directory
of
Safe
Havens
for
Animals™
Programs,
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/abuse_neglect/tips/safe
_havens_directory.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
6
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involving nonhuman animals, not just the protection of
animals threatened by violent households.
With the foregoing in mind, this article proceeds in
additional parts. Part I outlines important connections
between human and animal violence (known among many
in the field as “The Link” 8 ) that underlie the
institutionalization and operation of animal safe haven
programs. Part II places nonhuman animals—particularly
pets—in their legal context, underscoring the notion that
animals continue to be viewed under the law as property,
albeit an evolving and specially protected form of property.
The legal conception of pets, as described in Part II, is
sometimes in tension with related social constructions of the
human/pet relationship—including human/pet relationships
that exist in the context of domestic violence. For example,
when an abuse victim shelters a pet in a safe haven program
during his or her stay in a domestic violence shelter, property
ownership conventions must be observed and may collide
with public policy considerations at several decision-making
junctures.
One significant juncture at which this tension
manifests itself is highlighted and deconstructed in Part III
of this article. A pet owner who is a sheltered victim of
family violence may put his or her pet in a safe haven shelter
and then later decide to return to the abusive household. In
that event, the victim not only potentially re-victimizes and
endangers herself but also her animal. Elements of our social
services system are designed to help and look after human
victims of domestic violence in making and living through
this decision; and if a victim is a parent (most commonly a
8

See What is the Link, http://nationallinkcoalition.org/ what-is-the-link/ (last
visited July 30, 2017) (referring numerous times to “The Link” and
observing that “[a]nimal abuse, cruelty and neglect are often considered
isolated incidents wholly separated from other forms of family
violence. Today, professionals involved with victims of family violence
are not surprised when they learn that often these acts are linked, and that
various agencies are working with the same families . . . .”).

[83]
83

Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
woman) who leaves and returns to a home with children,
other elements of our social services system exist to protect
those children.9 No social services exist, however, to protect
the pet of a domestic violence victim when the owner
determines to return the animal to a household in which an
abuser resides and abuse may recur. Part III of the article
highlights this issue and suggests that a special form of
bailment—a conditional bailment—may help to protect
animals at this critical juncture. This suggestion then is
described and critiqued. Following Part III, we offer a brief
conclusion.
I. Domestic Violence and Animal Abuse
A. Unfortunate Connections: Linkages Between
Human and Nonhuman Animal Violence

The role of pets in family violence has remained
relatively unexplored in academic literature. 10 A study
9

See generally Janet E. Findlater & Susan Kelly, Child Protective
Services and Domestic Violence, 9 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 84 (1999)
(describing then current and aspirational relationships between child
protective services and domestic violence protection and prevention).
Our reference to female victims reminds us to expressly acknowledge
that women are not the only targets of family violence. Where references
are made to battered women and female victims of domestic violence,
we offer them as nonexclusive illustrations of what has historically been
the majoritarian fact pattern—i.e., abuse by men of their female
cohabitants. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that victims of
domestic violence are not homogeneous in sex, gender, age, or other
characteristics, and their unique attributes may contribute to both the fact
and impact of their victimization.
10
See Frank R. Ascione, Battered Women’s Reports of Their Partners’
and Their Children’s Cruelty to Animals, 1 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 119,
121 (1998) [hereinafter Ascione, Women’s Reports] (identifying then
existing literature on the issue); Sharon L. Nelson, The Connection
Between Animal Abuse and Family Violence: A Selected Annotated
Bibliography, 17 ANIMAL L. 369, 377–86 (2011) (listing articles
showing connections between animal abuse and family violence); Vivek
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conducted by the Humane Society of the United States in
2000 found that 21% of animal cruelty cases were
intertwined with other family violence.11 “Experts estimate
that from 48 percent to 71 percent of battered women have
pets who also have been abused or killed.”12 As a general
matter, available evidence indicates that “[v]iolence
exhibited by one family member against another rarely
involves a single act of abuse against one type of victim.”13
Moreover, data from existing studies on the
connection between animal and human abuse should be
treated with caution. In critiquing his own work and that of
others in this area, Dr. Frank R. Ascione, a nationally
recognized expert in the interaction between human and
animal violence, notes that studies of animal cruelty and
family violence against women do not “include comparison
samples of non-battered women or battered women who are
not currently in shelters.”14 Furthermore, the sample sizes of
all these studies are inevitably quite small. As a leading
Upadhya, Comment, The Abuse of Animals As a Method of Domestic
Violence: The Need for Criminalization, 63 EMORY L. J. 1163, 1167
(2014) (“Although the commission of animal cruelty has long been
identified as a potential risk factor for subsequent criminality, and as a
possible indicator of psychological disorders, only in the past three
decades has scholarship focused on the link between the two forms of
abuse.” (footnotes omitted)). Of course, humans are also animals. For
simplicity’s sake, we often refer to nonhuman animals simply as
“animals” in this article.
11
HUMANE SOC’Y U.S., THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES
(HSUS) FIRST STRIKE® CAMPAIGN 2000 REPORT OF ANIMAL CRUELTY
CASES (2001), http://humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/CAMP_FS_2000report.pdf.
12
Animals & Family Violence, https://awionline.org/content/animalsfamily-violence.
13
Charlotte Lacroix, Another Weapon for Combating Family Violence:
Prevention of Animal Abuse, 4 ANIMAL L. 1, 4 (1998); see also Clifton
P. Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend: Pet Abuse and the Role of Companion
Animals in the Lives of Battered Women, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
162, 171 (2000) [hereinafter Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend] (“[D]ifferent
forms of violence often coexist within families”).
14
Ascione, Women’s Reports, supra note 10, at 125.
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researcher in the field, Ascione stresses that his own 1998
study (described below) cannot prove causation but is
instead “descriptive.” 15 Even where links between animal
and human violence exist, it is far too easy to confuse
correlation with causation. It is thus impossible to use
Ascione’s results to extrapolate to a national comparison.16
However, a number of small-scale studies have reached
similar results in various areas of the country.17
In sum, despite the relative paucity of research on the
links between animal and human violence and the
shortcomings of the small amount of research that has been
done, existing studies do provide basic information that
supports connections between violence to animals and
humans. These studies are useful to the discussion of our
ideas about the sheltering of animals exposed to domestic
violence or a significant risk of future domestic violence. As
one commentator observed, “[t]he link between abuse
against animals and abuse against humans is long
documented both in psychological and sociological studies
as well as anecdotal reports.” 18 Taken as a whole, these
studies and reports reveal some disturbing connections and
trends.
1. The Triad: Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and
Animal Abuse

In Ascione’s groundbreaking study in 1998, thirtyeight women at a domestic violence shelter in Utah were
interviewed by shelter staff concerning their pets. 19 Many
expressed appreciation that someone had finally

15

Id. at 127.
Id. at 126.
17
Id.
18
Gilbreath, supra note 7, at 5.
19
Ascione, Women’s Reports, supra note 10, at 123.
16
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acknowledged concern for their pets. 20 Of the 74% who
owned pets, 71% reported that their abuser had either
harmed or threatened to harm their pets.21
Jane Ann Quinlisk’s statewide study of shelters in
Wisconsin found similar percentages—about 86% of the
seventy-two respondents owned pets, of whom 68%
reported that their abusers were also abusive to their
animals.22 Although there were lower rates of pet ownership
in Flynn’s study in South Carolina due to the sociodemographic composition of that state,23 Flynn also found a
connection between animal abuse and woman battering.
Forty percent of the 107 respondents owned pets, of whom
46.5% reported that their abusers harmed or threatened to
harm their pets.24
Animal abuse is not merely an indicator of spousal
abuse; it also has implications in the development of
children.25 Several studies suggest that children mimic the
behavior that is modeled by the adults in their lives. Some
report that children who witness domestic violence are more
likely to become perpetrators of domestic violence or
victims of domestic violence, depending on their gender.26
Similarly, children who witness animal abuse may be more
likely to abuse animals themselves.27 In Ascione’s study, for
example, 32% of the victims who had children reported that
20

Id. at 124.
Id. at 125.
22
Jane Ann Quinlisk, Animal Abuse and Family Violence, in CHILD
ABUSE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND ANIMAL ABUSE: LINKING THE
CIRCLES OF COMPASSION FOR PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION 169
(Frank R. Ascione & Phil Arkow eds., 1999).
23
Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 170–71.
24
Id. at 167.
25
See generally Jared Squires, The Link Between Animal Cruelty and
Human Violence: Children Caught in the Middle, KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 2,
6–7 (2000) (collecting “Child-Related Statistics, Facts, and Theories”).
26
Quinlisk, supra note 22, at 170.
27
Ascione, Woman’s Reports, supra note 10, at 127.
21
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their children had also harmed the pets.28 Of those instances,
the adult batterer had either harmed or threatened to harm
the animal 71% of the time. 29 In Quinlisk’s Wisconsin
survey, abuse of the pet by an adult perpetrator occurred in
the presence of the children 76% of the time. 30 Fifty-four
percent of those respondents stated that their children had
later copied the behavior on the pet.31 In Flynn’s study, two
women reported instances where their children abused the
pet; one believed that her child was mimicking the behavior
of the adult abuser. 32 Some researchers have attempted to
demonstrate, with mixed and sometimes controversial
results, that animal abuse during childhood can predict
future violence against other humans under a “violence
graduation hypothesis.”33 Other researchers have suggested
a “deviance generalization hypothesis,” positing that
“animal abuse is simply one of many forms of antisocial
behavior that can be expected to arise from childhood on.”34
Most of these researchers likely agree that animal abuse by
children is a “serious antisocial behavior”35 that sometimes
indicates a broader proclivity to violence.36

28

Id. at 125.
Id.
30
Quinlisk, supra note 22, at 169.
31
Id.
32
Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 167.
33
Arnold Arluke et al., The Relationship of Animal Abuse to Violence
and other Forms of Antisocial Behavior, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 963, 963–64 (1999).
34
Id. at 965.
35
Clifton P. Flynn, Why Family Professionals Can No Longer Ignore
Violence Toward Animals, 49 FAM. REL. 87, 88 (2000) [hereinafter
Flynn, Family Professionals].
36
Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law’s
Role in Prevention, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2001).
29
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2. A Silent Epidemic: Society Ignores the Link
Between Human and Nonhuman Violence

These studies strongly suggest a correlation between
domestic violence, childhood violence, and animal abuse.
For a multitude of reasons, however, society tends to
discount or disregard batterer threats against pets. Pets are
valued less than humans in weighing societal concerns, so
that any violence against pets meets with less shock than
violence against human victims.37 Furthermore, a misguided
belief that animal abuse is rare has become entrenched and
exists alongside the assumption that “crimes against animals
are . . . isolated incidents,” not part of a larger pattern of
violent activity. 38 As a society, we have not yet fully
appreciated the integral role that pet abuse plays in the cycle
of human violence.39
To a limited extent, connections between human and
animal social welfare movements are beginning to be
acknowledged in the United States through newly
established institutions, including (at least in East
Tennessee) Family Justice Centers. 40 A Family Justice
37

Flynn, Family Professionals, supra note 35, at 87.
Id.
39
Catherine A. Faver & Elizabeth B. Strand, Domestic Violence and
Animal Cruelty: Untangling the Web of Abuse, 39 J. SOC. WORK EDUC.
237, 240 (2003).
40
See id. at 239; Family Crisis Unit, http://knoxsheriff.org/
family/index.php (last visited July 30, 2017) (“The Family Justice Center
is the hub of more than 60 partnering agencies working together to
provide assistance and education pertaining to domestic violence, child
abuse, elder abuse, animal abuse and cyber investigations.”). Recent
institutions that acknowledge connections between human and
nonhuman violence may be conceptualized as a modern reimagining of
social movements from the nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth
century, the private movement to protect abused children was
intertwined with the animal welfare movement; private societies would
simultaneously handle both human and nonhuman service needs. Id. In
the early twentieth century, however, this common service system split
38
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Center is “the co-location of a multi-disciplinary team of
professionals who work together, under one roof, to provide
coordinated services to victims of family violence,”
including allowing the victims to “talk to an advocate, plan
for their safety, interview with a police officer, meet with a
prosecutor, receive medical assistance, receive information
related to shelter, and receive help with transportation.” 41
Family Justice Centers are a relatively new phenomenon,
based on the San Diego model. 42 The growth in Family
Justice Centers over the past fifteen years was fueled by a
$20 million funding initiative announced by President
George W. Bush in October 2003; the Knoxville, Tennessee
Family Justice Center was seed-funded with a grant from the
United States Department of Justice through the President’s
Family Justice Center Initiative and included an animal
abuse component (supported by the work of the Animal
Abuse Task Force of the Community Coalition on Family
Violence) at its initiation.43 There are currently more than
apart when the government took over the management of child protective
services. Id. Although government intervention in child welfare was
certainly laudable, it also divorced concern for human welfare from that
of nonhuman animal welfare. See Allie Phillips, The Dynamics between
Animal Abuse, Domestic Violence, and Child Abuse: How Pets Can Help
Abused Children, 38 PROSECUTOR 22, 22–23 (2004).
41
Tennessee Department of Finance & Administration, Family Justice
Centers, https://www.tn.gov/finance/article/fa-ocjp-fjc (last updated
April 13, 2016).
42
Id.
43
See Meg Townsend et al., Evaluability Assessment of the President’s
Family Justice Center Initiative (September 30, 2005), at 55–56,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/212278.pdf. Professor Heminway
was involved in the funding application process, which was supported
by The University of Tennessee College of Law. We both reside in
Knoxville and are licensed to practice in Tennessee. Moreover, our
experience with the matters addressed in this article arises out of pro
bono and public service work done in Tennessee. Accordingly, we have
written this article using primarily Tennessee examples and law. We also
have inserted references to other examples and laws, however, as
relevant or desired.
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seventy operational Family Justice Centers in the United
States; Family Justice Centers also exist in five foreign
countries. 44 A number of these centers, like Knoxville’s,
opened with financial support from the U.S. Department of
Justice. By linking public and private advocates across the
spectrum of human and animal violence initiatives, Family
Justice Centers hold promise to bind social welfare groups
in a powerful way.
3. Abusers Manipulate Bonds Between Human and
Nonhuman Victims

Academic studies of pets and family violence do not
merely describe a link between domestic violence and
animal abuse. They also help to explain, in a more
comprehensive way, why domestic violence exists. Animal
abuse was previously a missing link in the family violence
puzzle. The key to the link between animal abuse and
domestic violence is that animals are part of the “intimate
home environments of human beings.”45
A 1983 study showed that people regard their pets as
beloved family members. 46 In that study, 87% of
respondents considered pets to be family members, and 79%
celebrated their pets’ birthdays. 47 In a 1995 study by the
American Animal Hospital Association, 70% of respondents
who had owned a pet indicated that they thought of those

44

For
a
list
of
centers
with
web
links,
see
http://www.familyjusticecenter.org/affiliated-centers/family-justicecenters/ (last visited March 26, 2017).
45
Faver & Strand, supra note 39, at 238.
46
Id. at 240.
47
Dianna J. Gentry, Including Companion Animals in Protective Orders:
Curtailing the Reach of Domestic Violence, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
97, 102 (2001).
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pets as children.48 Today, more people have pets than have
children. 49 Humans tend to view their animals as “social
actors who are capable of interacting symbolically.” 50 In
2016, pet owners spent an estimated $62.75 billion dollars
on their pets. 51 U.S. veterinary expenses tripled between
1991 and 2001, an early indicator of the increasing value
placed on pets.52
Given this evidence of a strong human-pet bond, it is
no surprise that it extends to subjects of family violence. In
one study, Flynn conducted interviews with ten battered
women at a shelter in South Carolina who owned pets.53 The
women described their pets as family members, including
two respondents who brought photos of their pets with them
to the interview, behaving like “proud parents.” 54 Three
women even referred to their pets as “children.”55
Although this bond is touching, it has sinister
implications when recognized by an abuser. A pet’s status as
a family member makes the pet vulnerable to abuse.56 The
connection between animal abuse and other forms of
domestic violence is not simply a sign of a general violent
disposition on the part of the abuser, however. Instead, this
Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of “NonEconomic” Damages for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion
Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 ANIMAL L. 45, 59 (2001).
49
Clifton P. Flynn, Battered Women and Their Animal Companions:
Symbolic Interaction Between Human and Nonhuman Animals, 8
SOCIETY & ANIMALS 99, 101 (2000) [hereinafter Flynn, Symbolic
Interaction].
50
Id.
51
Pet Industry Market Size & Ownership Statistics,
http://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp
(last
visited March 26, 2017).
52
Susan J. Hankin, Not A Living Room Sofa: Changing the Legal Status
of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J. L. & POL’Y 314, 316 (2007).
53
Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 103.
54
Id. at 105.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 107.
48
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correlation appears to result from the batterer’s concerted
strategy to take advantage of the intimate family
environment for his or her own purposes. Abusers batter pets
to establish their power, instill fear, and encourage the “habit
of compliance” among their human victims. 57 Abusers
recognize that harming or threatening a human victim’s pet
is a viable strategy to coerce the human victim to do what
the abuser wants. 58 Customized versions of the Duluth
Model of Power and Control, frequently used to illustrate
locus of authority and influence in domestic violence
settings, identify the elements of this concerted strategy.59
As part of the family, pets exist within the same
environment that permits violence to occur against human
victims. This violence is fostered by the privacy associated
with the home and the position of “power and control” that
abusers can exercise over pets due to their “dependent
status” and “smaller physical stature.” 60 Even more
importantly, abusers react with jealousy to the strong
emotional attachments that exist between their human
victims and pets.61
57

Jennifer Robbins, Note, Recognizing the Relationship Between
Domestic Violence and Animal Abuse: Recommendations for Change to
the Texas Legislature, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 129, 133 (2006).
58
Faver & Strand, supra note 39, at 238.
59
See How Are Animal Abuse and Family Violence Linked?,
http://nationallinkcoalition.org/faqs/what-is-the-link (last visited July 30,
2017) (applying the Power and Control Wheel to issues at the intersection
of domestic violence and animal abuse); Wheels: Understanding the
Power and Control Wheel, https://www.theduluthmodel.org/wheels/ (last
visited July 30, 2017) (explaining descriptive “wheels,” including the
Power and Control Wheel, developed by the Domestic Abuse Intervention
Programs).
60
Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 107.
61
Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 172. This article also
postulates that there are two key reasons why domestic violence victims
may form unique emotional attachments to their pets. First, battered
women may identify with pets that have been similarly abused, and
second, pets may serve as emotional substitutes who fill the need of
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Abusers manipulate these bonds between human
abuse victims and their pets. Because these pets are so
important to the human subjects of domestic violence,
abusers can harm and threaten the pets in order to further
harm and coerce their human victims.62 The abuser can use
the pet to convince the victim to come home or drop criminal
charges.63 Analysts identify this strategy among abusers as a
negative surrogacy, where the abuser targets the animal to
hurt and control the human victim in a phenomenon known
as “triangling.”64 In one of Flynn’s studies, female victims
of family abuse cited their emotional attachment to the pet
as being part of the reason why their abusers targeted the
animals. 65 One woman insightfully stated, “[the pet] was
like an extension of me, you know? And . . . maybe he
abused the dog ‘cause [sic] he . . . didn’t want to go to jail
for abusing me . . . .”66 Another stated of her abuser, “I think
he uses the dog big time to hurt us . . . .”67 Similar examples
of abusers using violence against pets to hurt human victims
play out in communities across the country.68 The Knoxville
News Sentinel, for example, reported on felony animal abuse
charges filed against a man who broke the neck of his

companionship for battered women, who are often socially isolated by
their abusers. Id. at 168–74.
62
Faver & Strand, supra note 39, at 238.
63
Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 172.
64
Id. at 174.
65
Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 107.
66
Id. at 110.
67
Id. at 109.
68
Articles summarizing published reports of incidents and legal actions
involving the link between animal abuse and domestic violence are
regularly published in the LINK-Letter, a newsletter produced by the
National Link Coalition. These articles are available on the National
Link Coalition’s website at http://nationallinkcoalition.org/resources/linkletter-archives.
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stepdaughter’s Jack Russell terrier puppy in order to
“torment” his estranged wife.69
Even in situations where the abuser does not threaten
or harm the pet, targets of family violence are often
emotionally scarred by their pets’ reactions to the abuse that
the pets witness. 70 One woman described being upset
because her dog “panics” and “starts shivering” when the
abuser yells at her.71 In sum, all abuse, whether it be of a
human or a pet, contributes to the “climate of . . . terror” that
perpetuates further violence.72
4. Community Action in Response to Abuse

Society at large has begun to take notice of the
connection between human and nonhuman victims of abuse.
Academic studies are one indicator of this emerging
acknowledgment of this linkage.73 Changes to legal process
and even law itself are others. In addition, there has been a
focus on enforcement efforts against perpetrators of animal
cruelty in the hopes that they will help diminish violence
against humans.74 This enforcement rationale suggests that
69

Michael Silence, A felony animal abuse case, KNOX NEWS, Feb. 1,
2005, http://www.wate.com/story/2919445/man-gets-two-years-in-pleadeal-on-puppy-killing.
70
Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 116.
71
Id. at 117.
72
Id. at 113.
73
A bibliography of academic studies in this area is available at
http://animaltherapy.net/animal-abuse-human-violence/bibliography/.
74
GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 122–25
(Temple University Press 1995) (citing a variety of judicial opinions
concerning animal cruelty to distinguish direct and indirect duties).
Francione concludes that, although some judicial opinions interpret
animal cruelty statutes as creating duties owed directly to the animals,
others emphasize a “dual purpose” where the duty owed to the animal is
indirect. Id. at 122. The author reiterates that, “the primary rationale for
the anticruelty statutes is essentially that cruelty to animals has a
detrimental impact on the moral development of human beings.” Id. at
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one potent reason why society cares about animal rights is
because animal interests are intertwined with human
interests.75
One important change in this area is the growing
emphasis on including animals in orders of protection.76 In
Tennessee, for example, a protective order may “direc[t] the
care, custody or control of any animal owned, possessed,
leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor residing in the
household.”77 The Tennessee statute also insists that animals
be placed in the direct custody of the petitioner or in animal
foster care, emphasizing that the animal should never be
placed in the custody of the respondent to the protective
order. 78 Although the Tennessee Code does not extend
protection to first responders who help the abuse victim
remove pets from the household, such aid is available
through the internal guidelines of various law enforcement
offices.79
125. An emphasis on indirect duties is also prevalent in some theories of
animal ethics. See, e.g., PETER CARRUTHERS, THE ANIMALS ISSUE 146
(Cambridge University Press 1992) (“[S]ome ways of treating animals
are morally wrong . . . but only because of what those actions may show
us about the moral character of the agent. This will then be a form of
indirect moral significance for animals that is independent of the fact that
many rational agents care about animals, and hate to see them suffer.”).
75
Livingston, supra note 36, at 5.
76
As of 2016, thirty-two states, plus Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico,
have enacted statutes that permit the inclusion of pets in protection
orders. For more details about the statutory language in each state, see
Rebecca F. Wisch, Domestic Violence and Pets: List of States that
Include Pets in Protection Orders, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL
CENTER (2016), https://www.animallaw.info/article/domestic-violenceand-pets-list-states-include-pets-protection-orders.
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TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606(a)(9) (2016).
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Telephone interview with Jackie Roberts, Case Coordinator, Family
Justice Center in Knoxville, Tenn. (June 20, 2008). As part of their
standard operations, Knoxville police officers “standby” for fifteen
minutes while the victim retrieves personal belongings from the house.
For safety reasons, this standby procedure is never utilized at night. Id.
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In other rule making, state legislatures are increasing
penalties for animal abuse. All fifty states currently have
felony provisions for animal cruelty. 80 In Tennessee, a
perpetrator’s first animal cruelty offense is a Class A
misdemeanor,81 punishable by no more than 11 months and
29 days of incarceration, along with a fine not to exceed
$2,500. 82 Any subsequent offense is a Class E felony, 83
requiring incarceration for one to six years and a fine up to
$3,000.84 Tennessee has a separate statute, however, to deal
with aggravated animal cruelty, which occurs when a person
“intentionally kills or intentionally causes serious physical
injury to a [pet]” in a manner that exhibits “aggravated
cruelty” that has “no justifiable purpose.” 85 Aggravated
cruelty is a Class E felony.86

80

Animal Cruelty Facts and Stats, http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/abuse_
neglect/facts/animal_cruelty_facts_statistics.html (last visited March 26, 2017).
In recent years, activists have concluded that the best pragmatic approach
to achieving greater protection for pets is to emphasize how animal abuse
serves as an indicator of interpersonal violence. The increase in state
felony laws from five in 1990 to fifty today parallels the renewed focus
on the link between different types of violence, as highlighted by the
American Humane Society, The Humane Society of the United States,
the Animal Welfare Institute, the National Link Coalition, and other
animal protection organizations and institutions.
For instance,
legislators in both Pennsylvania and Texas recently cited the link
between violence to animals and people in enacting an overhaul of those
states’ anti-cruelty statutes. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Cites Link in
Enhancing Cruelty Penalties, THE LINK-LETTER (July 2017), at 1,
http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LinkLetter2017-July-v3.pdf; Link Cited as Rationale for Increased Cruelty Penalties,
The LINK-Letter (July 2017), at 3, http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/LinkLetter-2017-July-v3.pdf.
81
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-202(g)(1) (2016).
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Id. § 40-35-111(e)(1).
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Id. § 39-14-202(g)(2).
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Id. § 40-35-111(b)(5).
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Id. § 39-14-212(a).
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Id. § 39-14-212(d).
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Another important area of animal protection
legislation is cross-reporting as among child and adult
protective services and animal abuse responders. 87
Tennessee requires that any agency or government employee
involved in “child or adult protective services” report
suspected animal abuse to the appropriate animal protection
authority. 88 In order to make cross-reporting as potent as
possible, states also need to require humane society
investigators to report to social workers when they suspect
child abuse or domestic violence. 89 Other states have
extended mandatory reporting into other professions, such as
by requiring veterinarians to report suspected animal
abuse. 90 Many states, for example, either require
veterinarians to report suspected animal abuse or provide
immunity if veterinarians report such information,
prescriptions that resemble child abuse reporting
requirements.91
As a logical extension of these legislative efforts,
Tennessee law also provides for an animal abuse registry
akin to sex offender registries provided for by law in
Tennessee and elsewhere.92 At the time work on this article
was completed, the registry included information on eight

87

The National Link Coalition produces summaries of state cross-reporting
requirements (mandatory and permissive), based on the nature of required
reporters (e.g., child protection, adult protective services, animal care and
control, and veterinary professionals) and type of abuse. These summaries
are available at http://nationallinkcoalition.org/resources/articles-research.
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Id. § 38-1-402(a).
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Heather D. Winters, Updating Ohio’s Animal Cruelty Statute: How
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Gentry, supra note 47, at 104.
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convicted animal abusers. 93 Although Tennessee was the
first state to adopt legislation of this kind, municipalities in
other states have started to implement animal abuse
registries. 94 The effect of these still-young initiatives is
unclear, but they do represent another socio-legal response
to the link between human and animal abuse.95
In perhaps the most novel development, Connecticut
has recently passed legislation (“Desmond’s Law”) allowing
animals to have court-appointed advocates to represent them
in abuse and cruelty cases. 96 Either the prosecutor or the
defense attorney may request the animal advocate, and the
judge has discretion as to whether to make the appointment.
At this time, seven lawyers and a law professor are approved
as volunteer advocates. The passage of the law appears to be
connected to concern over both the link between animal
abuse and violence against people and the paucity of animal
abuse cases resulting in a conviction.
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See Tennessee Animal Abuse Registry, Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation,
https://www.tn.gov/tbi/topic/tennessee-animal-abuseregistry (last visited July 30, 2017).
94
See Karin Brulliard, Animal abusers are being registered like sex
offenders in these jurisdictions, WASH. POST (September 13, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/animalia/wp/2016/09/13/anima
l-abusers-are-being-registered-like-sex-offenders-in-thesejurisdictions/?utm_term=.4dd192c8abd8.
95
See id. (“The registries are part of widening efforts in the United States
to punish and track animal abusers, who, research has shown, commit
violence against people at higher rates than normal.”). Bills introducing
state animal abuse registries were introduced in a number of state
legislatures during the 2017 legislative sessions. New State Animal
Abuser Registries Proposed in 2017, https://www.navs.org/new-stateanimal-abuser-registries-proposed-2017/#.WYiRDq3MxAY.
96
See, e.g., Laurel Wamsley, In a First, Connecticut’s Animals Get
Advocates in the Courtroom, THE TWO-WAY (June 2, 2017),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/02/531283235/in-afirst-connecticuts-animals-get-advocates-in-thecourtroom?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&utm_ca
mpaign=npr&utm_term=nprnews&utm_content=20170603.
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Beyond legislation, the judiciary has begun to
highlight the presence of animal abuse in cases involving
domestic violence (especially child abuse), exposing the
interrelationships among the three types of household
violence. 97 In one Kentucky case, the judge permitted
joinder of interrelated child abuse and animal cruelty charges
when the defendants allegedly sexually abused their children
and used their pets for sexual gratification. 98 In another
brutal case out of Oregon, a jury convicted Charles Smith of
murdering his pregnant wife by tying her hands and feet
behind her back and leaving her to die of exposure in a
remote area. At trial, the state presented evidence of Smith’s
long history of violence against both women and animals,
including how he threw a kitten into a burning woodstove
and beat his wife’s puppy to death.99
Beyond the research initiatives on the link between
animal abuse and human aggression and the legislative,
regulatory, and judicial activity that they have engendered,
practical issues have emerged in handling matters at the
intersection of animal and human violence. For example,
there is widespread concern about the adequacy of social
services offered to victims of domestic violence. 100 A
particularly salient concern is the fact that most domestic
violence shelters do not take in the animals of human
domestic violence victims.
B. No Room at the Inn: Most Domestic Violence
Shelters Do Not Accept Pets

As an extension of the emerging interest in the
connection between domestic violence and animal abuse,
researchers have begun to highlight and criticize the failure
97

Gentry, supra note 47, at 104.
Id. at 104–05.
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of domestic violence shelters to evaluate or address the
importance of pets in the lives of domestic violence
victims. 101 Most domestic violence shelters do not accept
pets, due to “health regulations, space limitations, additional
costs, and potential liabilities.” 102 Concerned members of
the community have begun to change this norm,103 but the
situation persists.
Researchers stress that shelter staff should inquire
about pets at intake and take seriously the victims’ emotional
turmoil about leaving their pets.104 In Wisconsin, Quinlisk
found that large, urban shelters asked abuse victims about
their pets during intake, while small, rural shelters did not.105
Quinlisk stressed that even if a shelter has no program to take
in pets of domestic violence victims, merely expressing
concern and helping them “brainstorm” about their options
for their pets is helpful.106 Over two-thirds of those surveyed
whose pets had been abused expressed concern for the safety
of those pets.107 In another study by Flynn, all of the abuse

101

Id.; see also Frank R. Ascione, The Abuse of Animals and Human
Interpersonal Violence: Making the Connection, in CHILD ABUSE,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND ANIMAL ABUSE 50, 56 (Frank R. Ascione &
Phil Arkow eds., 1999) (83% of directors at surveyed domestic violence
shelters acknowledged an “overlap” between domestic violence and
animal abuse, but only 28% of those shelters routinely ask their clients
about animal abuse); Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 123
(suggesting that shelter staff should inquire about pets at intake and
consider establishing foster programs or on-site housing programs for
pets, particularly because some women delay seeking shelter due to
concern for their pets).
102
THE HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., STARTING A SAFE HAVENS FOR ANIMALS
PROGRAM 2, http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/2004_
SafeHavens_Guide.pdf [hereinafter HSUS, SAFE HAVENS].
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See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Quinlisk, supra note 22, at 173.
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victims who were interviewed wished that the shelter could
accommodate their animals.108
Some victims of family violence delay coming to a
domestic violence shelter out of concern for their animals,
which indicates the gravity of the failure to shelter the pets
of battered women. In Ascione’s study, 18% of those
surveyed delayed seeking shelter out of concern for their
pets’ safety. 109 Similarly, eight women, or 18.6% of
respondents, in one of Flynn’s studies delayed seeking
shelter for themselves due to their pets. 110 All of them
acknowledged that their pets had also been victims of abuse;
five of them delayed coming to the shelter for over two
months.111 A staff member at the shelter told the researcher
that one woman who had come to the shelter on three
separate occasions during his study returned home each time
because she feared for the safety of her pet.112
Yet, as striking as these numbers and stories may be,
research involving abuse victims in domestic violence
shelters likely understates the overall risk to those victims
because there most certainly are victims who never seek
shelter at all (at least in part because of a fear that their pets
will be abused or killed if they leave the household).113 This
shortcoming in the empirical data on abuse victims is likely
to persist because the study population is difficult to identify.
Even interviewing unsheltered domestic violence victims
whose abusers are arrested would not completely overcome
108

Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 118.
Ascione, Women’s Reports, supra note 10, at 125.
110
Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend, supra note 13, at 170.
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Id. at 172.
113
See Samantha Cowan, No Dog Left Behind: Pet-Friendly Domestic
Violence Shelter Makes It Easier to Leave, TAKEPART (Oct. 17, 2015),
http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/10/17/domestic-violence-pets
(“The institute’s findings support past studies, which have found that up
to 50 percent of women delay leaving abusive situations out of concern
for their pets.”).
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the deficiency (although that certainly would be a valuable
contribution). Regardless, however, it seems likely that
domestic violence victims who delay leaving an abusive
situation may actually be risking their own lives to protect
their pets, making animal sheltering a key concern for all
social workers and human services professionals.114
Having said that, this research on human domestic abuse
victims and their pets reveals that the humans are not the
only ones at risk in this situation. If a human victim of family
violence leaves a domestic violence situation without
securing the safety of a pet, the pet is at a significant risk of
abuse. In Flynn’s in-depth interviews with domestic
violence victims, he explored the fears that women had when
they were separated from their pets while at the domestic
violence shelter.115 Some women had been fortunate enough
to leave their pets with family or friends, while six were
compelled to give their pets away or take them to a local
animal shelter, which typically would require surrender of
ownership of the animals.116 Slightly over half of the women
had left their pets with their abusers.117 One of those women
worried that her husband was not feeding her dog, while
another received threats from her husband that he would take
their dog away from her.118 It is noteworthy, however, that
temporary fostering was open to these women, and Flynn
concluded that the women who deeply feared that their
abusers would hurt their pets put them in foster care before
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coming to the domestic violence shelter.119 Even though the
women who left their pets at home recognized that these pets
might be abused or neglected, they expressed guilt at taking
their pets away from abusers who also had also developed
relationships with the pets. 120 The psychological and
emotional impacts of the many disruptions in a violent
household are fraught with complexity.
C. Promising New Developments with Undesirable
Side Effects

In reaction to the grave dangers that develop due to
the lack of safe shelter for battered women’s pets, novel
arrangements are beginning to crop up to address the
problem. A growing number of domestic violence shelters
and social services organizations are taking part in efforts to
aid animals that are affected by domestic violence. 121
Domestic violence shelters have begun to welcome pets,
despite the practical and legal barriers to doing so. 122 In
Columbus, Ohio, social workers developed an innovative
program in which the pets of battered women are taken to a
women’s prison, where the inmates care for them.123 These
and other similar efforts should be encouraged and
supported. But until they are more universally and uniformly
available, other (potentially less desirable) options will
continue to play strong roles.
119
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Id. at 119–20.
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Faver & Strand, supra note 39, at 243.
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WASHINGTON POST, (Nov. 8, 2007) http://www.washingtonpost.com/
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SAF-T
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Feb. 2017).
123
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Significant among those options, community-based
sheltering in so-called “safe haven” programs may be the
most common, though not very widespread. Safe haven
programs typically are formed when domestic violence
shelters partner with “animal shelters, animal care and
control agencies, veterinary clinics, and private boarding
kennels” in order “to provide temporary housing for victims’
pets.” 124 Ascione’s 1999 survey identified 113 safe haven
programs nationwide, the youngest of which were still in the
conceptual phase 125 and the oldest of which had been
operating for ten years. 126 The animal welfare agencies
involved in these programs estimated that they sheltered a
total of 2,000 to 50,000 animals per year. 127 Safe haven
shelters are now more widely known and are more regularly
noted and currently documented by various organizations.128
This article focuses its core attention and proposal on pets
sheltered apart from their owners in safe haven programs.
The general attributes and operations of a safe haven
program are explained in the “Starting a Safe Havens for
Animals Program” brochure that is available on the website
of the Humane Society of the United States 129 and in the
“Safe Havens for Pets” brochure produced by Ascione. 130
The Humane Society brochure prefers that domestic
violence shelters serve as the “primary referring agency for
animals who require temporary foster care,” but it
encourages safe haven programs to consider accepting
referrals from other sources, such as the police and animal
shelters. 131 Personnel need to be available at all times for
animal intake because many domestic violence victims must
124
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flee their homes during the night.132 Moreover, the brochure
strongly suggests that veterinarians should immediately
check the animals.133 Safe haven programs commonly use
animal shelters, foster homes, veterinary clinics, and private
kennels to house the animals.134 In Ascione’s survey of safe
haven programs, for example, only three domestic violence
shelters (roughly 14% of the shelters interviewed) indicated
that they could shelter pets at their own facilities.135 Most
programs offer sheltering services for fourteen to thirty
days.136 Due to safety concerns and the stress of visits, it is
unadvisable to allow the human victim to visit her pet during
sheltering.137
The brochures also address procedures through
which the victims reclaim their pets. In many (if not most)
cases, the expectation is that the women and their pets will
move to a new home where they are more likely to be free
from abuse. However, some women decide to return to their
abusers. The Humane Society brochure acknowledges that
this outcome is “frustrating” and advises shelter personnel to
“educate the victim about the dangers of returning” to a
“potentially harmful situation.” 138 However, the brochure
does no more to elaborate on the serious risks that humans
and pets face when they return to an abusive home. Instead,
the brochure concludes that “the program will have to allow
the victim to reclaim the pet and return to the abuser if the
victim so chooses.”139
Ascione’s “Safe Havens for Pets” brochure reaches
the same conclusion.140 Ascione reminds us that “[l]eaving a
132
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batterer is often a process rather than a one-time decision”
and that “[w]omen should not be coerced into remaining
away from batterers by preventing them from retrieving pets
from a SHP program.” 141 He recognizes that this policy
sometimes produces “horror stories,” recounting an incident
where a woman came to the safe haven shelter with her
batterer to reclaim her pet. 142 Nonetheless, scholars and
social workers typically do not challenge the premise that
abused women should be able to reclaim their pets regardless
of their intentions. Moreover, as Part II illustrates, the law’s
conception of pets as personal property supports a domestic
violence victim’s right to reclaim her animal.
This article suggests that we should rethink this
assumption. By allowing domestic violence victims to
reclaim their pets and return with them to an abusive
household, safe haven programs perpetuate the cycle of
human and animal violence. The safe haven movement,
designed to solve a pressing social problem—ensuring the
temporary safety and welfare of pets of human abuse
victims—raises compelling philosophical, legal, and ethical
issues. However, a solution to this safe haven conundrum—
an issue at the intersection of the emotional and
psychological needs and legal rights of humans, on the one
hand, and the socio-legal aspects of animal protection, on the
other—may be possible. A potential solution lies in the
combination of traditional property and contract law
concepts with current legal and public policy support for
animal protection.
II. Animals, Property, and Rights: Legal Rules Relevant
to a Resolution of the Safe Haven Conundrum

If the law is to provide a solution to the safe haven
conundrum, it is important to understand current legal rules
141
142

Id.
Id. at 68.

[107]
107

Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
relating to animals. This Part identifies certain relevant legal
rules relating to animals and summarizes salient aspects of
the history and development of those rules. The Part also
makes certain observations about those legal rules in light of
their nature, history, and development.
A. Animals as Property in the Current Legal
Paradigm

Because pets are classified as property under the
current legal paradigm, a brief overview of certain elements
of property law is necessary to any disposition of the safe
haven conundrum.143 From a legal standpoint, property is a
bundle of rights related to a given object, making it a
fundamental organizing principle of any legal system. 144
American law traditionally treats animals as property in the
143

Property status has, of course, been an important part of the
conceptualization of animals for centuries, if not millennia. Aristotelian
and Stoic philosophies espoused teleological anthropocentrism—the
belief that the physical world was designed for use by humans, as
exemplified by the concept of the Great Chain of Being. Steven M. Wise,
How Nonhuman Animals were Trapped in a Nonexistent Universe, 1
ANIMAL L. 15, 19–24 (1995). Various developments—including, but not
limited to, the rise of modern science and the environmental
movement—have tempered enthusiasm for the notion of human
dominion over the natural world. Id. at 34–41. Nonetheless,
commentators continue to debate whether modern concepts such as
evolution truly detract from the position that human interests are superior
to animal interests. Compare Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property
Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 559–64 (1998) (arguing
that “[t]he gulf between humans and other animals evaporated in the
Darwinian revolution” and that “the ranking of humans in evolution”
does not “giv[e] humans special status and rights”) with CARRUTHERS,
supra note 74, at 143–45 (arguing that “human beings are continuous
with the rest of the natural world, having evolved, like any other species
of animal, through a process of natural selection,” but that only humans
are “rational agents” who deserve “direct rights”).
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same way that a book or chair is property.145 We can buy and
sell our pets, and they can also be the subject of bailment
agreements and the object of theft.146
Historically, states have viewed animals as “personal
property without any special value.”147 In 1857, for example,
a Tennessee court affirmed a human owner’s property rights
in a dog.148 With this mindset, some states were reluctant to
create a definition of “pet” or “companion animal” in their
statutory codes.149 The law typically “denies all justice to all
nonhuman animals”; legal rights inuring to an animal’s
benefit generally are exercised by the animal’s owner or
legal guardian or the state, while legal duties in relation to
an animal are owed to the animal’s owner or legal guardian
or the state via statute.150
145
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course of the time that this article was researched and written, the
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Yet, these conceptions of animals do not harmonize
well with the modern reality of pet ownership. As noted in
Part I.A.3, victims of family violence may describe their pets
as family members, echoing the mentality of many in society
at large. We view pets on an entirely different plane than we
view inanimate property.151 As Kathy Hessler suggests:
People do not plan memorial services, or
invest in serious medical treatment for their
books or lawnmowers. They don’t plan to
pay more in insurance premiums than the
purchase price or replacement cost of the
property they seek to protect. Individuals do
not leave money for their bicycles in their
wills, or seek visitation arrangements for
their televisions upon the termination of their
marriages. Yet individuals attempt to do all
these things and more for their companion
animals.152
Law, as the embodiment of social values, should reflect this
distinction.
Persistent social norms, however, sanction the
human domination of animals, which tends to create
to a nonprofit organization to commence a proceeding for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of two chimpanzees held as research subjects
but ultimately denying habeas corpus relief).
151
See, e.g., Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., 49 Misc. 3d at
766 (“[S]ome animals, such as pets and companion animals, are
gradually being treated as more than property, if not quite as persons, in
part because legislatures and courts recognize the close relationships that
exist between people and their pets, who are often viewed and treated by
their owners as family members.”); Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc. 3d 447,
451 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (“Where once a dog was considered a nice
accompaniment to a family unit, it is now seen as an actual member of
that family, vying for importance alongside children.”).
152
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ambiguity and ambivalence in prevailing legal structures. In
many cases, the law and legal process remain virtually
straitjacketed by the fact that animals are property, and
property cannot have rights.153 Animal cruelty is typically a
crime under state law,154 and our laws generally proscribe
unnecessary harm to animals. 155 Yet this proscription is a
weak form of protection, in part because of the way in which
we balance human interests against animal interests to make
a determination of necessary harm.156 In this balancing act,
“animals almost never prevail, irrespective of what might be
the relatively trivial human interest at stake and the relatively
weighty animal interest involved . . . .”157 Even where the
interests of animals may or should prevail, their abuse is hard
to detect, and the penalties for their abusers still pale in
comparison to penalties for some human violence or other
related crimes, compelling prosecutors to seek punishment
for something other than animal cruelty.158 While it may be
153
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the law presently categorizes entities in a simple, binary, ‘all-or-nothing’
fashion. ‘Persons have rights, duties, and obligations; things do not.’”).
154
See infra Part II.C.1.
155
See FRANCIONE, supra note 74, at 4.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Human violence often accompanies animal violence and is
punishable at higher felony levels. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13212(b) (2016) (stating that charge accompanying the least culpable
mental state for homicide, criminally negligent homicide, is punished as
a Class E felony) with id. § 39-14-212(d) (dictating the most severe form
of animal cruelty in Tennessee is punished as a Class E felony).
Furthermore, other violations such as tax evasion and gambling often
accompany cock and dog fighting, and penalties for those crimes are
more stringent. Compare id. § 67-1-1440(g) (criminalizing tax evasion
is a Class E felony) and id. § 39-17-504(c) (1989) (classifying
aggravated gambling promotion as a Class E felony) with id. § 39-14203(c)–(d) (categorizing dog fighting as a Class E felony, being a
spectator at a dogfight as a Class B or C misdemeanor, and cock fighting
as a Class A misdemeanor). Thus, scarce prosecutorial resources are
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easier to identify and successfully prosecute crimes other
than animal cruelty in some of these cases, the focus of
enforcement efforts on other criminal activity accompanying
animal abuse and away from animal abuse itself may tend to
reify and entrench perceptions that animals and animal abuse
are unimportant (or always less important than human life
and criminal activity—like tax evasion or gambling—
implicating only human victims). Legislative initiatives
defining domestic violence to include animal cruelty—
enabling prosecutors to file for either or both crimes159—
highlight the importance of animal welfare but may or may
not change these perceptions. In general, the legal
conception of animals as property drives, supports, and
embeds these and other related patterns in law enforcement
and the use of legal process. As a result, overall, a pure
property law approach to animals has increasingly proven
unworkable in a contemporary context.
B. Changing Perceptions of Animals in the Legal
Order

In light of increasing ethical, social, and legal tension
in balancing animal and human interests, commentators have
suggested a variety of new legal paradigms for pets.160 At
one extreme lies the “animal rights” perspective, which
suggests that we should remove property status from animals
often better spent on crimes other than animal cruelty. See Dog Fighting
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/dogfighting/
facts/dogfighting_fact_sheet.html?credit=web_id94655252 (last visited
Aug. 8, 2017) (noting that “[b]ecause dogfighting yields such large
profits, the penalties associated with misdemeanor convictions are much
too weak to act as a sufficient deterrent, and are simply seen as the cost
of doing business[]” and that dog fighting fosters other crime).
159
The National Link Coalition quotes and cites to the state statutory
definitions resulting from these initiatives in a document available at
http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/DV-CTAis-definition-of-DV-EA-2017-03a.pdf (last visited July 30, 2017).
160
Hankin, supra note 52, at 381–88.
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altogether, thus making them full-fledged legal rightholders. 161 Gary L. Francione, for example, rejects
accommodation with the traditional paradigm by framing the
issue as a choice between two polar opposites: animals “are
either persons, beings to whom the principle of equal
consideration applies and who possess morally significant
interests in not suffering, or things, beings to whom the
principle of equal consideration does not apply and whose
interests may be ignored if it benefits us. There is no third
choice.”162 According to Francione, improving the treatment
of animals within a property framework is insufficient—we
must instead recognize the moral significance of animals by
affording them “equal consideration.” 163 This standard
would apply to any animal that is sentient and can suffer.164
In practice, this framework would end the usage of animals
as “resources” so that the “institutional exploitation of
animals for food, biomedical experiments, entertainment, or
clothing” would cease. 165 Although the animal rights
perspective is both simple and, to many, compelling,
significant criticisms have been levied against it.166
161

Kelch, supra note 143, at 532.
Gary L. Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL
RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 131 (Oxford
University Press, Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. 2004)
(emphasis added).
163
GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR
CHILD OR THE DOG? 100–01 (Temple University Press 2000)
[hereinafter FRANCIONE, YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG?].
164
Id. at 82, 159.
165
Id. at 102. Francione does accept that “conflicts may require
accommodation of some sort” and that an animal’s legal rights may be
“overridden by appropriate moral considerations,” such as that a human
appropriately preferring to help another human over an animal “in
situations of true emergency.” FRANCIONE, supra note 74, at 4, 10; see
also FRANCIONE, YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG?, supra note 163, at 157–59.
166
Among other things, commentators find the comparison that animal
rights activists make between racism, sexism, and the current role of
animals to be “inappropriate,” “distasteful,” and not cogent, while also
arguing that the animal rights position devalues human life. For further
162
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A countervailing viewpoint advocates the status quo.
Animals have no rights beyond the “protections they have
incident to the economic, aesthetic, and humanitarian
interests of human beings. 167 The “aggregate” of human
characteristics, including “the ability to express reason, to
recognize moral principles, to make subtle distinctions, and
to intellectualize” makes “humans fundamentally,
importantly, and unbridgeably different from animals.” 168
Many advocates of this position argue that the social
contract, as the underpinning of our legal system, is
predicated on a consent of the governed that can only arise
from these unique intellectual capabilities. 169 Therefore,
exploration of these critiques, see David Schmahmann & Lori
Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for Animals, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 747, 757, 780 (1995). Comparisons between the current role of
animals in our society and ancient and modern slavery, as well as
analogies to societal prejudices against women and immigrants, are
common in the animal rights literature. See, e.g., Favre, Equitable SelfOwnership, supra note 144, at 477–78, 491; Kelch, supra note 143, at
534; Wise, supra note 143, at 16.
167
Schmahmann & Polecheck, supra note 166, at 759.
168
Id. at 752.
169
Id. at 754–55; see also CARRUTHERS, supra note 74, at 36, 194 (using
contractualism to argue that morality is “a human construction[] created
by human beings . . . to govern . . . relationships . . . in society[,]” and
that humans owe no direct moral duties to animals because animals do
not possess reason). Although some species have the ability to recognize
“the beliefs and desires of others,” rationality also requires “a conception
of social rules, and of what it might be for all to act under the same social
rules.” Id. at 139. Compare JAMES B. REICHMANN, S.J., EVOLUTION,
ANIMAL ‘RIGHTS,’ AND THE ENVIRONMENT 252 (Catholic University of
America Press 2000) (“The human’s rationality totally penetrates and is
suffused throughout his animality; it is not a distinct ‘quality’ added to
it. This union of rationality and animality clearly differentiates the
human from all other sentient beings whose animality is not a rational
animality.”) with Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights: Legal,
Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspectives, in ANIMAL RIGHTS:
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 57–58 (Oxford University
Press, Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. 2004) (arguing that
rights are not based on “cognitive capacity,” but instead that “legal rights
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only humans can directly benefit from the rights bestowed
by that social contract—the only practical measure of rights
is human interests. 170 The creation of full-fledged animal
rights would be an unprecedented and destabilizing shift in
our legal system that would demand the courts to enforce the
interests of a new and vague constituency.171 This viewpoint
ignores, however, how the current legal paradigm has
already proven insufficient to handle the modern role of
pets—an insufficiency that creates inefficiencies.
Furthermore, the Kantian social contract that is often
emphasized in this viewpoint is not the only justification for
rights.172
Finally, moderate activists urge a more nuanced
approach between these two rubrics. Although the most
radical animal rights advocates suggest changing pets’ status
“to one approaching that of persons,” many suggest we
should continue to conceive of pets as property, albeit with
some significant qualifications.173 Elimination of title in pets
are instruments for securing the liberties that are necessary if a
democratic system of government is to provide a workable framework
for social order and prosperity. The conventional rights bearers are with
minor exceptions actual and potential voters and economic actors.
Animals do not fit this description . . . .”).
170
Schmahmann & Polecheck, supra note 166, at 759, 760.
171
Id.
172
David Favre, Judicial Recognition of the Interests of Animals—A New
Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 333, 334 (2000). Various justifications for
human rights exist and are considered in the context of animals. See id.
at 335. Kant assigned rights due to the dignity arising from rationality
and self-awareness, but this conception has been criticized for excluding
humans who do not have full rationality, unless the species is considered
in the aggregate instead of individually. See also id. at 338 (stating that
legal analysis should be based on a balancing of “conflicting interests”);
Kelch, supra note 143, at 538–40 (the ability of a living being to
experience pain and suffering makes it worthy of certain moral
considerations); CARRUTHERS, supra note 74, at 13–26 (describing
theism, intuitionism, utilitarianism, and contractualism as possible bases
for moral duties).
173
Hankin, supra note 52, at 385.
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is “neither advisable nor feasible,” but it should be
recognized that a pet is not the same sort of property as is an
inanimate object. 174 Within this viewpoint, Carolyn
Matlack’s formulation of pets as “sentient property” has
garnered attention.175 Matlack’s definition encompasses any
animal that is warm-blooded and domesticated, recognizing
these animals as “living, feeling companions,” but not giving
them any status that approaches personhood.176
In a vein similar to Matlack, animal welfarists argue
that “it is morally acceptable, at least under some
circumstances, to kill animals or subject them to suffering as
long as precautions are taken to ensure that the animal is
treated as ‘humanely’ as possible.”177 This would involve a
balancing of human and animal interests within what tends
to be a utilitarian framework.178 Peter Singer argues that “we
should give equal consideration to similar amounts of
suffering, irrespective of the species (or order) of the beings
who suffer” so that consideration is based on the individual,
not the species.179 Furthermore, his framework suggests that
humans tend to deserve a “higher degree of consideration”
because our mental capacities make us capable of profound
suffering.180 Thus, animal welfarists show it is possible to

174

Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership, supra note 144, at 484, 495.
Hankin, supra note 52, at 386.
176
Id. Compare this approach to that of animal rights advocate Joan
Dunayer, who argues that all sentient beings “warrant full and equal
moral consideration.” JOAN DUNAYER, SPECIESISM 4 (2004).
177
FRANCIONE, supra note 74, at 6.
178
Id. at 6–7.
179
Peter Singer, Ethics and Animals, 13 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 45, 46
(1990).
180
Peter Singer, The Significance of Animal Suffering, 13 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCI. 9, 10 (1990) (“to be human is to possess certain
characteristics distinctive of our species, such as the capacity for selfawareness, for rationality, and for developing a moral sense . . . . It is not
arbitrary to say that beings with these capacities live fuller lives than
beings without them . . . .”).
175

[116]
116

Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
tout our unique human attributes while nevertheless
demanding better treatment of nonhuman animals.
David Favre has articulated a salient legal
compromise between property in animals and animal rights.
Favre’s approach, like ours, is rooted in traditional notions
of property law. He proposes that property interests in
animals be divided into legal and equitable aspects, with
legal title belonging to the human owner and equitable
interest belonging to the animal itself, providing the animal
with a hybrid form of self-ownership similar to a trust.181
The courts would balance the competing interests between
the legal title holder (the animal’s guardian) and the animal
(equitable owner of itself) in order to reach the fairest
outcome.182 Only the animal’s interests in fundamental lifesupporting activities would be considered. 183 With the
stronger legal standing available to the animal under this
legal framework, a more stringent and serious balancing of
interests would occur between human and animal.
C. Current Tensions Between the Legal and Social
Conceptualization of Animals

As suggested by the enthusiastic proponents of a
variety of new paradigms, there is increasing tension
between traditional legal conceptions of animals and the
change that is occurring in society concerning animal wellbeing. Despite welfare-oriented leaps forward in
jurisprudence, traditional legal conceptions of animals as
property persist; however, these conceptions become
progressively less descriptive and trenchant as the societal
interaction of animals and humans changes. As animals are
treated more like humans in society, animals are being

181

Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership, supra note 144, at 491–92.
Id. at 501.
183
Id. at 498.
182

[117]
117

Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
treated more like humans in the law. Both legislatures and
courts are part of this change momentum.
Specifically, with social realities—especially those
involving human bonding with pets—bearing down, the law
has shifted towards acknowledging animal welfare in several
major respects. First, statutes against animal cruelty have
proliferated and strengthened over the past several decades,
although enforcement may not always be vigilant. Second,
the law is shifting away from using fair market value as a
measure of damages in veterinary malpractice actions, pet
death cases, and emotional distress cases. Third, pet custody
battles are growing in number and ferocity, forcing a
reluctant legal system to address the issue.
1. Pets in Criminal Law: Animal Cruelty Statutes
Within the Framework of Property Rights

All states have statutes criminalizing animal cruelty,
and the level of concern in animal cruelty statutes is not
generally replicated for inanimate property.184 Furthermore,
the majority of states now categorize some forms of animal
cruelty as misdemeanors and even felonies instead of petty
offenses, whereas few states punished violators at the
misdemeanor and felony level in the early 1990s.185
184

Hankin, supra note 52, at 324. Some judicial reasoning treats animal
cruelty as a type of vandalism or as a charge that complements
vandalism. See, e.g., People v. Baldacchino, NO. C046420, 2005 WL
3249943, at *5 (Cal Ct. App. 2005) (noting that California has a general
vandalism statute that is followed by more specific statutes that include
topics such as vandalism of a church, certain types of damage to
buildings, and animal cruelty, and urging that charges should be brought
under one of the more specific statutes when possible); People v. GuidoSilva, NO. A106831, 2005 WL 2203274, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(considering a case where the defendant was charged with both animal
cruelty and vandalism in relation to the death of a race horse and holding
that to be guilty of vandalism, the defendant’s actions had to be a
“proximate cause of damage to or destruction of the horse”).
185
Hankin, supra note 52, at 367.
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In addition to these harsher penalties, offenders in
certain jurisdictions, including Tennessee, must forfeit
custody of the animals that were the subject of the
conviction. 186 In Tennessee, “any governmental animal
control agency, law enforcement agency, or their designee”
receives custody of animals seized under the animal cruelty
statute.187 Under Tennessee law, the court may also curtail
or prohibit the person’s custody of animals for a period of
time that it deems reasonable.188 In a 2005 North Carolina
case, the Animal Legal Defense Fund sued and gained
custody of dogs based on an anti-cruelty statute similar to
Tennessee’s statute. 189 This marked the first time that a
private organization was able to “enjoin an owner’s conduct
and gain the right to control the animals’ welfare” through
the use of an anti-cruelty statute.190 Thus, some of this state
legislation has made pets more akin to children in the eyes
of the law.
The tension between property and human treatment
is heightened in cases in which defendants charged with
animal cruelty use their right to property as a defense to the
search and seizure of the animals. Alleged perpetrators have
defended against animal cruelty charges on the basis that the
animals were seized during warrantless searches of the
defendant’s property.191 In order to avoid a property debate,
some courts focus on the evidentiary value of the animals
instead of their suffering, effectively meeting the
perpetrator’s property argument with a property-oriented
response. 192 When the animals are viewed primarily as
186

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-202(e) (2016).
Id. § 39-14-210(f).
188
Id. § 39-14-202(e).
189
Guben, supra note 147, at 68.
190
Id.
191
See Amie J. Dryden, Note, Overcoming the Inadequacies of Animal
Cruelty Statutes and the Property-Based View of Animals, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 177, 202 (2001).
192
Id. at 202–03.
187
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evidence (rather than the victim) of a crime, several
exceptions to the warrant rule come into play, such as the
plain view exception.193
Other exceptions to the warrant requirement place
more value on the animal’s life. Some courts have been
willing to proceed under the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement, which allows for
warrantless seizures when immediate action is necessary to
preserve life or evidence, thereby preventing the frustration
of an important governmental interest. 194 Although they
allow the seizure to stand, courts have hesitated when the
peril of a nonhuman animal, rather than a human, forms the
basis of the emergency.195
The Michael Vick case is a well-known—albeit
highly unusual—example of a custody transfer resulting
from animal mistreatment. It is therefore analogous to the
animal surrender and placement options available on a more
routine basis in other locales. Vick’s pit bulls were seized in
April 2007 based on suspicions of his involvement in a dog
fighting ring. 196 Although fighting dogs are usually
euthanized, animal sanctuaries and rehabilitation centers
throughout the country took custody of most of the pit bulls
after Vick agreed to pay almost a million dollars for their
evaluation and care.197 This outcome is anomalous and was
only available in this instance because Vick offered such a
large sum for the care of the animals.

193

Id.
Id. at 203.
195
Id. at 203–04.
196
Juliet Macur, Given Reprieve, N.F.L. Star’s Dogs Find Kindness,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A1.
197
Id. at A7.
194
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2. Pets in Tort Law: Moving Beyond Fair Market
Value When a Pet is Harmed or Killed

When a wrongdoer harms or kills a pet, the
traditional response by civil courts has been to award the
owner damages based on the fair market value of the animal,
which is often negligible (particularly if the pet is a mixedbreed animal or of unknown descent) and certainly pales in
comparison to the worth of the pet to the owner based on
value attributable to companionship and related emotional
attachment. 198 The traditional damages framework is
beginning to recede, however.199 Critics of that framework
argue that the use of a fair market value in calculating
damage awards, which emphasizes economic cost at the
expense of sentimental worth, leads to both “undercompensation and under-deterrence.”200 Because the value
of pets to many humans in the United States today cannot be
adequately represented in economic terms through a fair
market valuation, the availability of non-economic damages
is integral if the common law is to meet the tort goals of
“compensation, deterrence, and the reflection of societal
values.”201 For the legal system to remain relevant, common
law tort actions must keep pace with changing social
values.202
In 2000, Tennessee became the first state to provide
an owner with a statutory remedy for non-economic
damages in legal actions involving the death or injury of a
198

See Hankin, supra note 52, at 323; Lauren M. Sirois, Comment,
Recovering for the Loss of a Beloved Pet: Rethinking the Legal
Classification of Companion Animals and the Requirements for Loss of
Companionship Tort Damages, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 1199, 1202–03
(2015).
199
See Dryden, supra note 191, at 199.
200
Hankin, supra note 52, at 325 (internal footnote omitted).
201
Waisman & Newell, supra note 48, at 46.
202
Id. at 51 (quoting Dearborn Fabricating & Engr. Corp. v. Wickham,
532 N.E.2d 16, 17–18 (Ind. App. 1988)).
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pet.203 The relevant statute is known as the T-Bo Act, named
after a Shih Tzu owned by Tennessee Congressman (and
previously state senator) Steve Cohen. While in his yard, TBo was seriously injured by a large dog that was running
loose and died after “three days of frantic trips to the night
emergency clinic and veterinarian . . . .”204 After this loss,
Cohen realized that the damage awards for pets do not
correspond to the value of a pet’s companionship, prompting
him to introduce the T-Bo Act. 205 Cohen explained the
impetus for the bill by lamenting that the only damages
available to him upon T-Bo’s death were for “repairs, as if it
were a clock or desk” and for the cost of buying a similar
dog as a replacement.206 Thus, the T-Bo Act stipulates that
an owner can receive up to $5,000 in non-economic
damages 207 for “the loss of reasonably expected society,
companionship, love, and affection”208 when a pet is harmed
or killed. Tennessee’s statutory approach starkly contrasts to
the common law in states like New York, which does not
recognize “an independent cause of action for loss of the
companionship of a pet.” 209 The Tennessee statute is
particularly noteworthy because it recognizes the capability
203

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2000); Hankin, supra note 52, at
338.
204
Canine Loss Spurs New Law, ST. LEGISLATURES, (Oct. 1, 2000)
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/3756789/canine-loss-spursnew-law.
205
Elaine T. Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful
Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court and Legislative Action and a
Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L.
215, 225 (2003) (quoting Waisman & Newell, supra note 48, at 69–70).
206
Id. at 225 (quoting Waisman & Newell, supra note 48, at 70).
207
TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a) (2016).
208
Id. § 44-17-403(d). In pet death cases, courts in some states consider
how much the owner has expended on the pet in the past in order to gauge
how much the owner values the pet. See Hankin supra note 52 at 330–
31 (quoting Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 314 (Alaska 2001)).
209
Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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of animals to be pets and the tendency of humans to form
strong emotional bonds with those pets, thus beginning to
address some of the shortcomings of the traditional legal
paradigm which, as earlier noted, fails to recognize the
companionship function of animals by providing a definition
of “pet” or “companion animal” within the statutory law.210
While recovery under the T-Bo Act is limited in
terms of both the eligible claimants and the amount of
damages that may be awarded, it is nonetheless an
impressive and progressive first step. In 2003, Colorado
representatives introduced a bill that allowed for up to
$100,000 in damages for loss of pet companionship.211 The
bill was withdrawn, however, very shortly after being
introduced. 212 Since that time, state legislators have
continued to introduce, and some state legislatures have
passed, related legislation.213
The judiciary also has played a role in changing the
legal conception of animals as property in tort actions. In the
courts, we witness the same tension between old and new
views with which the legislatures contend. For example,
when grieving pet owners invoke the tort theory of
210

See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
Elizabeth Paek, Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family:
Dismantling the Property Classification of Companion Animals by
Statute, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 481, 518–19 (2003).
212
H.B. 03-1260, 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003); see
also, e.g., Gerald L. Eichinger, Veterinary Medicine: External Pressures
on an Insular Profession and How Those Pressures Threaten to Change
Current Malpractice Jurisdiction, 67 MONT. L. REV. 231, 255
(2006); Victor E. Schwartz and Emily J. Laird Non-Economic Damages
in Pet Litigation: The Serious Need To Preserve a Rational Rule, 33
PEPP. L. REV. 227, 249 (2006).
213
See Sirois, supra note 198, at 1203–04 (citing 510 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 70/16.3 (2014)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2016)); Julia
Fidenzio, Massachusetts to Allow Non-Economic Damages for Loss of
Pets, COMMITTEE ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW (Feb. 3, 2010),
http://nysbar.com/blogs/animalaw/2010/02/massachusetts_to_allow_no
necon.html.
211
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emotional distress or loss of companionship (consortium) in
litigation, they move firmly beyond the realm of fair market
value. Many jurisdictions struggle with the issue of whether
an owner may sue under the tort theory of emotional distress
if the distress arises from harm to a companion animal.214
Some jurisdictions allow recovery for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress upon the pet owner, but not
for negligent distress arising from harm to an animal. 215
These jurisdictions reason that “the affection of a master . . .
is a very real thing.”216 Other state courts disallow recovery
for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, reasoning that “owners cannot recover for
emotional connections to their property.”217
Despite the advent of statutes providing for noneconomic damages for harm to pets, pet owners or caretakers
may need or desire access to “private, civil measures which
deter wrongful acts and compensate the victims.”218 Among
other things, recoveries in these private actions may yield
larger damage awards against wrongdoers than these statutes
permit. For instance, while the T-Bo Act caps damages at
$5,000, some courts in other states have permitted
compensatory damages in emotional distress cases that are
ten times that amount.219

214

Hessler, supra note 152, at 44–45 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17403 (West 2000); Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 543, 546
(Wash. Ct. App. 2006)).
215
Waisman & Newell, supra note 48; Steven M. Wise, Recovery of
Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and
Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of A Companion Animal,
4 ANIMAL L. 33 (1998).
216
La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964)
(“the affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing”).
217
Waisman & Newell, supra note 48, at 65.
218
TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2016).
219
Id. § 44-17-403.
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3. Pets in Family Law: Pet Custody Battles

Pet custody battles also raise questions that implicate
the traditional legal conception of animals as property.
Kathy Hessler suggests that divorcing couples use mediation
to determine custody of their pets in order to avoid the court
system, which is often unsympathetic and refuses to mediate
between the parties concerning any sort of visitation rights
pertaining to pets. 220 Unfortunately, if private mediation
fails, the couple may nevertheless find themselves in the
courthouse. In a Pennsylvania case, for example, a divorcing
couple made a written agreement that purported to give
custody of the couple’s dog to the wife while reserving
visitation rights to the husband, although “[t]he ‘Agreement’
was never incorporated or merged into the Divorce
Decree.” 221 The ex-husband later sued when the ex-wife
violated this “Agreement.”222 In dismissing the complaint,
the trial court emphasized that “any terms set forth in the
Agreement are void to the extent that they attempt to award
custodial visitation with or shared custody of personal
property.”223 Most courts assert that disputes over pets are
simply property disputes, so that any consideration of the
“best interests” of the animal is inappropriate.224
If judicial reasoning continues to evolve, however,
courts may become sympathetic to parties filing claims for
the resolution of animal custody issues. For instance, Alaska
enacted a new statute in 2017 that permits courts to amend
divorce or marriage dissolution agreements to include
ownership of an animal, taking into consideration the wellbeing of the animal.225 Other state legislatures have followed
220

Hessler, supra note 152, at 49.
Desanctis v. Prichard, 803 A.2d 230, 231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). For a
discussion of this case, see Hankin, supra note 52, at 323.
222
Desanctis, 803 A.2d at 231.
223
Id. at 232 (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502).
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Paek, supra note 211, at 505.
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in proposing and passing similar legislation. 226 Tennessee
law may be evolving in this regard. In one Tennessee case,
for example, the judge ruled that dogs at issue in one dispute
should remain in the house and neighborhood where they
had spent their entire lives, echoing the type of reasoning
often used in child custody cases.227 The judge appeared to
be sympathetic to the views of many animal welfare activists
who urge that custody battles for pets should be “based on .
. . who has formed a closer bond to the animal, or who can
provide a better home for it,” 228 instead of focusing on
property ownership as determined through receipts for
purchase and veterinary care.229
Determining ownership of an animal for purposes of
custody disputes is often difficult. In cases involving married
parties, community property issues complicate already
murky applications of traditional property law. While the
assignment of ownership based on the best interests of the
in Marriage Dissolutions and Pet Protective Orders, THE LINK-LETTER
(November
2016),
at
1,
http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/LinkLetter-2016-Novem.pdf.
226
See, e.g., Patrick Anderson, Bill seeks to give pets a voice in R.I.
divorce cases + Poll, PROVIDENCE J. (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20170228/bill-seeks-to-givepets-voice-in-ri-divorce-cases--poll; Illinois Considers Pets’ Welfare in
Divorce Proceedings, THE LINK-LETTER (July 2017), at 10,
http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LinkLetter2017-July.pdf; Christopher Mele, When Couples Divorce, Who Gets to
Keep the Dog? (Or Cat.), N.Y. TIMES (March 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/us/divorce-pet-custody-dogcat.html?_r=0.
227
Ann Hartwell Britton, Bones of Contention: Custody of Family Pets,
20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 1, 15 (2006) (quoting Michael Lollar,
Who Gets Snoopy? Custody of Pets Can Be a Wrenching Issue in
Divorce, COM. APPEAL, Jan. 11, 1996, at 1C).
228
Hankin, supra note 52, at 387.
229
Britton, supra note 227, at 4 (quoting Ranny Green, ‘Legal Beagle’
Offers Problem-Solving Tips, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at H5
(quoting statements made by Linda Cawley, one the nation’s first and
pet law experts)).
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animal could be an appropriate method to resolve custody
disputes in domestic violence situations, 230 in most
jurisdictions, the traditional approach to ownership
determinations is still the law. Accordingly, traditional
property ownership concepts continue to be the basis for
educating abuse victims as they consider fleeing from a
violent home. For example, one informational sheet
published by The Humane Society of the United States
(“HSUS”) instructs battered women that they can prove
ownership of their pets by producing “[a]n animal license,
proof of vaccinations, or veterinary receipts” in their
names.231
D. Bailment and Damages for Conversion of Property
in a Safe Haven Context

Bailments involving animals raise particularly
thorny issues at the intersection of the traditional and
progressive conceptions of animals as property. Bailment is
the “delivery of personal property by one person (the bailor)
to another (the bailee) who holds the property for a certain
purpose, [usually] under an express or implied-in-fact
contract.”232 A bailment is neither a gift nor a conveyance of
title; the bailee takes possession of the property, but title and
230

Gentry, supra note 47, at 115 (citing Raymond v. Lachmann, 695
N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)). Yet, we must carefully avoid
standards that could result in ownership being assigned to the abuser,
such as if ownership were based on who had formed the closest bond
with the animal.
231
ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116, at A-66.
232
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Merritt v.
Nationwide Warehouse Co., 605 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)
(“A bailment is a delivery of personalty for a particular purpose or on
mere deposit, on a contract expressed or implied, that after the purpose
has been fulfilled, it shall be re-delivered to the person who delivered it
or otherwise dealt with according to his direction or kept until he
reclaims it.”); 1 TENN. JURIS., Bailments § 2 n.18 (2004) (providing a list
of Tennessee cases that affirm this definition).
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the right to recover possession remain with the bailor. 233
Thus, Tennessee law (like the law of other U.S. jurisdictions)
holds that property delivered by a bailor to a bailee “shall be
re-delivered to the person who delivered it or otherwise dealt
with according to his direction or kept until he reclaims
it.”234 The bailor has a cause of action against the bailee for
conversion if the bailee “fail[s] or refus[es],” inconsistent
with the bailment contract, “to return [the property]. . . .”235
Tennessee also recognizes that while a bailment is
contractual in nature (centering on an express or implied
agreement between the bailor and the bailee) a legally valid
and enforceable contract is not required to create a legally
valid and enforceable bailment. 236 For instance, a quasicontract might suffice, and a bailment may be created by
operation of law in certain circumstances. 237 There are
various types of bailment. Of particular importance in
animal care is a gratuitous bailment for the benefit of the
bailor, which is in the nature of a caretaking arrangement for
the property of the bailor in which “the bailee receives no
compensation.”238
Animals involved in bailments are typically treated
the same way inanimate, insentient property is treated, in
accordance with the traditional conception of animals as
property.239 Pet owners enter into myriad bailment situations
concerning their pets (including by, for example, leaving a
pet at a veterinary hospital for a surgery or boarding a pet at
a kennel during a vacation). Many of these arrangements are
bailments for the mutual benefit of the bailor and the bailee,
since the bailee receives compensation for services that
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (9th ed. 2009).
Aegis Investigative Group v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson
County, 98 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
235
8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 239 (2014).
236
Aegis Investigative Group, 98 S.W.3d at 163.
237
Id.
238
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (9th ed. 2009).
239
FRANCIONE, supra note 74, at 52.
233
234
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include the bailment. 240 Of particular importance to this
article, a human victim of domestic violence enters into a
bailment arrangement (a gratuitous bailment for the benefit
of the bailor) when she asks a safe haven shelter to house
and care for her pet for a limited amount of time while she is
in a shelter that admits only humans. The solution we offer
in Part III of this article works with this property law
conception.
Bailments involving animals, like custody battles
involving animals, raise issues about ownership; bailors are
typically owners or agents of owners, while bailees often
want to ascertain the bailor’s ownership before accepting the
subject property for safekeeping. Significant uncertainty
exists in this area of the law as applied in this context, as
revealed by the responses in Ascione’s survey of shelters
that provided services for the pets of domestic violence
victims.241 After a brief description of responses he received,
Ascione concluded that “specific recommendations are not
possible given the current lack of consensus about how to
deal with pet ownership issues.”242 The lack of clear legal
guidance Ascione observed persists and does a disservice to
both human and nonhuman victims of violence.
Ascione’s specific findings revealed different levels
of awareness and various understandings of pet ownership
questions. One animal shelter in Ascione’s survey indicated
that ownership only became an issue if pets were not
reclaimed or would otherwise need long-term
arrangements.243 Most shelters reported that they informed
women that they would lose ownership of their pets if they
failed to reclaim them at the end of the agreed-upon
sheltering time, many even requiring the women to sign a
46 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 4 (1998).
See ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116 and accompanying text.
Proof of ownership of personal property can be tricky.
242
Id. at 40.
243
Id. at 38.
240
241
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form acknowledging this possibility. 244 Some shelters
assumed that the animal became the property of the shelter
upon entry, which indicates a possible misunderstanding by
the shelter of the nature of a bailment; while other shelters
thought that they would have to return the pet to the abuser
if he came for it.245
Moreover, shelters surveyed by Ascione were split
on whether a woman could relinquish a pet when she was a
co-owner or the abuser was the sole owner of the animal.246
Among the animal shelters that responded to Ascione’s
survey, 30% believed that a co-owner could relinquish a pet,
while 40% believed that she could not.247 Under the law, in
a cotenancy of either real or personal property, cotenants
have “unity of possession” under “more than one distinct
title” so that each cotenant has full title and the right of
possession, making it so that no cotenant can exclude any
other cotenant from the property.248 Accordingly, if a pet is
co-owned by a victim of domestic violence and her abuser,
neither, alone, can relinquish ownership of the pet.
Legal ownership is especially important in the safe
haven sheltering context when a victim and her abuser
contest pet ownership and a shelter must decide upon a
course of action. A woman can relinquish a pet or place it in
a sheltering program if she is the sole legal owner. 249
However, legal ownership of an animal is not always easily
discerned, which could have ramifications when a victim of
violence attempts to remove a pet from an abusive home or
when the pet is being sheltered.
Ownership in the safe haven context is a combined
issue of law and fact that may require judicial resolution.
244

Id. at 36.
Id. at 38–39.
246
Id. at 38.
247
Id.
248
20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 1 (2014).
249
ASCIONE, SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116, at 40.
245
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Exclusive possession over an extended period of time creates
a rebuttable presumption of ownership. 250 But in a typical
domestic violence situation, abusers, human victims, and
pets are living together in a single household. Legal guidance
is sparse when the animal in question has been in the
possession of both parties who claim ownership. In a case
involving a prized show dog that was being shown by the
defendants with the plaintiff’s permission, an Illinois court
found that a certificate of registration that listed the
defendants as co-owners created only a presumption of coownership that was rebutted by the “demeanor of witnesses”
that suggested that the plaintiff had never intended to
relinquish sole ownership of the dog when the certificate was
created.251 Thus, written documents are not a foolproof way
to establish ownership. A legal determination as to
ownership could depend instead on other facts and the
credibility of the parties in asserting them.
Current law provides so little guidance in part
because of the paucity of judicial opinions in this area of the
law in a safe haven or analogous context. Few Tennessee
cases have dealt with bailment in an animal abuse situation.
One noteworthy case, however, is Largin v. Williamson
County Animal Control Shelter. In Largin, Williamson
County officials seized animals from the plaintiff’s home as
part of animal abuse proceedings that the state had initiated
against her. 252 The plaintiff was eventually convicted of
animal abuse 253 and subsequently initiated a proceeding
against the animal shelter when it refused to return the
animals to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that, by refusing
to return the animals, the defendant animal shelter

250

Beard v. Mossman, 19 A.2d 850, 851 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1941).
Buczkowicz v. Lubin, 399 N.E.2d 680, 682 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
252
NO. M2005-01255-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2619973, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 12, 2006).
253
State v. Siliski, 238 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007).
251
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committed conversion and/or negligent bailment. 254 The
trial court dismissed the case on a technical matter based on
a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted,255 because the complaint did not allege that the tort
was caused by a government employee behaving negligently
within the scope of his employment as is required under
Tennessee law. 256 In reviewing the matter, the appellate
court (like the trial court) never reached the validity or
enforceability of the bailment itself. Instead, it affirmed the
lower court’s dismissal based on the procedural
requirements of Tennessee law.257
As inadequate and incomplete as property law may
be in this context, it continues to govern the legal
relationship between humans and their pets. As a result,
under current safe haven arrangements, a human domestic
violence victim (as bailor) who shelters her animal in a safe
haven program (as bailee) has a legitimate expectation under
the law that she will recover possession of her animal on
request. This arrangement exists solely for the benefit and
subject to the control of the human victim. The health,
welfare, and overall interests of the nonhuman animal,
objectively determined, are not accounted for in current
bailments of this kind. This creates a conundrum for the safe
haven: even if safe haven shelter or social services
professionals reasonably believe that an animal is in danger
of being abused if he or she is returned to the owner,
bailment law provides that the animal must be returned. This
legal conclusion troubles us and motivates this article.
We have determined that public policy and legal
considerations provide a basis for rethinking the way in
which bailment relationships between domestic violence
254

Largin, 2006 WL 2619973, at *1.
Id. at *2.
256
Id. at *4 (citing Gentry v. Cookeville Gen. Hosp., 734 S.W.2d 337,
339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)).
257
Largin, 2006 WL 2619973, at *4–5.
255
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victims and safe haven shelters are constructed. Documented
connections between human and animal violence have
focused attention on the need to include animals in the
equation as a component and resolution of the family
violence problem (or at least as a means of mitigating the
effects of family violence).258 The legal system already has
reacted to this phenomenon with the inclusion of animals in
protective orders, an increase in criminal penalties for
animal abuse, and the adoption of human-animal abuse
cross-reporting statutes.259 In addition, the law has begun to
react to the changing nature of the human-pet bond by
providing for non-economic tort damages for the death of a
pet. 260 Because bailment agreements are contractual, it is
possible to better incorporate this changing socio-legal
landscape into bailment relationships between human
domestic violence victims and safe haven shelters. Part III
explores this idea under the laws of the State of Tennessee,
the state in which we are licensed to practice. Analogous
arguments may be persuasive in other U.S. jurisdictions.
III. Special Bailments as a Solution to the Safe Haven
Conundrum
A. A Proposal and its Legal Basis

Because bailments are in the nature of contracts, the
bailor and bailee may create a “special bailment.” While a
general bailment requires that the property be “redelivered
upon request,” in a special bailment the “delivery to the
bailee is upon some condition or term, or stipulation
affecting and operating upon the redelivery.” 261 If a pet258

See supra Part I.A.4.
Id.
260
See supra Part II.C.2.
261
1 TENN. JURIS., Bailments § 2 (2004); see also Aegis Investigative
Group v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 98 S.W.3d 159,
162–63. (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added) (“A bailment is a
259
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owning human domestic violence victim and a safe haven
shelter together agree that the victim’s pet will be cared for
by the shelter for a temporary period and that the shelter will
return the pet, subject to the fulfillment of a specified term
or the satisfaction of an express condition, that conditional
bailment agreement should be enforced if challenged in
court.
Exceptions to a court’s enforcement of a special
bailment agreement of this kind under Tennessee law may
include contract formation or enforcement defenses or
public policy considerations. For example, the lack of legal
capacity of the bailor pet owner (because of minority status
or sufficiently impaired mental capacity) may render the
bailment agreement void or voidable. 262 In addition, the
court may not enforce a safe haven bailment agreement: if
the bailor pet owner enters into the agreement under legally
recognized duress or subject to undue influence 263 or is
parted from her animal as a result of fraud; 264 if the
delivery of personalty for a particular purpose or on mere deposit, on a
contract expressed or implied, that after the purpose has been fulfilled it
shall be re-delivered to the person who delivered it or otherwise dealt
with according to his direction or kept until he reclaims it.”); Merritt v.
Nationwide Warehouse Co., 605 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)
(same); Rhodes v. Pioneer Parking Lot, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tenn.
1973) (same).
262
See Lowery v. Cate, 64 S.W. 1068, 1070 (Tenn. 1901) (noting that
infancy is a good defense to a claim of breach of contract).
263
See Reed v. Allen, C/A NO. 1153, 1988 WL 90185, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Aug. 30, 1988) (describing an application of the duress and undue
influence claim under Tennessee law).
264
The effect of fraud on contracts and other transactions in Tennessee
has been described as follows:
Fraud vitiates and avoids all human transactions, from
the solemn judgment of a court to a private contract. It
is as odious and as fatal in a court of law as in a court
of equity. It is a thing indefinable by any fixed and
arbitrary definition. In its multiform phases and subtle
shapes, it baffles definition. It is said, indeed, that it is
part of the equity doctrine of fraud not to define it, lest
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agreement is found to be unconscionable;265 or if the conduct
between the parties gives rise to a valid claim of estoppel.266
In most cases, the availability of these formation and
enforcement defenses can be limited by effective controls on
the actions taken by the bailor and bailee.
Valid and binding contracts typically are enforced in
Tennessee consistent with public policy.
Unless a private contract tends to harm the
public good, public interest, or public
welfare, or to conflict with the constitution,
laws, or judicial decisions of Tennessee, it
the craft of men should find ways of committing fraud
which might evade such a definition. In its most
general sense, it embraces all “acts, omissions, or
concealments which involve a breach of legal and
equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, and
are injurious to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another.” A
judicial proceeding in rem, while generally binding
upon all persons, is no more free from the fatal taint of
fraud than a proceeding in personam, or an individual
contract. When once shown to exist, it poisons alike
the contract of the citizen, the treaty of the diplomat,
and the solemn judgment of the court.
Smith v. Harrison, 49 Tenn. 230, 242–43 (Tenn. 1871) (internal citation
omitted).
265
In our view, the defense of unconscionability is unlikely to be raised
(or, if raised, survive a motion for summary judgment) in a court action
involving safe haven bailment agreement, since the bargain between the
pet owner and the shelter is not likely to be so one-sidedly favorable to
the shelter—or oppressive to the pet owner—that a court could find the
agreement unconscionable. See Haun v. King, 690 S.W.2d 869, 872
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (describing, in similar terms, the
unconscionability defense in Tennessee) (citing Hume v. United States,
132 U.S. 406 (1889); Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y.
1977)).
266
See Callahan v. Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1954) (setting forth the elements of an equitable estoppel claim) (citing
19 AM. JUR. Estoppel § 42).
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does not violate public policy. The reverse is
also true: A contract with a tendency to injure
the public violates public policy.267
In determining the sources of Tennessee public policy, the
Tennessee Supreme Court has stated
[p]ublic policy in Tennessee “is to be found
in its constitution, statutes, judicial decisions
and applicable rules of common law.”
Although the determination of public policy
is primarily a function of the legislature, the
judiciary may determine public policy in the
absence of any constitutional or statutory
declaration.268
Public policy in Tennessee supports the use of a
special bailment as a solution to the safe haven conundrum.
Property rights are strong in Tennessee, but Tennessee law
has evolved to incorporate animal welfare into legal
questions involving pets in domestic violence situations.
Specifically, the Tennessee constitution provides “[t]hat no
man shall be . . . deprived of his . . . property, but by the
judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”269 However,
the Tennessee General Assembly and Tennessee courts have
provided that human animal owners may be deprived of their
animals under certain circumstances. For example, human
subjects of protective orders in Tennessee may be
267

Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn.
1991) (internal citations omitted) (citing Home Beneficial Ass’n v.
White, 177 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tenn. 1944); Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v.
Lawson, 229 S.W. 741, 743 (1921); Holt v. Holt, 751 S.W.2d 426, 428
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)).
268
Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Tenn. 1998) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 112 n.17
(Tenn. 1975)).
269
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8.

[136]
136

Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
dispossessed of some or all of their ownership rights in a
family pet. 270 Moreover, a person convicted under
Tennessee’s animal cruelty statutes may be required by the
court to forfeit possession and ownership of the subject
animal.271 In these cases, the court also “may prohibit the
person convicted from having custody of other animals for
any period of time the court determines to be reasonable, or
impose any other reasonable restrictions on the person's
custody of animals as necessary for the protection of the
animals.” 272 In State v. Webb, the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the
reasonableness of the trial court’s imposition of a ten-year
prohibition on ownership of any animals by the defendant, a
person convicted of animal cruelty. 273 Moreover, as the
background provided in Parts I and II of this article amply
shows, Tennessee law is evolving to incorporate animal
welfare concerns in a variety of contexts—especially those
involving pets, including pets in domestic violence
situations.274
Accordingly, we propose that safe haven shelters
enter into written bailment agreements 275 that expressly
270

TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-3-606(a)(9) (2016).
Id. §§ 39-14-202(e), -212(e) (2016).
272
Id. § 39-14-202(e) (2016); see also id. § 39-14-212(e) (2016) (“The
court may prohibit the defendant from having custody of other animals
for any period of time the court determines to be reasonable, or impose
any other reasonable restrictions on the person's custody of animals as is
necessary for the protection of the animals.”).
273
130 S.W.3d 799, 838–39 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).
274
See, e.g., supra notes 207 & 208 and accompanying text.
275
Many safe haven shelters already use written agreements to settle
ownership of the pets during sheltering. In Francione’s survey, for
example, fourteen safe haven shelters (66.7% of the survey) had a policy
providing that owners of sheltered pets “would lose custody or
ownership of their pets if they failed to retrieve [them].” See ASCIONE,
SAFE HAVENS, supra note 116. At six of the shelters (30% of survey),
“ownership was formally transferred to the animal welfare agency” upon
the commencement of sheltering, while at three other shelters (15% of
271
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condition the return of pets to their owners on an objective
determination that the pet is not returning to a household that
puts the pet at significant risk of physical, mental, or
emotional harm. 276 That objective determination may be
made by the shelter itself or by an independent third party
(acting in the nature of “animal protective services” or a
guardian ad litem) and, in either case, should be based on
information supplied to it in good faith by or on behalf of the
owner in accordance with an established protocol. Because
shelter personnel may be considered to be interested parties
in the decision-making process (perhaps having formed their
own human-animal bonds with the pets under their care), it
is preferable that an independent third party be designated to
make the risk determination. The decision maker, the timing
and nature of notices between the parties, the standard
governing the decision, the evidentiary burdens, and the rest
of the decision-making process should be delineated
expressly in the written bailment agreement. The shelter
should determine its own release policy.277 Existing forms of
bailment used in this context can be modified to include a
condition of this kind.
survey), pets were re-licensed so as to no longer appear in the woman’s
name. Id. at 37–38.
276
The condition is intended to be a tailored analog to court
determinations of the “best interests of the child” in legal proceedings
involving child welfare. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION
GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (2016),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/best_interest.pdf (summarizing
the standard for “best interests” and its definition and use in various
states); Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, Your Client's
Rights (noting that a parent may lose rights to a child “involuntarily if
the Judge of a Chancery, Circuit or Juvenile Court finds there are legal
grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best
interest.”) (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
277
To help in creating that policy, we recommend reviewing and
considering the general information provided id. at 36–40 (describing the
results of Ascione’s study pertaining to owner knowledge of release
policies and pet ownership issues upon release).
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The procedure employed by safe haven shelters to
effectuate the special bailment should be carefully designed
and executed in a manner that best ensures the agreement
will be determined to be valid and enforceable if challenged.
Accordingly, we recommend that the safe haven shelter, at a
minimum, engage in the following steps in entering into and
exercising its rights under the bailment agreement:
• The safe haven shelter should ensure that the pet
owner who signs the agreement has the legal capacity
to enter into a contract. She must be of the requisite
age and have the requisite mental competence under
applicable state law in order for a court to determine
her to have the requisite legal capacity. 278 Obtain
documentary proof, if it is available or can be
obtained.
• Similarly, shelter personnel should ensure that the
pet owner does not feel threatened or intimidated into
signing the agreement by any words spoken or
actions taken directly or indirectly by the safe haven
shelter or any intermediary (e.g., a social worker
working with the pet owner).
278

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(2) (1981)
(stating that a “natural person” has “full legal capacity to incur
contractual duties” unless she is: “under guardianship,” an “infant,”
“mentally ill or defective,” or “intoxicated”); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 31
(“It is essential that the parties to a contract have the capacity to contract.
. . . The capacity to contract involves a person’s inability to understand
the terms of an agreement, and not his actual understanding.”); 17 C.J.S.
Contracts § 175 (“The test of mental capacity to contract is whether the
person in question possesses sufficient mind to understand, in a
reasonable manner, the nature, extent, character, and effect of the act or
transaction . . . . [T]o invalidate his contract . . . it is sufficient to show
that he or she was mentally incompetent to deal with the particular
contract in issue.”); Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991) (stating that “[n]o published Tennessee authority is found
which defines degree of mental capacity required to invalidate a
contract,” but quoting with approval the above language from 17 C.J.S.
Contracts § 133(1)(e) (now 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 175)).
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•

The pet owner and representatives of the shelter
should discuss and document all facts about violence
to the pet, threats made against the pet, violent
behavior directed toward the pet, in addition to basic
health and care information.
• Shelter personnel should read and describe the
standards associated with release of the pet to the
owner.279 Clarify that the animal may not be returned
to the owner under the circumstances outlined in the
agreement and that the owner surrenders ownership
of the pet to the shelter under those circumstances.
Offer standard examples of situations that allow for
return of a pet to its owner and of situations that do
not allow for return.
These steps (and, as necessary or desired, others specific
to the shelter) should be set forth in a written protocol
that is used by the shelter each time it enters into a safe
haven agreement with a pet owner. Other steps specific
to the pet owner and related circumstances may be
added to the protocol in discrete cases. Any additions of
this kind should be documented in writing and included
with the file for the resulting agreement.
B. Possible Extralegal Concerns with the Proposal

We readily acknowledge that the proposal we outline
in Part III.A is not without drawbacks. Paramount among
them are the effects of the agreement (and the execution of
its terms and provisions) on the mental and emotional state
of the human pet owner—a victim of domestic violence. In
addition, our proposal may raise personal and professional
concerns for the social workers serving these domestic

279

Of course, the shelter should review all of the terms of the bailment
with the pet owner to ensure that she understands all aspects of the
arrangement.
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violence victims. This section briefly addresses these two
anticipated critiques of our proposal.
Based on the touching human-pet bond described
supra Part I, one could argue that it is in the human victim’s
best interests to retain full ownership of—and complete
control over the residence of—her pet. Often, the pet is the
only source of unconditional love and constancy that the
woman has.280 Furthermore, research on domestic violence
has revealed that leaving a domestic violence situation is a
process, meaning that these human victims rarely make a
sudden and complete break from their abusers. In a study
conducted in 1983, for example, 50% of the victims who fled
to a shelter returned to their abusers.281 Instead of seeing this
return as a “failure[],” however, the authors of the study cast
the stay at the shelter as “part of the process of gaining
independence.” 282 These women return to their violent
homes with new insights and knowledge, so that the time at
the shelter was in fact quite useful.283 One could therefore
argue that it would be detrimental for these women to lose
their pets in this situation. Perhaps some women would
refuse to come to the shelter at all, denying themselves a
chance to begin the process of growth and understanding that
could ultimately help them leave their abusive situations.
Even when safe havens and abuse victims create valid
special bailment agreements, a victim could experience a
host of unhealthy reactions if the situation were to develop
so that the victim had to relinquish her pet. These unhealthy
reactions could include an increased sense of isolation, anger
toward the safe haven system, or distrust of the social
workers tasked with helping these abuse victims. For these
280

Flynn, Symbolic Interaction, supra note 49, at 113.
Kathleen J. Ferraro & John M. Johnson, How Women Experience
Battering: The Process of Victimization, 30 SOC. PROBS. 325, 336
(1983).
282
Id.
283
Id.
281

[141]
141

Summer 2017 | Volume 12 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
and other reasons, we appreciate that a special bailment
might not be the best option for every abuse victim and that
the invocation of the special bailment would need to be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
The process suggested in our proposal also may put
additional pressure on social workers working with victims
of family violence and create tensions with their obligation
of confidentiality to their clients. Clinical social workers
typically have stressful jobs.284 Studies find that the stress
social workers suffer may subject them to a significant risk
of secondary post-traumatic stress disorder.285
Social workers who provide services for domestic
violence victims may experience unique types of stress,
including vicarious traumatization. 286 The unhealthy
physical and emotional reaction to the stresses of clinical
social work and related fields—which is associated with
secondary post-traumatic stress disorder and vicarious
traumatization—has also been termed “compassion
fatigue.”287 This term was first used to describe “burnout in
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See generally CHARLES R. FIGLEY & ROBERT G. ROOP, COMPASSION
FATIGUE IN THE ANIMAL-CARE COMMUNITY 2 (2006) (describing how
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nurses exposed to traumatic work-related experiences” 288
but has now also been applied to doctors, social workers,
veterinarians, and animal shelter workers. Their work
requires these professionals “to feel the emotional needs and
experiences” of their clients (human or animal), but this
empathic response makes the caregiver susceptible to
trauma. 289 Symptoms of compassion fatigue include “[a]
sense of powerlessness,” “fear,” “numbness,” and the feeling
of being on “[a]n emotional roller coaster.”290
Compassion fatigue is the result of “prolonged
exposure to suffering” coupled with “traumatic memories”
of “unresolved conflicts and distress” related to the suffering
of clients.291 A study of animal-care workers conducted by
the HSUS between 2003 and 2004 found that about 68% of
animal shelter workers surveyed were at “high” or
“extremely high” risk of developing compassion fatigue,
which could manifest itself through symptoms such as selfdoubt, numbness, fear, depression, hyper-vigilance, and
sleep disturbances.292 Similarly, a 2008 survey conducted by
the National Association of Social Workers indicates that
25% of social workers in child welfare/family practices
“experience sleep disorders,” 37% report psychological
problems, and 65% suffer from fatigue. 293 Undoubtedly,
social work and related fields produce highly stressful work
environments. Accordingly, when reasonable, efforts should
be made to avoid creating new policies that would further
burden these workers.
288
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Moreover, social workers, like psychologists and
attorneys, have a professional obligation to keep client
relations and communications confidential absent consent
from the client or other compelling professional reasons.294
Tennessee law treats this confidential information as
privileged to the same extent that psychologist-patient and
attorney-client confidences are privileged. 295 In all
likelihood, a pet owner who chooses to place her pet in safe
haven under our proposed form of special bailment would
need to give consent to her social worker to supply necessary
information to the person charged with determining whether
the owner’s pet can be returned to her under the terms of the
bailment agreement (the shelter or the third-party decision
maker). 296 Under applicable ethical rules governing social
workers, this requires that the social worker inform the
client, “to the extent possible, about the disclosure of
confidential information and the potential consequences,
when feasible before the disclosure is made.” 297 Workers
must offer this information in addition to general counseling
about “the nature of confidentiality and limitations of
clients’ right to confidentiality.”298 Although there is some
precedent in the cross-reporting context for exempting
NAT’L ASSOC. SOC. WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS § 1.07 (1996)
[hereinafter NASW CODE OF ETHICS].
295
See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-105 (providing for attorney-client
privilege), 63-11-213 (providing for psychologist-patient privilege) &
63-23-109 (providing for social worker-client privilege); Kirchner v.
Mitsui & Co., 184 F.R.D. 124, 126 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
296
The express exception allowing for disclosure of confidential
information does not strictly apply here, since the “serious, foreseeable,
and imminent harm” anticipated under the conditional bailment is not “to
a client or other identifiable person,” but rather to a pet. See NASW
CODE OF ETHICS § 1.07(c) (“The general expectation that social workers
will keep information confidential does not apply when disclosure is
necessary to prevent serious, foreseeable, and imminent harm to a client
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certain communications from these confidentiality
strictures,299 the management of confidential information is
already complicated and burdensome for social workers, and
a special bailment like that proposed here would add to that
complexity and burden.
C. Potential Extralegal Benefits of the Proposal

Yet, the proposal we make in Part III.A also may
assist social workers and their clients in dealing with the
difficult circumstances and decisions emanating from
domestic violence. For example, the existence of a special
bailment may provide the social worker with a means of
helping the client to relieve additional stress associated
with providing care to a pet as he or she attempts to better
care for herself and may provide the social worker with
healthy additional leverage in communications with client
victims of domestic violence. This section addresses these
two potential benefits.
First, the removal of the animal victim from the cycle
of violence could reduce the emotional trauma for both
human and non-human victims. Domestic violence victims
experience an emotional roller coaster that is similar in
origin and manifestation to the phenomenon known as
compassion fatigue, as described above in Part III.B. Several
studies, for example, have described the “climate of fear”
299
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experienced by the victims of violence.300 One study found
that women who chose to go to a shelter were actually more
fearful than their counterparts who were not at shelters.301
Women who reach out for help—the sort of women who
shelter their pets while they themselves are in a shelter—are
in a state of extreme fear. Battered women have been
described as being in “a numbed shock,” while they may also
experience a wide and varying range of emotions ranging
from happiness and excitement to anger and fear.302 These
emotional reactions raise questions about the ability of these
human victims to care for their pets and may suggest that, at
least in certain circumstances, the separation of human and
pet could help break the cycle of fear and numbness or
otherwise provide some emotional relief.
Similarly, the special bailment agreement could
provide healthy leverage that hastens the human victim
along the path of emotional evolution that will ultimately
compel the victim to leave the violent situation. Before
victims become willing to sever a violent relationship, they
must move from rationalization of the violence—a stage
where the victims view the violence as “normal, acceptable,
or at least justifiable”—to victimization, a stage where “a
variety of catalysts” have forced the victim to “redefin[e]
abuse” and no longer regard the abuse as acceptable.303 The
catalysts that lead a victim to stop rationalizing the violence
include: “a [sudden] change in the level of violence[,] . . . a
change in resources [for the victim,] . . . a change in the
relationship [with the batterer,] . . . [the onset of] despair[,] .
. . [an increase in the public nature of the violence,] . . . and
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[being confronted with] external definitions of the violent
relationship.”304
The possible removal of a pet could trigger several
of these dimensions of the victimization stage. One obvious
example would be with respect to “the interjection of
external definitions of abuse.” 305 Ferraro and Johnson
describe how victims react positively to “genuine concern”
shown to them by others. 306 This reasoning could be
extended to a situation that involves the potential removal of
the pet. The removal of the pet would highlight the level of
concern that is felt by outside observers of the situation,
which in turn might alter the paradigm in which the human
victim views the violence. Similarly, despite a lack of
“systematic research,” researchers emphasize that a child’s
desire to leave an abusive situation has a dramatic impact
upon a mother in her contemplation of leaving a violent
home. 307 Although pets cannot vocalize desires to leave
abusive circumstances, the forced relinquishment of the pet
could be analogous to a child’s request not to return to a
violent home.
Women often are propelled to act when they reach a
point of despair and lose all hope that a situation will
improve. 308 Observers note that the victim must hit rock
bottom before she will leave a domestic violence
situation.309 The possible or actual relinquishment of a pet
could push a woman closer to the realization that she herself
is a victim and that her situation will not improve unless she
removes herself from the violent household. Specifically, a
social worker could use the special bailment agreement as a
tool in educating a domestic violence victim to the danger of
304
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returning herself, as well as any dependent children or
nonhuman animals, to a violent household. Many social
workers express frustration that they cannot adequately
portray to domestic violence victims the risks associated
with a return to the very household in which they
experienced
violence. 310 The
assessment
and
communication of potential harm to both children and pets—
as well as potential harm to the victim herself—may help a
victim of domestic violence in assessing the merits and risks
of returning to a living situation in which violence can be
expected.
To confirm what we earlier stated, we appreciate that
our special bailment proposal is not an airtight solution or
panacea for all of the problems associated with animal abuse
and domestic violence in a safe haven setting. Nonetheless,
we believe that implementation of our proposal could be
another way to help “move the ball down the field.” If save
haven shelters and social workers were given the tools and
ability to actively and realistically consider special bailments
as an option to implement on a case-by-case basis, the mere
act of thinking through the utility and appropriateness of the
bailment alternative could, itself, have a positive impact on
specific cases and on the overall state of human and animal
welfare.
Conclusion

The issues involved in family violence situations are
multifaceted. As we learn more about them and begin to
work at resolving them, additional issues present themselves
for resolution. In the past twenty years or so, a number of
these emerging issues have arisen out of our increasing
awareness of the link between animal violence and human
310
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violence in the home. As humans have developed closer,
family-like relationships with their pets, these animals have
been unmistakably and unwittingly brought into the cycle of
family violence. Among other things, we now know that all
of these living, sentient beings are at risk of harm as
dependents or cohabitants of a perpetrator of domestic
violence.
Both the social service system and the law have
responded to changes in the social and moral conception of
animals and their role in family violence. The development
and operation of safe haven programs for the pets of
domestic violence victims who are transitioning temporarily
to shelter life is one of those responses. Overall, the
installation of safe haven shelters for pets in these
circumstances has been a positive development. However,
the potential that a domestic violence victim will reclaim her
pet and return the pet to a violent household highlights a
shortcoming in the social services system’s response to
family violence: nonhuman animal family members are left
without advocates in the process. Although domestic
violence victims and their children are assisted and protected
by specialized counselors, the pets in these households
continue to be treated not as family members but rather as
inanimate, insentient property under the control of an owner.
While this has been the historic legal conception of pets, law
has begun to acknowledge that this conception is outdated
and incomplete.
We suggest that practices, in addition to positive law,
need to evolve further to protect pets involved in family
violence situations and disputes. In particular, we propose
that safe haven shelters use a conditional bailment when they
take in and care for the pets of domestic violence victims.
This bailment would prevent return of the pet to its owner if
the pet would be at significant risk of physical, mental, or
emotional harm. Through the condition and the essential
related procedures, animals that have witnessed or been
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victims of domestic violence receive some protection—
protection at a level commensurate with their position as
nonhuman family members.
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